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Abstract 
The informational efficiency of financial markets is the most debated topic of financial 
economics. Asset price formation in the absence of new market relevant information is 
described as a puzzle unresolved by standard economic theory. This thesis asks if this puzzle is 
simply a case of missing information. If there is market relevant information in existence, which 
has been identified by market agents, but not discerned by economists.  
Traders/Investors have prior expectations for the outcome of future market relevant information 
events (subsequently termed ‘priors´). Such priors relate to the scope, scale, timing and 
probability of an upcoming information event. These priors play a significant role in the price 
formation process upon the arrival of the expected information event.  
Priors are updated frequently by individual investors concurrently with information flows 
which may change the individuals’ expectation of the upcoming high scope information event. 
Such changes to priors alter the fundamental valuation of a given asset and can be considered 
completely in line with rational expectation hypotheses. The subtle changes to the priors of a 
few market agents alone is not enough to result in a large-scale price formation process. 
However, an information event sufficiently absorbed by a large number of market agents, which 
results in an alteration to prior’s en masse, will significantly alter the weighted average 
valuation of a given asset sufficiently that a large-scale price formation process should be 
observable.  
This research identifies a database of market relevant information, in the form of market 
rumours, broadcast by market agents and commentators. This information by nature is not 
published or archived by the incumbent and regulated financial information sources such as 
Reuters and Bloomberg, thus potentially missed by research economists.  
Empirical results of this thesis show that at intraday observations of market price, large scale 
and persistent volatility events are observable at the time of rumour broadcast. The 
instantaneous increase in volatility during the first minute of rumour arrival is up to 211%, 
while the cumulative increase in volatility over a 60-minute window is as much as 2614%. Such 
large-scale volatility events had previously been attributed to ‘noise’ or private information 
flows.  
Further findings show that large excess returns in the run-up to central bank announcements 
can be attributed to market rumours dispersion. Such pre-announcement excess returns had 
been observed in the past but unexplained in the literature. Results show that trading on the pre-
announcement rumour for 10 days per year can generate almost 100% greater return than 
holding the market portfolio on all other days of the year. 
The thesis also documents the existence of a new price formation process undocumented in 
the literature. Empirical results identify the existence of large excess returns in the day 
following European Central Bank (ECB) announcements but only when the day is a Friday. 
This is termed ‘the ECB conditional Friday effect’. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Economic theory dictates that financial market prices should remain at equilibrium unless new 
market fundamental information becomes available. This new information may become 
available to the public or be privately acquired by an individual or a small group of market 
agents. The information may be scheduled, that is, the time of its release is known by the public 
but its content/scale of information is unknown prior to its arrival. The information may also 
be unscheduled, that is, the arrival and the content, scale and scope of the information is 
unknown ex-ante.  
The magnitude of the correction toward the new equilibrium occurring as a result of an 
information event should be directly related to the amount by which the new information 
changes the fundamental valuation of the market traded asset. Fundamental valuation may 
change due to the scope (e.g. central bank policy announcement), the content (e.g. interest rate 
policy), the scale (e.g. deviation from current interest rates), and the probability content (e.g. 
forward guidance) of the information event. Further, the magnitude of price deviation from 
equilibrium also depends on the degree to which new information deviates from expectations 
(e.g. deviation from analyst forecasts).  
The complete and instantaneous incorporation of new market relevant information into market 
price is considered to be an efficient price formation process. Further, the deviation of market 
price from equilibrium without the detection of new fundamental information is considered to 
be an inefficient price formation process. This economic principle is formalised as the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis by Fama (1965). 
It is the observation of large deviations of market prices from equilibrium in the absence of new 
information that lead the strongest critiques of the notion of informationally efficient financial 
markets. It is the central focus of this thesis to investigate market price deviations from 
equilibrium occurring in absence of new market information, such price formation processes 
are often deemed ‘puzzles’ of financial economics. The central question posed in 
commencement of this research is whether such price formation processes occur independently 
and are therefore ‘puzzles’, or, does an information set exist which is detected by market agents 
but not yet identified by academics? Further, is such an information set sufficiently influential 
to alter the fundamental valuation of market traded assets? As a result, can a price formation 
process be detected upon the arrival of new information of this kind? 
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Eugene Fama’s (1965) Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) is among the most empirically 
analysed theories of economics. In its most strict form, Fama’s hypothesis contends that for a 
financial market to be considered efficient, available information, private or public about the 
past, present or future must be priced. A more relaxed version of his hypothesis (Fama (1991)) 
contends that a market can be considered ‘semi-strong’ efficient if all known public information 
is priced. The least strict form of the EMH considers a market to be ‘weakly’ efficient as long 
as current prices reflects all information priced in the past. The large-scale interest in testing 
this hypothesis is unsurprising given that an efficient financial market is one of the cornerstones 
of a functioning market driven economy. Inefficiencies in the financial markets of such 
economies can be catastrophic, as evident during the recent financial crisis which had led to a 
prolonged period of economic decline, followed by stagnation in most major developed 
economies. The financial crisis, after all, at its most fundamental level, can be considered a 
result of informational inefficiency in financial markets.  
The informational efficiency of financial markets has proponents and opponents in abundant 
measures. Empirical examination of financial market price during times of new public and 
private information arrival is abundant. Results of such analysis predominantly show support 
for the EMH, with evidence pointing to weak form efficiency (lack of autocorrelation 
persistence and profitability for technical traders, Jensen (1978)), semi-strong form efficiency 
(new public information is immediately priced, Andersen and Bollerslev (1997)) and strong 
form efficiency (private information is priced as evidenced by order flow, Li et al. (2009)). 
Proponents point to excessive price variation, both in the first and second moment, in the 
absence of new fundamental information as evidence of informational inefficiency in the 
financial markets. Price formation processes such as the January Effect (Rozeff and Kinney 
(1976)), Monday Effect (Kamara (1997)), asset price bubbles (Shiller (2003)), over and under 
reaction to new public information (De Bondt and Thaler (1985)) and the price to earnings ratio 
effect (Fama and French (1995)) are considered as repudiations to the notion that financial 
markets are informationally efficient. 
More recently policymakers and academics have turned their attention to financial market 
‘functionality’ (see ECB (2012)) and O’Hara (2003)). Financial market functionality is 
fundamentally dependent upon a complete price discovery process and sufficient liquidity 
provisions. Liquidity provision is defined as a market agent’s ability to buy and sell assets 
without, individually, having a large impact on price (Hasbrouk (2009)). A complete price 
discovery process is defined as the integration of new public and private information, 
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instantaneously, in price (O’Hara (2003)). Therefore, for a market to be considered functional, 
it should also be informationally efficient under the strictest definition of the EMH.  
According to this definition of financial market functionality, the abundant price formation 
puzzles identified by proponents of the EMH would suggest that a large number of financial 
markets may be defined as dysfunctional. Such price formation puzzles, are solved 
incrementally with wider access to market relevant public and private information databases 
and the availability of intraday and ultra-high frequency observations of market price.  
Alternative trading windows such as intraday price observations and overnight trading periods 
have been examined to show that increasing amounts of excess price variability can be 
attributed to new public information arrival (Andersen and Bollerslev (1997)). The nature of 
new public information, in terms of scale, relevance and surprise has also been tested to account 
for increasing amounts of excess price variability (Faust et al. 2007)). The structure of public 
information arrival has also been examined. For instance, unscheduled monetary policy 
announcements have been shown to have a significantly greater impact on price than scheduled 
announcements (Kuttner (2001)). A large number of financial markets have been examined, at 
various frequencies of price observation during heterogeneous public information events, to 
unravel the structure of the instantaneous and cumulative price response (see among others, 
Andersen et al. (2003)).  
Proponents of efficient markets lend support from the existence of private market relevant 
information to explain the remaining unexplained price formation processes. Recently, the 
existence of price formation resulting from private information, has been documented by using 
order flows (see among others O’Hara (2003), Evans and Lyons (2002) and Li et al. (2009)). 
Such periods of private information driven order flow have been characterised as increasing the 
inherent informational risk in the market, thus leading to excess return premiums required to 
compensate market participants. A risk premium driven price formation process seems 
plausible and this price discovery process has gained traction in the recent literature. However, 
questions have been posed as to whether private information flows can completely explain the 
existence of large scale return and volatility events. After all, the value of private information 
to market agents is maximised if they trade incrementally on such information and do not shock 
the market with orders capable of causing large scale price formation events (Cespa and 
Foucault (2013)).  
Progressively, price formation puzzles, investigated with more sophisticated datasets and 
methodologies are converging to the definition of a complete price discovery processes. 
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However, significant large scale price formation processes exist in the financial markets that 
cannot as yet be fully explained by the arrival of new fundamental information detected by 
academics (Andersen et al. (2007), Groß-Klußmann and Hautsch (2011)). 
This thesis contributes toward the price discovery literature by providing further support to the 
idea that informationally driven price formation processes are recurrent and a key feature of 
financial markets. The fundamental assertion of this thesis leans on the notion that market 
agents have priors (Fleming and Remolona (1999)). Traders/Investors form prior expectations 
for given outcomes of future market relevant information events (subsequently termed 
‘priors´). Such priors relate to the scope, scale, timing and probability of an upcoming 
information event. These priors play a significant role in the price formation process upon the 
arrival of the expected information event. A realised information event which significantly 
deviates from the weighted average expectation (e.g. analyst forecasts) is shown to have a 
greater impact on market price than one which is largely in line with the weighted 
average/consensus expectation (see among others, Kuttner (2001), Faust et al. (2007)). 
Similarly, the price impact is of greater magnitude if the realised information event is of 
fundamental scope. An example of this would be scheduled central bank policy announcements 
(Andersen et al. (2007)).  
Priors are updated frequently by individual investors concurrently with information flows 
which may change the individuals’ expectation of the upcoming high scope information event. 
Such changes to priors may alter the fundamental valuation of a given asset and can be 
considered completely in line with rational expectations hypotheses. The subtle changes to the 
priors of a few market agents alone is not enough to result in a large-scale price formation 
process. However, an information event sufficiently absorbed by a large number of market 
agents, which results in an alteration to prior’s en masse, will significantly alter the weighted 
average/consensus valuation of a given asset sufficiently so that a large-scale price formation 
process should be observable.  
This thesis posits that such expectation altering information events occur frequently and when 
such information is pertaining to large scope macroeconomic news events, the price impact 
could be large scale. The impact could be of such scale that the resulting price formation process 
may be deemed a puzzle, if the expectation altering information events go undetected. 
The assertion in this thesis is that a Bayesian updating process of traders’ prior expectations is 
taking place in the pre-announcement period, prior to large scope macroeconomic news events. 
Such updating is posited to be as a result of new information, perhaps public, which has been 
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detected by market agents but not by academics. The information is therefor, not private but 
also not public in the regulatory sense. That is, it is not published and/or archived by mandated 
outlets such as Bloomberg or Reuters. Should the content of such information change the 
weighted average expectation of market agents, about the scale, probability or timing about the 
forthcoming large scope central bank announcement, then pre-announcement price formation 
process should be observable. 
This thesis identifies a dataset of prior altering information events and shows empirically that 
contemporaneous and persistent large-scale intraday price volatility is dependent on the arrival 
of such information events at intraday observations of price. Further, this dataset is employed 
to solve an existing price formation puzzle identified by Lucca and Moench (2015). The central 
bank pre-announcement positive drift in returns previously identified as a pre-announcement 
risk premium can be explained with the existence of prior updating information events. This 
research also identifies a unique, central bank announcement conditional day-of-the-week 
effect. This price formation process could be considered a pricing puzzle however, applying the 
central hypothesis of this thesis to this price formation process allows for an intuitive 
explanation based on the notion of expectations updating.  
The remainder of the thesis presents the central theoretical hypothesis, along with empirical 
evidence in support. 
Chapter 2 investigates a new source of market relevant informational flow that is discerned by 
market agents but not yet identified by academics. The advent of social networks has enabled 
the identification of ‘market rumours’ and this has rarely been the subject of discussion within 
the price discovery literature, as until the introduction of Twitter and similar financial micro-
blogging sources, these elements whilst known to market participants were not available as a 
database for investigators. It is this largely neglected category of information which is of most 
interest to this study. These rumours are essentially chatter, broadcast by market agents and 
commentators on the microblogging website Twitter.com. The information is therefore public 
and archived, timestamped and fully observable to both academics and market agents. 
I suggest that rumours about expected future market events, circulating publicly, are prior 
altering information events. Rumours by nature are difficult to pinpoint in time and rational 
expectations theory would suggest rumour information to be of little fundamental importance 
to the pricing of assets. It is therefore understandable that this type of information has been 
overlooked in the past. However, it is fair to posit that if rumours sufficiently alter the 
perceptions held by market participants of a given future market event, they become 
fundamental to the pricing mechanism. Rumours of forthcoming European Central Bank (ECB) 
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actions, dubbed ‘ECB sources’, which are broadcasted regularly by ‘in the know’ market 
commentators are observed. All such broadcasts are timestamped to within one-minute 
accuracy which alleviates the difficulty of pinpointing the arrival of a rumour in time. 
Moreover, the unique nature of Twitter as a broadcasting mechanism is that, commentators are 
not subject to stringent financial regulatory body mandates and in-house substantiation filtration 
systems. This fundamentally differentiates Twitter from incumbent financial news 
broadcasters, such as Bloomberg and Reuters, which have in the past been the source of new 
timestamped market information for studies testing the asset price impact of new information 
(see, among others Li et al. (2015)). 
The arrival of 63 ‘ECB sources’ rumours broadcast on Twitter is pinpointed, to within one-
minute accuracy, during a 420-day sample period of one-minute frequency spot Euro-US dollar 
exchange rates. I show, using Anderson and Bollerslev’s (1998) Flexible Fourier form 
regression, that there is a significant increase in the volatility of exchange rate returns following 
the arrival of 25 out of 63 ‘ECB sources’ rumours. The empirical results suggest that in the 
foreign exchange markets, market participants actively seek rumour information pertaining to 
market relevant ECB announcements. The consideration of such actionable information in the 
price formation process makes it possible to explain a greater proportion of asset price volatility.    
In Chapter 3, I explore the potential effect of rumours on financial market price formation in 
the central bank pre-announcement period. Results show that stock market excess returns are 
significantly large and positive in the 24-hour trading period immediately before scheduled 
monetary policy announcements. These excess returns are particularly observable in recent 
years, between 2011 and 2015, during which the European Central Bank (ECB) has exercised 
policy measures considered to be accommodative. This finding is in line with observations of 
a similar pattern in pre-announcement price formation found by Lucca and Moench (2015) for 
trading windows prior scheduled FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee). However, given 
the findings of the previous chapter I ask: Is the central bank pre-announcement anticipatory 
effect simply as a result of new public information flows which have previously gone 
undetected?  
I expand the data set from Chapter 2 to six years of observations for ‘ECB sources’ stories 
broadcast on Twitter and corresponding stock and currency intraday return observations. 
Employing the same model as Lucca and Moench (2015), pre-ECB return windows are isolated 
and tested for excess returns above other non-pre-ECB trading periods. Empirical results show 
that average excess returns earned on the stock market index, in the 24-hour trading window 
immediately prior the 55 ECB Governing Council’s scheduled policy announcements are 
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statistically significant and substantially higher than all other days. The implication is that the 
pre-announcement drift is also observable in European markets pre-ECB windows. This 
contrasts with Lucca and Moench (2015) findings that show the pre-announcement drift is only 
observable for scheduled FOMC announcements, with no specific pattern occurring for other 
central banks. I conjecture that this is simply due to the sample period under scrutiny. Their 
sample period concludes in 2011, whereas the sample period here is from November 2010 
through November 2015. It is fair to suggest that the major changes in the ECB’s balance sheet, 
policy mandate and expansion of policy tools from 2011 onwards may be, in part, the reason 
behind their divergence in results.  
Importantly, further empirical results show that the pre-announcement drift is rumour 
conditional and less puzzling than previously assumed. This result is in line with the most 
compelling case put forward by Lucca and Moench (2015) for explain the ‘drift’. In fact, they 
suggest that investors could be subject to more complex information flows than those detected 
in standard theory. In this chapter, I assert that such information flows include the arrival of 
new publicly available information in rumour form pertaining to forthcoming policy actions. 
These rumours have the standard theoretical effect of an ensuing risk adjusted price formation 
process 
In Chapter 4, I explore the currency market price formation process in the central bank post-
announcement period. Findings show that the immediate EUR/USD exchange rate response to 
European Central Bank (ECB) schedule policy announcements is in line with the standard 
economic theory formalised through the Efficient Market Hypothesis (see Fama (1970)). The 
Euro area currency experiences large negative excess returns in the immediate (5-minute) 
period following Central Bank Monetary Policy announcements which are deemed to be mostly 
accommodative throughout the sample period under scrutiny. This finding is unsurprising, 
given that it is simply the anticipated financial market response to new and relevant, public 
information.  
The main finding of this Chapter, however, is in stark contrast to that professed by standard 
asset pricing theories. I document large, significant negative excess returns on the EUR/USD 
spot exchange rate on the day following scheduled ECB policy decision announcements. This 
pricing anomaly only takes place on Friday trading days which follow scheduled ECB 
announcements taking place on Thursdays. When the day-of-the-week following an ECB 
announcement falls on a Thursday then no pricing anomaly can be observed. I define this ECB 
Friday pricing anomaly as the ‘ECB conditional Friday effect’. Overall, these findings present 
a price formation anomaly which is conditional on a prevailing scheduled ECB policy decision 
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announcement and that the trading day following the announcement must fall on a Friday. 
Several explanations are explored for this conditional price formation process. 
The initial intuition is that such a uniform post-ECB negative drift must be a result of new 
public information arrival. However, findings in this chapter show that scheduled public 
information events observed on days following scheduled ECB announcements, are 
heterogeneous in macroeconomic data type and report both Euro negative and positive 
information. Thus, I conclude that the intuitive reasoning based on standard asset pricing theory 
cannot be used to explain the ECB conditional Friday price formation process.  
Due credence is also given to a second argument; that this ECB conditional Friday effect is one 
linked to findings presented in market microstructure literature. This literature finds that Friday 
afternoons in multiple markets experience higher levels order flows, volume and short selling 
(see among others, Ralando et al. (2012)). In this context, the hypothesis could be that large-
scale profit taking and closing of positions occurring after a larger impact public information 
event are the determinants of the ECB conditional Friday effect. The magnitude of the average 
excess negative return on the EUR/USD following scheduled announcements is over 20 basis 
points. Therefore, this argument is also dismissed given that post-ECB scheduled 
announcement immediate market reaction is likely to be short positions in the EUR/USD, the 
covering of which would result in an opposite directional Friday price effect than that observed 
in the empirical results.  
The most intuitively persuasive reason for the ECB conditional Friday effect is simply a risk-
weighted liquidation of long positions in the Euro prior to Friday market close. The intuition 
being that traders, cautious of weekend news relating to an already dovish ECB during a 
predominantly policy easing cycle, would not be willing to stay long the currency over the 
weekend following ECB announcements. Further, ECB Governing Council members, who are 
mandated to a quiet period prior to scheduled announcements, tend to make frequent comments 
and clarification to the world press during the days following ECB meetings. Following 
predominantly dovish ECB announcements in the sample, such comments may be deemed by 
traders to be likely to have a Euro negative impact on post-weekend market open. Therefore, a 
conclusion can be drawn that traders, long the currency on post-ECB Fridays, are likely to make 
a risk-weighted decision to cut their positions. And, traders short the currency, are likely to 
make the risk-weighted decision to remain short. This conclusion comes with a caveat; that the 
strength of this argument is very much linked to the intuition underpinning rational risk-
weighted investor/trader behaviour. Thus, the ECB conditional Friday effect is, in part, still a 
pricing puzzle worthy of further investigation. Chapter 5 concludes this thesis. 
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Chapter 2. Trade the Rumour 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The excess volatility puzzle is one of the foremost unanswered questions in financial 
economics. The Efficient Market Hypothesis in all its guises has offered theoretical and 
empirical backing to the notion that security prices vary as a result of new information arrival. 
A large number of studies, however, have shown that such flows of market relevant information 
cannot fully explain the large volatility observed in financial markets. Many scholars, however, 
argue that such excess of volatility can be explained by the existence of private information 
(see, among others, French and Roll 1989). A competing explanation comes from behavioural 
finance, and it is based on the idea of irrational investors as a solution to the ‘excess volatility 
puzzle’. The existence of excess volatility, within this school of thought, is ascribed to the 
existence of noise, technical and speculative investors (see, among others, De Long at al. 1990). 
Both of these competing paradigms struggle to offer tangible evidence of the determinants of 
excess of volatility. ‘Noise’ and private information are, in fact, particularly difficult to pinpoint 
in time, source, scale and scope.  
In this chapter, I define a tangible alternative source of excess financial market volatility, a part 
of the puzzle previously unaccounted for by economists but discerned by market participants. 
More specifically, I pinpoint the source, timing, scale and scope of sixty-three financial market 
rumours relating to upcoming European Central Bank (ECB) policy actions and 
announcements. I assert that such rumours are neither private in scope nor noise in relevance. I 
define financial market rumours as actionable information, broadcast on Twitter, by multiple 
market commentators. I suggest this is information to be considered for trade execution, given 
a probabilistic change in market participant’s expectations of future ECB policy decisions, thus 
leading to a change in market consensus. 
As long as enough number of market participants discerns a particular rumour as having a high 
enough probability to occur, then a period of market volatility should be observable. The 
empirical findings of this chapter show that out of 63 ECB rumours under scrutiny, 25 result in 
a significant and positive impact on foreign exchange volatility. The instantaneous increase in 
volatility during the first minute of rumour arrival is up to 211%, whereas the cumulative 
increase in volatility over a 60-minute window is as much as 2614%.   
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) suggests that financial asset prices reflect all 
information relevant to the value of a given traded security. In its strongest form, the EMH 
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dictates that relevant information, regardless of whether it is in the public domain, or held 
privately, will be reflected in market price. Given this assertion, asset price fluctuations should 
reflect the arrival of new information about relevant market events that have already occurred 
or are expected to occur in the future. This notion has resulted in a large body of research testing 
the informational efficiency of financial markets. A large number of studies have investigated 
the market impact of the arrival of macroeconomic news (Andersen et al. 2000, Cutler et al. 
1989, Menkhoff 2010, Berry and Howe 1994, Andersen and Bollerslev 1997, Cai et al. 2001, 
Chang and Taylor 2003, Bauwens et al. 2005, etc.). One strand of this literature focuses on the 
directional change in asset prices following news arrival, while the remainder measure asset 
price volatility following news arrival (Li et al. 2015). The latter is of greater relevance to this 
study. At lower frequency daily observations, French and Roll (1986), Barclay et al. (1990) and 
Ito et al. (1998), find that a relatively small amount of daily asset price volatility can be 
attributed to the arrival of new public information. They all conjecture the existence of private 
information among ‘informed market agents’, as the reason behind the remaining unexplained 
asset price volatility. However, any evidence of the existence of such private information is 
ambiguous, as opposed to being pinpointed in time with a given source.            
The availability of higher frequency intraday data has yielded more insightful results. Andersen 
et al. (2000), Cutler et al. (1989), Menkhoff (2010), Andersen and Bollerslev (1997), Cai et al. 
(2001) and Chang and Taylor (2003), all find that a larger proportion of price variability can be 
attributed to the arrival of new information. There remains a consensus, however, that volatility 
attributable to the arrival of new public information is low when compared to that of their 
respective samples. Andersen and Bollerslev (1997), in particular, discover a distinct periodic 
intraday volatility pattern where the magnitude of return variability is consistently correlated 
with variations in market activity. They suggest, in line with French and Roll (1986), that the 
greater variability in returns during periods of heightened market activity is evidence of price 
adjustments due to the existence of private information.1 More recently, scholars have 
increasingly focussed on studying the formation of price prior the arrival of new information. 
Bauwens et al. (2005), Andersen et al. (2007), and Groß-Klußmann and Hautsch (2011) have 
found heightened levels of volatility in stock, bond and currency markets prior to the arrival of 
new scheduled and unscheduled public information. Bauwens et al. (2005), draw upon these 
findings to give further empirical support to the notion that private information triggers price 
                                                             
1 Periodic volatility patterns during periods of heightened market activity can also occur as a result of market microstructure factors such as 
systematic periods of increased order flows (Groß-Klußmann and Hautsch 2011).  
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adjustments prior to market information becoming public. Despite this growing body of 
literature, questions remain over the plausibility of the notion that a sizable majority of excess 
price variation occurs due to private information arrival. After all, by nature, private information 
is likely to filter relatively slowly into price and not to produce large price deviations - as 
suggested by price discovery authors (see, among others, Andersen and Bollerslev 1997 and 
Bawuens et al. 2005). While it is fair to acknowledge the existence of private information and 
a resultant price formation process, the idea that private information is the main - or one of the 
main determinants - of financial market volatility, is not entirely plausible.           
The literature testing the informational efficiency of financial markets has traditionally divided 
new information into four broad categories. The first consists of the arrival of new scheduled 
public information named structured information. Information of this type becomes available 
in the market at a pre-specified time. New structured public information is generally about 
market events that have occurred in the past. An example of this type of information would be 
macroeconomic data released by a government body.  
The second is the arrival of new unscheduled information named unstructured information. This 
type of information does not have a pre-specified arrival time, and it is generally about market 
relevant events that have already occurred. An example of this type of information would be 
the announcement of a profit warning.  
The third type consists of privately held information, which is assumed to circulate among a 
small group of ‘in the know’ market agents. Information of this type is generally about a market 
relevant event due to take place in the future or which has already taken place, but of which the 
public are unaware. An example of this type of information would be insider knowledge of an 
upcoming takeover.  
The fourth type consists of market rumours. The financial market impact of this type of 
information has been explored to a lesser extent. This is in part due to the ambiguous nature of 
rumours and difficulty in acquiring timestamped historical datasets of rumour arrival.  Pound 
and Zeckhauser (1990) were among the first to consider the price effect of market relevant 
rumours by considering takeover stories published in financial newspapers. They found that 
speculative stories of potential mergers and acquisitions published in the Wall Street Journal 
result in significant changes in the ‘price trends' for the acquired firm's equity, during the pre-
acquisition windows. Similar findings of rumour conditional equity price variation have been 
presented by Zivney et al. (1996), Gao and Oler (2012) and Chou et al. (2015). More recently, 
Ahern and Sosyura (2015) carry out more in-depth analysis of similar rumours published in the 
12 
 
mainstream financial U.S. press. They find stock prices of rumoured takeover targets are 
rumour conditional and that such price movements are unconditional of the accuracy of the 
reported rumour. There is, therefore, substantial empirical evidence pointing to a rumour 
conditional stock price effect. 
The above literature finds evidence that rumours pertaining to firm-specific factors - such as 
takeovers, earnings reports, hiring and firing – have a role in the price formation process. This 
finding is in part supportive of the findings in this chapter. At an elementary level, they all show 
that rumours, irrespective of realised accuracy have a market price impact.  However, the 
findings presented in the literature fail to show the real-time price formation effect of rumours. 
This is usually due to rumour datasets not containing timestamps to a high enough frequency. 
Moreover, the rumours studied are all pertaining to firm-specific factors and it would be valid 
to suggest that the role of firm-specific rumours is limited given that they amount to 
idiosyncratic noise in the wider market context, which based on fundamental financial theory, 
can be diversified away in any long run return window.   
There is very limited research into the systematic influence of rumours on macro-markets. 
Oberlechner and Hocking (2004) show - using questionnaire and interview data - that traders 
implement currency market transactions based on informal communications with ‘in the know’ 
journalists and sources. The intuition is that market relevant rumours carry an informational 
risk premium. Their intuition and survey findings are in line with the empirical results of this 
chapter; however, in the absence of an empirical sample of timestamped market relevant 
rumours, it is difficult to identify any associated real-time price discovery process. Kosfeld 
(2005) builds on Banerjee’s (1993) theoretical model to show that if the diffusion of a rumour 
is wide enough, through word of mouth, then such rumours can cause a significant ‘price run-
up’. The model builds on the assumption that rumours transmit more effectively in networks 
that are small and local rather than large and global. I would argue that this theoretical model 
can be expanded to include a more global outreach for a given rumour since the existence of 
social media outlets has been shown to lead to rapid rumour diffusion (Nekovee et al. (2007)). 
The rapid global transmission combined with the macroeconomic information content of ECB 
Twitter rumours would suggest that systematic risk factors are at play – so that during rumour 
diffusion the market should command risk premia.   
In this chapter, I focus on a new source of systematic informational flows that is relevant to 
macro-markets. The advent of social networks has enabled the identification of ‘market 
rumours’ and this has rarely been the subject of discussion within the price discovery literature. 
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In fact, up until the introduction of Twitter and similar financial micro-blogging sources, such 
rumours whilst known to market participants were not available as a database to investigators. 
It is this largely neglected category of information, which is of most interest to this study.2  
Results show that real-time price discovery in the foreign exchange markets are associated with 
the real-time arrival of ECB relevant rumours. This finding provides fundamental evidence that 
market relevant rumours - conveying a potential change to future expectations of systematic 
risk factors - carry risk premium in macro-markets. This previously undetected price formation 
process incrementally increases the proportion of excess volatility that can be explained.  
I suggest that rumours about expected future market events, circulating publicly, are 
information of this type. Rumours by nature are difficult to pinpoint in time and rational 
expectations theory would suggest rumour information to be of little fundamental importance 
to the pricing of assets. It is therefore understandable that this type of information has remained 
overlooked in the past. I argue, however, that if rumours sufficiently alter the perceptions held 
by market participants of a given future market event, they become fundamental to the pricing 
mechanism. This assertion will be discussed in greater depth in section 2.2. A domain is 
available where market relevant rumours can be pinpointed in time by using Twitter. The social 
networking platform, Twitter, is a medium through which market commentators and 
participants exchange opinions and information about market relevant events. I identify 
rumours of forthcoming ECB actions, dubbed ‘ECB sources', which are broadcasted regularly 
by ‘in the know' market commentators. All such broadcasts are timestamped to within one-
minute accuracy, which alleviates the difficulty of pinpointing the arrival of a rumour in time. 
Moreover, the unique nature of Twitter as a broadcasting mechanism is that commentators are 
not subject to stringent financial regulatory body mandates and in-house substantiation filtration 
systems. This fundamentally differentiates Twitter from incumbent financial news broadcasters 
such as Bloomberg and Reuters, which have in the past been the source of new timestamped 
market information for studies testing the asset price impact of new information (see, among 
others Li et al. 2015). 
I pinpoint the arrival of 63 ‘ECB sources’ rumours broadcast on Twitter, to within one-minute 
accuracy, during a 420-day sample period of one-minute frequency spot Euro-US dollar 
exchange rates. Using Andersen and Bollerslev’s (1997b) Flexible Fourier form regression, I 
show that there is a significant increase in the volatility of exchange rate returns following the 
                                                             
2 Given the above discussion, the statement by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998): “If private information is at least in part ruled out, supporters 
of the Efficient Market Hypothesis must concede the existence of fundamental market information detected by market actors but not by 
economists” still remains relevant today. 
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arrival of 25 out of 63 ‘ECB sources’ rumours. Empirical results suggest that in the foreign 
exchange markets, market participants actively seek rumour information pertaining to market 
relevant ECB announcements. The consideration of such actionable information in the price 
formation process makes it possible to explain a greater proportion of asset price volatility.    
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 defines the theoretical 
framework that provides the rationale for market rumours to be a source of information 
fundamental to the process of price formation in efficient markets. Section 2.3 provides details 
of market and information data. Section 2.4 assesses the robustness of the methodological 
approach I adopt by means of Monte Carlo simulation. Section 2.5 discusses the empirical 
results, while section 2.6 concludes the chapter. 
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2.2 Rumours and Price Formation: A Paradigm  
In this study, I show empirically that rumours play a significant role in the price formation 
process. The question remains, however, if market rumours can be considered information 
events fundamental to the efficiency of financial markets. Are market rumours a type of 
information fundamental to the calculation of asset price? Do market agents change their 
calculations of asset prices based on new rumours? Can the market, therefore, be considered 
efficient if prices re-adjust at the time of new rumour information arrival? 
I answer these questions in the context of strong form EMH, which asserts that an efficient 
financial market will price all available relevant information, public and private, about market 
events that have already occurred or are expected to occur in the future. Market rumours by 
nature are information events predominantly indicating the size, scope, timing and probability 
of future market events. The arrival of a market rumour could plausibly change the nature of 
investor forecasts of future events. Depending on the quality of the source of a given rumour, 
market agents may reasonably alter the probability they attach to the possible outcomes of a 
specific future event. It is therefore perfectly reasonable for investors to alter their pricing of an 
asset based on the reliability and timing of a given rumour. The second question remains over 
the motivation for market agents to change their market positions based on a rumour contingent 
alteration to their forecast. To answer this question, I refer to Figure 2.1, which provides simple 
illustrations of price formation leading up to a future event E. Figure 2.1a illustrates a semi-
strong efficient market, where market agents react only to public information at the time of 
event E. 
Figure 2.1a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Price 
Time E 
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The size, scope and probability of this event become known only at time E, and the profits 
generated by the price adjustment would only be earned by those reacting immediately. The 
price formation process illustrated in Figure1a is purely theoretical and not observable in 
financial markets.   
A price formation process with increasing investor price forecast accuracy and private 
information diffusion is illustrated in Figure1b. Price variation is observed in this scenario up 
to event E. 
Figure 2.1b 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The timing, size, scope and probability of a future event in a strong form efficient market is 
partly known and priced by ‘in the know’ market agents. Market agents with the best forecasts 
or private information prior to event E will profit most. This simple illustration is converging 
to the reality of financial market price formation.  
Figure 2.1c 
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In reality, however, Figure 2.1c is more representative of pre-event price formation. Price 
formation is a dynamic process where forecasts alter frequently due to continuous market 
information flows. The timing, size, scope and probability of upcoming event E changes based 
on heterogeneous forecasts and beliefs. Cumulative market participant forecasts form a market 
consensus, which at any given time determines price.           
If the arrival of a rumour R (Figure1c) sufficiently changes the forecasts of a large enough group 
of market agents to a new homogenous forecast, then a resultant volatility event may be 
expected. Given that market agents attach a certain probability to the rumour being true they 
stand to profit by taking action based on the change to their forecasts. The profit may be 
contemporaneous at time R or based on a time advantage over market agents who react at time 
E. With the obvious profit motive of market agents in mind, it is perfectly rational for market 
agents to change their position based on the probability they attach to the rumour being true. 
Such a probabilistic calculation is simply a risk-weighted trading decision, one that would be 
deemed rational in an efficient market.  
To demonstrate this, I define It as a vector of all variables determining the exchange rate of a 
given currency pair prior to an event E. The outcome of such an event could alter the 
composition, magnitude and probability attached to any given element of vector It. I would, 
however, expect It to remain fixed between t=0 and t=E, without the arrival of unscheduled 
market relevant information. This vector includes the known quantities of exchange rate 
determinants such as, the rate of inflation, trade balances, interest rate differential, as well as 
information about central bank announcements/actions, which determine investor’s 
expectations about the future values of said variables. Further, I denote 𝐼𝑡 as a vector containing 
the consensus estimates of all market participants of each element of It between t=0 and t=E. 
Equilibrium foreign exchange rate at any time 𝑡 ∈ [0; 𝐸] can be written as 𝐹𝑋𝑡 = ∅(𝐼𝑡, 𝐼𝑡). I 
can obtain the approximate change in the foreign exchange rate within this time window (t=0 
to t=E) by linearizing ∅ and time differencing the result, so that: 
∆𝐹𝑋𝑡 ≅ ∅1
′ ∆𝐼𝑡 + ∅2
′ ∆𝐼𝑡 
where ∆ is the difference operator between 𝑡 = 0 𝑡𝑜 𝑡 = 𝐸, and ∅1
′ =
𝜕∅
𝜕𝐼𝑡
 and ∅2
′ =
𝜕∅
𝜕𝐼𝑡
. By 
supposition, none of the foreign exchange rate determinants can change during the window, 
thus ∆𝐼 = 0 and ∆𝐹𝑋 = ∅2
′ ∆𝐼𝑡. Any marginal effect on the exchange rate is given by an element 
of the vector ∅2
′ , as a result of a change to an element of the market consensus vector 𝐼. Changes 
to market consensus without material changes to vector I, detectable as excess volatility, can be 
deemed a repricing of risk by the market, due to either undetected information events or noise. 
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I assert that a rumour event R, can be seen as an undetected information event. Provided that R 
delivers information about the probability, scale, scope or timing of upcoming event E, and that 
it sufficiently alters market consensus elements of vector 𝐼, a marginal effect on the exchange 
rate should be observable following the arrival of the rumour at t=R. The magnitude of such a 
change should be proportional to ∅2
′ ∆𝐼𝑡 as a result of the arrival of R. In section 2.5.5, I show 
that this marginal effect is observable in terms of significant periods of exchange rate volatility 
following the arrival of ECB rumour information events.  
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2.3 Data description 
2.3.1 Euro-US dollar exchange rate data 
The Euro-US dollar currency market is the largest in the world by number of transactions per 
day. It opens 2200 GMT Sunday and is subject to a 24-hour trading day until 2200 GMT Friday. 
Pre-market (weekend) trading is available through some exchanges, however trading volume is 
relatively illiquid when compared to standard non-weekend trading (Chaboud et al. 2014). The 
markets opening hours overlap geographic trading days in Tokyo, Sydney, Frankfurt, London 
and New York; the most active financial centres. This 24-hour trading day allows the 
investigation of price formation during the full weekly information cycle.  
I source EUR-USD exchange rate data from Bloomberg professional services. I have chosen to 
utilise 1-minute interval exchange rate data to accommodate the investigation of post-rumour 
price formation in greater detail. The data supplied consists of exchange rate quotes for a period 
spanning from September 29, 2013 to May 08, 2015 (84 weeks, 420 days), totalling in 604,800 
observations. Quote data is available for weekend trading hours (2200 GMT Friday to 2200 
GMT Sunday) however, I choose to omit these observations due to reasons given above. 
Further, I omit half trading days and major holidays during which trading is considerably less 
active. These omissions result in a final minute-by-minute data sample of 596,160 observations. 
There is a total of 414 trading days, individually made up of 1440 1-minute intraday returns. I 
define intraday returns (Rt,n) in terms of trading day t=1,2,...,414 and minute interval 
n=1,2,…,1440. Where price is defined as Pt,n, minute by minute returns are calculated as 
follows: 
𝑅𝑡,𝑛 = log(𝑃𝑡,𝑛) − log (𝑃𝑡,𝑛−1)  
The collection of daily EUR-USD data is also required for inclusion in the baseline Flexible 
Fourier form regression to account for the highly persistent volatility factor as observed by 
Andersen and Bollerslev (1997b).  The inferred daily volatility in daily frequency observations 
of spot EUR-USD exchange rates, as determined by EGARCH estimates, controls for the 
observable highly persistent volatility in exchange rate. A detailed discussion of this procedure 
will be outlined in section 2.4. I source this daily data, spanning from January 2012 to June 
2015 for a total of 910 observations, via Bloomberg professional services. Daily data (Rt) is 
then filtered to omit related observations removed from the intraday sample (898 observations). 
Descriptive statistics for both daily and intraday frequency samples are presented in Table 2.1. 
[2.1] 
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Table 2.1 
Descriptive statistics for full sample daily and intraday minute-by-minute EUR-USD exchange rate returns. 
 Mean Median St. Dev.  Skew Kurtosis Min Max Observations 
Rt -4.55x10
-4 -1.45 x10-4 0.0052 -0.138 2.84 -0.021 0.024 898 
Rt,n -2.64x10
-7 0 1.43x10-4 0.235 192.47 -0.0088 0.0094 596,160 
    
  
2.3.2 Intraday patterns of the Euro-USD series 
It is clear from Table 2.1 that with a skewness of 0.235 and kurtosis of 192.47 the EUR-USD 
minute-by-minute raw returns are not normally distributed across the sample. This is consistent 
with previous studies by Chaboud et al. (2014) and Andersen and Bollerslev (1997b), who make 
use of intraday currency 1-minute and 5-minute data respectively. Furthermore, it can be 
observed that when sample returns are averaged for the trading day, there are distinguishable 
increases in return variability during specific times of the trading day. This greater variability 
is somewhat apparent, although centred around zero, for raw returns but is profoundly clear for 
absolute returns. This unique feature of intraday data was initially identified by Andersen and 
Figure 2.2 
(a) EUR-USD intraday 1-minute average (one trading day) raw returns R.,n. (b) EUR-USD intraday 1-minute 
average (one trading day) absolute returns |R.,n|. 
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Bollerslev (1997a) and has been consistently observed by a number of other scholars (see, e.g., 
Bauwens et al. 2005, Dominguez 2003, and Chaboud et al. 2014). Figure 2.3 illustrates the 
average interval raw and absolute returns across the trading day. 
Figure 2.3 
Ten day correlogram for absolute EUR-USD returns | Rt,n |. 
 
 
 
The regular intraday pattern observed for absolute returns suggests persistent spikes in volatility 
at regular times for the trading day across the sample. These spikes in price variability coincide 
with prominent geographical financial centres opening and their respective scheduled public 
information releases of macroeconomic data and Central Bank news. This chapter defines the 
trading day as commencing 2200 GMT when the average absolute 1-minute returns are low 
relative to the trading day. There are small periodic increases in absolute returns as Asian 
financial centres begin their respective trading days. There is a notable rise to a higher level of 
0.011% for the Frankfurt opening, and a further rise to 0.016% for the start of the London 
trading day. There are further spikes in absolute returns at 0900 GMT (660th interval) and 1000 
GMT (720th interval) which represent regular macroeconomic data releases. The most 
distinguishing feature of the daily pattern is that of the 930th trading interval at which points 
absolute returns spike to 0.046%. This represents East coast US financial centres opening and 
the release of scheduled macroeconomic data such as the US employment report. Further 
distinguishable spikes represent a second scheduled macroeconomic data point, US stock 
markets closing and times during which the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) releases 
information.  
The intraday pattern in absolute returns discussed above has been reported to result in a 
persistent U-shaped autocorrelation effect throughout the sample (see, e.g., Andersen and 
Bollerslev 1998, and Bauwens et al. 2005). I report similar findings in Figure 2.3, which depicts 
22 
 
the 10-day correlogram for absolute returns.  Standard volatility models developed for analysis 
of lower frequency daily, weekly and monthly data, by design, are not appropriate given the 
persistent autocorrelation in observations (Payne 1996). This is the principal reason I offer for 
selecting the methodology outlined in section 2.4.  
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2.3.3 Information event data 
There are two sources of financial market information for this chapter; Bloomberg professional 
services and Twitter. Information events sourced via the former facilitate the inclusion of times 
during which scheduled and unscheduled public information arrives. For scheduled events, a 
unity value is included as a dummy variable for the event window commencing at the minute 
the information is released via Bloomberg. The inclusion of said event windows allow for the 
testing of the papers’ main hypothesis while controlling for any volatility jumps attributable to 
scheduled public information events. From Bloomberg professional services, I collect 
timestamped data for 20 categories of scheduled public information releases, totalling in 429 
events of this type for the period September 29, 2013 to May 08, 2015. Further, 250,000 
unscheduled public information arrivals (news headlines) are collected via Bloomberg for the 
same period. The times of such news headlines are cross-referenced with the sample of 
timestamped rumour information. Any rumour observations which either repeat such 
Bloomberg information arrivals or occur concurrently are eliminated from the sample.3 
Details of public information data is provided in Table 2.2. For the purpose of this chapter, I 
collate scheduled public information in twenty categories, FOMC rate decisions, ECB rate 
decisions, FOMC meeting minutes release, speeches given by prominent ECB and FOMC 
Committee members, US employment reports, Category 1 economic data (US GDP, US CPI, 
US ISM manufacturing data, US consumer confidence, German ZEW economic confidence 
data, German IFO economic confidence data and Eurozone CPI) and Category 2 economic data 
(US retail sales data, US Durable Goods, US Manufacturing PMI, German Employment Report, 
European PMI manufacturing, German Industrial Production and German Factory Orders). A 
relevance indicator provided by Bloomberg determines the constituent economic data events 
included in the latter two categories.4 In further research there is scope to include additional 
control variables, particularly those relating to the microstructure of the EUR/USD market.   
Preliminary analysis of the EUR-USD market shows that of the largest 25 absolute returns for 
the sample, 10 occur concurrently within the arrival of news associated with the ECB (see Table 
2.3). It is therefore appropriate, that I focus on highly relevant market rumours relating to 
forthcoming ECB actions or changes in remit. Such highly relevant market rumours are 
appropriate examples of actionable information discerned by market actors but not yet  
                                                             
3 The inclusion of further control variables such as sentiment indicator could potentially augment this research. However, for simplicity and 
to avoid possible endogeneity problems, I have chosen to exclude such indicators. 
4 It is worth noting that for Eastern Standard Time (New York) the change to daylight savings time occurs sooner and ends later  than in Western 
Europe. This can cause some disparity when observing US related information events. I control for these disparate periods when constructing 
public information dummy variables. 
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investigated by economists.  Rumours of this type are quoted as ‘ECB sources’ stories. These 
rumours are regularly reported by ‘in the know’ financial market commentators via Twitter. 
ECB sources stories are particularly prevalent within a one-week window of the ECB’s 
Governing Council meeting that takes place on a monthly basis. I can gauge the popularity of 
the ECB sources story by the number of times the quoted rumour is repeated. It is relatively 
simple to search Twitter archives for the phrase ‘ECB sources’. I select ECB rumour events 
where the quoted story is repeated by more than 50 ‘in the know’ financial market 
commentators. I then perform an advanced search for the full quoted story i.e. “ECB Sources: 
ECB is working on a discussion chapter to execute government bond buying. 3 different 
options”, and pinpoint the time of the first broadcast of the quote. In total, I collect times for 
the first broadcast of 63 ECB rumour events. Some ‘sources’ stories gain so much traction 
among financial commentators that they are then reported via Bloomberg professional services. 
Details of the 63 ‘ECB sources’ events are given in Appendix A1. 
The applied threshold of 50 repeats of a given rumour is determined arbitrarily, but nonetheless 
is reasonable method of preventing the selection of stale rumours and those which are largely 
Table 2.2 
Scheduled public information arrival for period September 29, 2013 to May 08, 2015. 
Announcement  Regular Time 
(GMT) 
Bloomberg 
Relevance Indicator 
Number of 
Observations  
FOMC Rate Decision   1900/1800 97.6 13 
ECB Rate Decision  1245 97.7 18 
FOMC Minutes 1930/1830 97.6 12 
ECB Speakers Various N/A 46 
FOMC Speakers Various N/A 52 
US Employment Report  1330 99.2 20 
US CPI (Cat 1) 1330/1230 94.4 19 
US GDP (Cat 1) 1330/1230 96.8 19 
US ISM (Cat 1) 1500/1400 96.0 19 
German ZEW (Cat 1) 1000 98.3 19 
German IFO (Cat 1) 0900 96.6 19 
Eurozone CPI YoY (Cat 1) 1000 95.3 19 
US Consumer Confidence  (Cat1) 1330/1230 95.2 19 
US Durable Goods (Cat 2) 1330/1230 92.1 19 
US Retail Sales (Cat 2) 1330/1230 91.3 19 
US Manufacturing PMI (Cat 2) 1445/1345 90.0 19 
German Employment Report (Cat 2) 0855 90.0 19 
Eurozone Manufacturing PMI (Cat 2) 0800 to 0900 90.0 19 
German Industrial Production (Cat 2) 0700/1100 93.2 20 
German Factory Orders (Cat 2)  0700/1100 91.5 20 
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ignored by financial market commentators. Since the rumours are collected manually, the 
threshold also serves as a means of eliminating selection bias. In effect reducing problems 
associated with hand selected information samples by automating selection. There is scope in 
future research to perform sensitivity analysis to gauge a more precise threshold for a market 
rumour to be considered ‘actionable’.   
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2.4 Methodology   
To infer any meaningful exchange rate volatility effect due to the arrival of new information, I 
need to account for the intraday pattern in absolute returns found in the previous section. I make 
use of the Andersen and Bollerslev’s (1997b) empirical model as it is the most closely aligned 
with the aim of detecting the exchange rate return variability linked with the arrival of new 
information. This model has been developed specifically for the purpose of controlling for the 
intraday diurnal pattern persistent in intraday data. By design, the model is flexible and can be 
adapted to control for latent daily volatility clustering, low-frequency calendar effects and the 
arrival of heterogeneous public information other than the principal rumour information in 
question. The model has been applied by several authors in the literature to study the volatility 
effects of the arrival of new information on equity, currency, bond and their respective futures 
markets (see, e.g. Bauwens et al. 2005, Andersen and Bollerslev 1998, Bollerslev et al. 2000, 
Andersen et al. 2000, Dominguez 2003 and Cai et al. 2001).    
In order to ‘smooth’ out intraday periodicity we must think in two frequencies of time; day t 
and interval n within day t. Thus, 𝑅𝑡,𝑛 is the market return at interval n of day t (e.g. 2200 GMT 
would be n=1 for a given day, t). The model can be specified as follows;  
𝑅𝑡,𝑛 −  ?̅?𝑡,𝑛 = 𝜎𝑡,𝑛 ∙ 𝑠𝑡,𝑛 ∙ 𝑍𝑡,𝑛 
where ?̅?𝑡,𝑛, is the mean market return, which is defined as a sample mean of 1-minute returns. 
𝑍𝑡,𝑛, is a normally distributed error term with mean zero and unit variance, whereas the term  
𝑠𝑡,𝑛 captures the intraday periodic component discussed in section 2.3.2. Finally, 𝜎𝑡,𝑛 captures 
the latent interday conditional heteroscedasticity component which remains persistent. It is the 
joint presence of this latent interday component and the intraday periodic patterns documented 
in Figure 2.2b that result in the u-shaped pattern observe in the correlegram of absolute returns 
(Andersen and Bollerslev 1997b). Related intraday estimates of the highly persistent interday 
conditional heteroskedasticity can be defined as:   
?̂?𝑡,𝑛 = ?̂?𝑡/𝑁
1/2 
where N is the number of intervals in each day (1440) and ?̂?𝑡 is estimated using an generalised 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) type model. Intraday estimates of the 
latent interday volatility component achieved through equation 2.3 are under the assumption 
that this volatility component remains constant throughout the day. Although this assumption 
[2.2] 
[2.3] 
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is not necessarily correct, it has been shown to have no impact on the overall robustness of the 
FFF regression nor does it affect the consistency of the regression estimates5.  
In order to fully specify a functional model from the general representation outlined in equation 
(2.2), the components are log-transformed and squared. 
Figure 2.4 
Bayesian and Consistent Akaike information criterion calculated for Flexible Fourier form regressions where 
order of expansion P, takes values from 1-50.   
 
 
This allows for the isolation of the term st,n as the sole explanatory component of  normalised 
and debased 1-minute EUR-USD volatility process:   
2 ln[|𝑅𝑡,𝑛 −  ?̅?𝑡,𝑛|] − ln ?̂?𝑡,𝑛
2 = 𝑐 + 2 ln 𝑠𝑡,𝑛 + 𝜀𝑡,𝑛 
The final model is defined by Andersen and Bollerslev (1997b) as two-step flexible Fourier 
form (FFF) regression. The first step requires appropriate estimates of the sample mean ?̅?𝑡,𝑛, a 
GARCH estimate of the latent daily volatility component ?̂?𝑡 and the appropriate specification 
of the public information, intraday pattern and rumour event components of st,n. For the daily 
sample period, January 2012 to June 2015, I observe large exchange rate fluctuations (Figure 
2.5a) particularly for the latter part of the 414 day, intraday sample period. Such periods of 
heightened volatility have been found to expose limitations of standard GARCH models (Engle 
(2001)). I therefore apply a GARCH (1, 1) and an exponentially weighted GARCH (EGARCH 
1, 1) model to daily EUR/USD returns. The latter model is better formulated to capture the 
direction and persistence of volatility shocks in the daily sample. Figure 2.5b depicts the daily 
volatility estimates obtained from the EGARCH (1, 1) model.  
                                                             
5 For further details see Andersen and Bollerslev (1997b). 
[2.4] 
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The second step of the FFF regression is the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of the 
equation provided below in its final form:  
2ln
|𝑅𝑡,𝑛 − ?̅?𝑡,𝑛|
?̂?𝑡/𝑁1/2
= 𝑐 + 𝛿0,1
𝑛
𝑁
+ 𝛿0,2
 𝑛2
𝑁
+ ∑ 𝜆𝑘𝐼𝑘(𝑡, 𝑛) +
𝐷
𝑘=1
∑ (𝛿𝑐,𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑠
𝑝2𝜋
𝑁
𝑛 + 𝛿𝑠,𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑛
𝑝2𝜋
𝑁
𝑛) +
𝑃
𝑃=1
𝜀𝑡,𝑛 
where the unknown parameters to estimate are; 𝛿0,1, 𝛿0,2, 𝛿𝑐,𝑝, 𝛿𝑠,𝑝, and 𝜆𝑘, with p=1, .., P and k= 1, 
.., D. The ∑ (𝛿𝑐,𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑠
𝑝2𝜋
𝑁
𝑛 + 𝛿𝑠,𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑛
𝑝2𝜋
𝑁
𝑛)𝑃𝑃=1  sinusoid parameter (Fourier series) controls for 
intraday seasonality component for each day t, of N intervals (1440). This allows for linear 
estimation of the volatility impact attributable to public information and rumour events k, for 
interval n, on day t, represented by 𝐼𝑘(𝑡, 𝑛). Normalising constants n/N and n
2/N are linear and 
quadratic trends within each day, where n=1,..,1440. P determines the order of expansion 
Figure 2.5 
(a) Raw daily returns for 414-day period from September 29, 2013 through May 08, 2015. (b) Conditional 
standard deviation inference from an EGARCH(1,1) model for daily EUR-USD returns for September 29, 2013 
through May 08, 2015. 
 
 
[2.5] 
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(pitch) of the sinusoid components in the trigonometric variable. An order of expansion of 4-8 
has been implemented in previous adoptions of this model (Andersen and Bollerslev 1997b, 
Bollerslev et al. 2000 and Dominguez 2003).   
The order of expansion (P) appropriate for the FFF regression implemented with one-minute 
frequency data used in this analysis is likely to deviate from the above studies, given their use 
of 5-minute data. I determine the appropriate order of expansion by calculating the Bayesian 
and Consistent Akaike Information Criterion for equation (2.5) when P ranges from 1 to 50 (see 
Figure 2.4). The results of model comparison provided in Figure 2.4 shows that the optimum 
value for order of expansion of the Fourier series, is P=25. The periodic pattern can be 
converted to absolute returns, exclusive of dummy variables, as follows:  
|𝑅𝑡,𝑛 − ?̅?𝑡,𝑛| = 𝑁
−1
2⁄ ∙ ?̂?𝑡 ∙ exp (
?̂? + ?̂?0,1
𝑛
𝑁 + ?̂?0,2
 𝑛2
𝑁 +
∑ (?̂?𝑐,𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑠
𝑝2𝜋
𝑁 𝑛 + ?̂?𝑠,𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑛
𝑝2𝜋
𝑁 𝑛
)𝑃𝑃=1
2
) ∙ exp(𝜀?̂?,𝑛 2⁄ ) 
A comparative illustration is provided in Figure 2.6 between, 1-minute average trading day, 
realised absolute returns and fitted absolute returns implied by the FFF model and calculated in 
equation (2.6). Charts a, b and c demonstrate the improvement in fit when the tuning parameter 
P is increased from six to twelve and then to 25 – with the latter being the optimal order of 
expansion. 
OLS estimation of the FFF regression outlined above will provide consistent parameter 
estimates for information and rumour events, given correct specification of the sinusoid term 
according to Andersen and Bollerslev (1998). The heteroscedasticity correction and log 
transformation in the first step of the sequential FFF approach enhance the efficiency of linear 
parameter estimates for public information and rumour event dummies in the second step. I 
double-check that this is the case by simulating 2000 trials of the above model using the Monte 
Carlo approach. I find all parameter estimates (OLS) in the second step FFF regression to be 
normally distributed, including all 25 𝛿𝑐,𝑝 and 𝛿𝑠,𝑝 coefficients. This simulation exercise 
suggests that the finite sample properties of the above OLS estimates do not depart from the 
standard asymptotic properties.6  
 
 
                                                             
6 The empirical results from the above Monte Carlo simulations are presented in Appendix A2. 
[2.6] 
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Figure 2.6 
Comparative illustration: Fit of the Fourier component, with tuning parameter P=6, 12 and 25, of the FFF model 
to the average absolute one-minute EUR-USD returns across the 24-hour trading day. (a) Graphs the fit of the 
Fourier component with tuning parameter P=6 of the FFF model, to the average absolute one-minute EUR-USD 
returns across the 24-hour trading day. (b) Graphs the fit of the Fourier component with tuning parameter P=12 
of the FFF model, to the average absolute one-minute EUR-USD returns across the 24-hour trading day. (c) 
Graphs the fit of the Fourier component with tuning parameter P=25 of the FFF model, to the average absolute 
one-minute EUR-USD returns across the 24-hour trading day 
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The effectiveness of this model has been reviewed by Harju and Hussain (2011). They suggest 
that the non-linear transformation performed using the trigonometric component may result in 
time varying non-zero values in 𝜀𝑡,𝑛 for times when 𝐼𝑘(𝑡, 𝑛) takes unity value (during 
information event windows). In their evaluation of the FFF procedure they suggest an integrated 
approach to the FFF model, where sequential estimates of ARCH effect and non-linear 
transformation are combined in one step, which provides more efficient parameter estimates of 
linear event dummies. The improvements in model efficiency are however found to be marginal 
by measure of mean absolute error (MAE), mean squared errors (MSE) and Diebold–Mariano 
test (DM test). 7 
The biggest improvement to model efficiency occur by swapping between GARCH (1, 1) and 
a HYGARCH (1, d, 1) in the first sequential heteroscedasticity correction step. By measure of 
mean squared errors, Harju and Hussain (2011), find an improvement of 2% for a sequential 
FFF model which is subject to HYGARCH (1, d, 1) heteroscedasticity correction in the first 
stage. Given that their suggested improvement yielded marginal improvements to the efficiency 
of estimates and no significant change in estimation outcome, I have chosen to follow the 
stepwise process adopted by Andersen and Bollerslev (1997b). This is partly for simplicity, but 
more importantly, to allow for a more direct comparison of event studies exclusive of market 
rumours (Andersen and Bollerslev (1997b and 1998), Bollerslev et al. 2000 and Dominguez 
2003), and this research.   
Overall, the supporting evidence from the Akaike and Bayesian Information Criterion for the 
first step procedure for equation (2.5), along with additional results of the Monte Carlo 
simulation of the second step procedure, I conclude the FFF model is an appropriate tool for 
the purpose of this study. 
  
                                                             
7 By measure of mean absolute error (MAE) and mean squared errors (MSE), an integrated FFF model exhibits an improvement over a 
sequential FFF model by 1.3% and 0.6% respectively (Harju and Hussain, 2011). 
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2.5 Empirical findings 
2.5.1 Preliminary analysis 
I begin by tabulating the 25 largest absolute one-minute returns over the full sample period. I 
then cross-reference the times and dates of these abrupt changes in exchange rate with the 
sample of public and actionable information data set. The same matching exercise was followed 
by Fleming and Remolona (1999), Andersen, Bollerslev and Cai (2000) and Bollerslev, Cai and 
Song (2000) in analysis of return variability in stock, bond and currency markets during public 
information arrival. Their results show concurrently, that the largest 25 absolute returns of their 
respective markets of interest occur during times of public information arrival. I carry out the 
same exercise for find that of the 25 largest absolute returns, 21 occur during times of public 
information arrival. These last, together with their matched information/rumour event, are 
reported in Table 2.3.  
Twenty of the largest jumps in exchange rate can be attributed to scheduled public information 
and one to the unscheduled announcement of the approval of an economic assistance package 
for Greece. These 21 events are corroborated, certified and reported by the accredited newswire 
Bloomberg. Such information has in the past been referred to as fundamental financial market 
information; relevant, ‘rational’ public market information reported by an authorised newswire. 
Four of the 25 largest absolute EUR-USD returns for the full sample period occur during times 
of ‘actionable’ information arrival. Three of these events are rumours of forthcoming ECB 
action reported by ‘in the know’ commentators broadcasting on Twitter. The fourth is the 
reporting of the arrival of Russian troops in Crimea by independent Twitter users. 
While this matching exercise is somewhat subjective, the results reported in Table 2.3 suggest 
that ‘actionable’ rumours discerned by market agents could have a sizable impact on market 
price. These matching results provide the basis for the hypothesis that the availability of Twitter 
as a medium for rumour diffusion would enable economists to identify a form of ambiguous - 
yet actionable - information that can be associated with significant fluctuations in market prices. 
I conclude this to be substantial preliminary support for the hypothesis that market rumours - 
i.e. information previously not discerned and categorised as private information or miss-
identified as not fundamental - are of value to traders and they are a constituent factor of market 
price formation.   
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2.5.2 Intraday periodicity  
The highly persistent intraday volatility pattern evident in one-minute absolute returns 
illustrated in Figure 2.2 is consistent with the findings of previous studies based on intraday 
data. For instance, Dominguez (2003), Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), Bollerslev et al. (2000) 
and Bawuens et al. (2005) all find evidence of intraday periodicity of this type for five-minute 
interval data and adopt the FFF regression approach to control for this. Their selection of 
smaller sets of tuning parameters (8, 4, 6 and 4 respectively) is appropriate for lower frequency 
five-minute data.8  
                                                             
8 Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) is the only paper to include parameter results of the cosinor element of the FFF regression. 
They find all but one of the sinusoid parameters, the fourth sine variable, to be significant. 
Table 2.3 
Largest absolute 1-minute returns for EUR-USD spot exchange rate market from September 29, 2013 through 
May 08, 2015. For each of the 25 largest absolute returns, I indicate the information/rumour event, which may 
have contributed to returns.   
Absolute 
Returns 
(%)  
Timestamp 
(GMT) 
Return 
Interval 
Information/Rumour event 
0.942 03/04/2015 1330 930 US Employment Report  
0.878 07/11/2013 1245 885 ECB Rate Decisions  
0.875 18/03/2015 2004 1384 FED Press Conference  
0.823 06/03/2015 1331 931 US Employment Report  
0.786 22/01/2015 1344 944 ECB Press Conference  
0.761 22/01/2015 1340 940 ECB Press Conference  
0.617 18/03/2015 1800 1260 FED Rate Decision  
0.587 06/02/2015 1330 930 US Employment Report  
0.571 20/02/2015 1735 1175 Euro group decide to extend financial assistance to Greece  
0.564 18/03/2015 2005 1385 FED Rate Decision  
0.535 05/12/2014 1330 930 US Employment Report  
0.479 12/03/2015 1230 930 US Retail Sales  
0.422 18/02/2015 1900 1260 FOMC Minutes 
0.421 03/10/2014 1330 930 US Employment Report  
0.404 04/09/2014 1245 885 ECB Rate Decisions  
0.388 22/01/2015 1345 945 ECB Press Conference  
0.375 07/02/2014 1330 930 US Employment Report  
0.367 18/03/2015 2003 1383 FED Rate Decision  
0.363 04/12/2014 1732 1172 ECB Sources (Twitter) German ECB members opposed to 
new balance sheet language 
0.356 17/09/2014 1900 1260 FED Rate Decision  
0.344 06/11/2014 1333 933 ECB Press Conference  
0.342 28/02/2014 1000 720 Rumours of Russian troops in Sevastopol emerge on 
Twitter   
0.340 20/11/2013 1520 1040 ECB Sources(Twitter) Governing council considering 
negative deposit rate of 0.1% 
0.339 21/01/2015 1435 995 ECB Sources(Twitter): QE proposal calls for roughly €50 
billion in bond buying per month  
0.338 29/10/2014 1800 1260 FED Rate Decision 
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For the purpose of this study, I find a tuning parameter of 25 to be the most appropriate for the 
one-minute frequency EUR-USD returns sample - as outlined in section 2.4. In Table 2.4 I set 
Table 2.4 
Coefficient estimates for constant, normalising constants and Fourier components of the FFF regression of 
equation (2.5). Results set out for the complete FFF regression (inclusive of public information and ECB rumour 
event dummies), and for the same regression with both rumour and public information events excluded.  
Parameter  FFF Regression  t-Stat Rumours Excluded t-Stat 
Periodic Pattern 
Only t-Stat 
c 14.264 3.772 14.316 3.779 14.974 3.905 
δ0,1 -116.791 -5.155 -117.174 -5.163 -121.526 -5.290 
δ0,2 0.081 5.136 0.081 5.144 0.084 5.271 
δc,1 -13.419 -5.851 -13.447 -5.852 -13.831 -5.947 
δs,1 -1.874 -35.281 -1.864 -35.034 -1.815 -33.707 
δc,2 -3.090 -5.389 -3.103 -5.401 -3.226 -5.547 
δs,2 0.057 2.033 0.054 1.927 0.043 1.531 
δc,3 -1.744 -6.837 -1.744 -6.827 -1.796 -6.946 
δs,3 0.536 26.562 0.537 26.547 0.514 25.110 
δc,4 -0.793 -5.517 -0.796 -5.529 -0.843 -5.784 
δs,4 -0.758 -45.656 -0.762 -45.812 -0.717 -42.628 
δc,5 -0.514 -5.571 -0.518 -5.600 -0.492 -5.255 
δs,5 -0.057 -3.911 -0.051 -3.476 -0.041 -2.766 
δc,6 -0.333 -5.166 -0.329 -5.092 -0.348 -5.315 
δs,6 -0.057 -4.239 -0.058 -4.289 -0.084 -6.150 
δc,7 -0.187 -3.898 -0.186 -3.879 -0.195 -4.015 
δs,7 -0.080 -6.290 -0.079 -6.177 -0.052 -4.084 
δc,8 -0.105 -2.813 -0.105 -2.802 -0.104 -2.746 
δs,8 0.113 9.270 0.111 9.082 0.104 8.477 
δc,9 -0.157 -5.211 -0.158 -5.245 -0.155 -5.065 
δs,9 -0.002 -0.178 -0.006 -0.470 -0.016 -1.298 
δc,10 -0.117 -4.664 -0.120 -4.782 -0.133 -5.222 
δs,10 0.023 1.985 0.025 2.143 0.034 2.872 
δc,11 -0.105 -4.850 -0.105 -4.867 -0.104 -4.774 
δs,11 0.058 5.153 0.056 4.912 0.034 2.962 
δc,12 -0.071 -3.731 -0.072 -3.801 -0.082 -4.249 
δs,12 -0.067 -6.024 -0.065 -5.841 -0.055 -4.826 
δc,13 -0.096 -5.652 -0.094 -5.539 -0.107 -6.186 
δs,13 0.012 1.095 0.013 1.158 0.012 1.069 
δc,14 -0.056 -3.571 -0.056 -3.576 -0.032 -2.010 
δs,14 0.015 1.351 0.012 1.101 0.008 0.762 
δc,15 0.012 0.853 0.012 0.821 -0.016 -1.101 
δs,15 -0.077 -7.131 -0.075 -6.897 -0.082 -7.457 
δc,16 -0.051 -3.752 -0.052 -3.794 -0.045 -3.271 
δs,16 0.032 2.955 0.032 2.927 0.043 3.946 
δc,17 -0.004 -0.286 -0.002 -0.175 0.009 0.678 
δs,17 0.034 3.194 0.035 3.284 0.042 3.822 
δc,18 0.037 2.986 0.037 2.960 0.031 2.476 
δs,18 -0.011 -1.024 -0.012 -1.083 -0.037 -3.430 
δc,19 -0.018 -1.506 -0.019 -1.566 -0.039 -3.210 
δs,19 0.050 4.686 0.049 4.570 0.065 6.018 
δc,20 0.010 0.863 0.010 0.889 0.029 2.434 
δs,20 -0.032 -3.055 -0.032 -3.028 -0.027 -2.515 
δc,21 0.063 .511 0.061 5.333 0.050 4.259 
δs,21 -0.015 -1.440 -0.016 -1.499 -0.034 -3.161 
δc,22 0.025 2.243 0.026 2.337 0.021 1.869 
δs,22 0.021 1.999 0.022 2.113 0.035 3.312 
δc,23 0.065 5.799 0.064 5.768 0.066 5.865 
δs,23 -0.049 -4.652 -0.049 -4.684 -0.048 -4.508 
δc,24 0.180 16.339 0.180 16.352 0.182 16.322 
δs,24 0.024 2.260 0.024 2.246 0.021 1.955 
δc,25 0.042 3.835 0.041 3.746 0.036 3.218 
δs,25 -0.003 -0.325 -0.004 -0.364 -0.001 -0.064 
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out parameter estimates for the intraday periodicity control component of the FFF regression 
of equation (2.5). The second and third column report the parameter estimates for the full FFF 
regression inclusive of rumour and public information dummy variables. The remaining 
columns report parameter estimates obtained when the rumour event dummy variables and 
when the rumour and public information event dummy variables are excluded from the FFF 
regression9. The results show that most of the fifty sinusoid parameter estimates are significant 
and perform well in controlling for the highly persistent intraday periodicity in absolute EUR-
USD returns. As with findings presented by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), some Fourier 
series parameter estimates are insignificant. The inclusion of such terms is, however necessary 
for better smoothing of the intraday periodic component.10 Most notably, results in Table 2.4 
show that the inclusion of rumour and public information dummy variables reduces the number 
of significant sinusoid parameters and the respective size of their coefficient estimates. 
Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), Andersen et al. (2000), Dominguez (2003) and Bawuens et al. 
(2005) have all suggested and supported the idea that intraday periodicity is a manifestation of 
price variability resulting from the existence of private information. From these results, I can 
conclude that the inclusion of a relatively small number of rumour event variables is able to 
absorb some volatility dynamics previously captured by the intraday periodic components.  
  
                                                             
9 The 𝑅2 for FFF regression, Rumours Excluded and Periodic Pattern only are 0.1032, 0.0933 and 0.0895 respectively. 
10 For example, the inclusion of the insignificant ninth sine parameter (δs,9) facilitates the inclusion of the subsequent 
significant sinusoid parameters. 
36 
 
2.5.3 Volatility response structure 
Macroeconomic public information and rumour events occur infrequently in the sample period 
relative to the large number of 596,160 EUR-USD return observations. I observe 63 rumour 
events and control for 20 categories of macroeconomic announcements the summation of which 
is 492 observations of information events. The relative infrequency of such events and 
persistent noise in high frequency intraday data - as noted in sections 2.3.2 and 2.4 - make 
coefficient point-estimation of independent events and corresponding time intervals following 
the events implausible (Andersen and Bollerslev 1998). The inclusion of an FOMC rate 
decision event as a single minute dummy variable in equation (2.5), for example, would result 
in an insignificant coefficient estimate given the aforementioned infrequency of such an event. 
To control for this feature of the dataset, one option is to extend event dummy variables to a 
longer time horizon, say 60 minutes following the event instead of one minute. This solution 
would improve the chances of capturing the volatility impact of an associated information 
event. This however, would provide only a broad-brush picture of the immediate impact of 
information arrival on the volatility of exchange rate. In this case, the coefficient estimates 
would only suggest some impact on volatility during the 60-minute event window. Empirical 
estimates of equation (2.5) with 60-minute dummy variables capturing rumour events are 
reported in Table 2.6.  
Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) proposed an alternative methodology to gain a better insight 
into the instantaneous and cumulative impact of information events on price variability. They 
propose that volatility response in exchange rates following information arrival can be proxied 
with an average volatility pattern across all such events. They calibrate this pattern by fitting a 
third order polynomial to volatility observations during announcement event windows. The 
fitted volatility response pattern is then included in the FFF regression as explanatory variable 
to calculate the degree to which absolute returns during the event “load onto” this pattern. The 
implication of this is that, for each information event k and subsequent Nk time intervals, the 
𝐼𝑘(𝑡, 𝑛) term in equation (2.5) is replaced with a calibrated volatility response pattern 𝛾(𝑖) where 
𝑖 = 0,1,2 … , 𝑁𝑘. The volatility response pattern is calibrated by fitting an appropriate 
polynomial structure to the observed average volatility response in the immediate post 
announcement period for a specific type of market information event.  
While Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) adopt a single volatility response pattern for 
macroeconomic information arrival, I calibrate four volatility response patterns specific to the 
type of macroeconomic information event and calibrate a further volatility response pattern 
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specific to rumour event windows. The intuition is that the volatility response pattern following 
information arrival differs depending on the speed of information arrival as well as the type of 
information content. For instance, during macroeconomic events such as the ECB rate decision 
where a press conference is held, information arrival is incremental. This is contrary to 
macroeconomic data release, where information arrival is immediate.  
I calibrate volatility response patterns specific to ECB rumour events, ECB rate decision events, 
FOMC rate decision events, slow release public information events (FOMC minutes, FOMC 
and ECB prominent speakers) and fast release public information events (US Employment 
report, US GDP, US CPI, US ISM manufacturing data, US consumer confidence, German ZEW 
economic confidence data, German IFO economic confidence data, Eurozone CPI, US retail 
sales data, US Durable Goods, US Manufacturing PMI, German Employment Report, European 
PMI manufacturing, German Industrial Production and German Factory Orders).  
The four volatility response patterns for macroeconomic announcements are calibrated by 
fitting a third order polynomial to the dummy variables attached to the event windows for the 
four categories of macroeconomic information. The polynomial restricts the volatility response 
window to 60 minutes for all macroeconomic information releases, except the ECB and FOMC 
rate decisions, for which the response window is extended to 120 minutes to accommodate the 
lengthy press conference that follows the decision announcement.  
The third order polynomials calibrated for the volatility response following ECB (equation 
(2.7)) and FOMC rate decisions (equation (2.8)) are provided below:  
 𝛾𝐸𝐶𝐵(𝑖) = 5.577[1 − (𝑖 120⁄ )
3] − 0.127[1 − (𝑖 120)⁄
2]𝑖 + 0.00301[1 − (𝑖 120)⁄ ]𝑖2 
 
𝛾𝐹𝑂𝑀𝐶 (𝑖) = 8.856[1 − (𝑖 120⁄ )
3] − 0.228[1 − (𝑖 120)⁄
2]𝑖 + 0.00412[1 − (𝑖 120)⁄ ]𝑖2 
where 𝑖 = 0,1,2 … ,120. I then specify the third order polynomials calibrated for the volatility 
response following slow release (SR) public information events (equation (2.9)) and fast release 
(FR) public information events (equation (2.10)) as follows:  
𝛾𝑆𝑅 (𝑖) = 3.850[1 − (𝑖 60⁄ )
3] − 0.218[1 − (𝑖 60)⁄
2]𝑖 + 0.00733[1 − (𝑖 60)⁄ ]𝑖2 
 
𝛾𝐹𝑅(𝑖) = 4.527[1 − (𝑖 60⁄ )
3] − 0.326[1 − (𝑖 60)⁄
2]𝑖 + 0.0100[1 − (𝑖 60)⁄ ]𝑖2 
where 𝑖 = 0,1,2 … ,60.  
[2.7] 
[2.8] 
 [2.9] 
 [2.10] 
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The volatility response pattern for ECB rumour event windows is calibrated through a higher 
7th order polynomial fitted to all parameters of equation (2.5) relevant for ECB rumour event 
windows. The choice of higher order polynomial allows for more flexibility in capturing greater 
fluctuations in the volatility pattern throughout rumour event windows. Intuitively, the 
ambiguous nature of market rumours could in fact result in a less cohesive price formation 
process. From experimentation and evidence presented in Figure 2.8 I can see that, contrary to 
‘fundamental' macroeconomic events, the volatility response following rumour events does not 
decay consistently across the event window. There is a distinct decrease, followed by an 
increase in volatility response for five one-minute intervals following the arrival of a rumour 
before volatility begins to decay again. A higher order polynomial allows for better calibration 
of this distinct pattern. The 7th order polynomial calibrated for the volatility response following 
ECB rumour events (equation (2.11)) is specified as follows:  
𝛾𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑟 (𝑖) = 2.75𝑒
−10𝑖7 − 6.60𝑒−8𝑖6 + 6.25𝑒−6𝑖5 − 2.98𝑒−4𝑖4 − 0.0075𝑖3 + 0.096𝑖2 − 0.52𝑖
+ 0.19 
where 𝑖 = 0,1,2 … ,60. 
Given that the above volatility response patterns are pre-determined, an estimated coefficient 
𝜆(𝑘, 𝑖) loading onto this pattern during event k, enables the calculation of the immediate 
volatility impact of an information event. The immediate volatility response in absolute returns 
(from equation (2.6)) is given by exp (?̂?𝑘 ∙ 𝛾(0) 2⁄ ) − 1, whereas the same response for the 
subsequent time intervals is given by exp (?̂?𝑘 ∙ 𝛾(𝑖) 2⁄ ) − 1. The cumulative response in 
absolute returns for the full event window is calculated as:  
𝑀(𝑘) = ∑ [exp (
?̂?𝑘 ∙ 𝛾(𝑖)
2
) − 1]
𝑁𝑘
𝑖=0
 
Further details of the structure of the outlined volatility response patterns are provided in the 
coming section.  
[2.12] 
[2.11] 
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2.5.4 Public information announcement effect 
Figure 2.7 illustrates the shape of the estimated volatility response patterns calculated as 
 ?̂?(𝑘, 𝑖) = ?̂?𝑘 ∙ 𝛾(𝑖) for each of the 20 macroeconomic public information announcements. 
Figure 2.7a illustrates the volatility response patterns following ECB and FOMC rate decisions, 
where their different scale is determined by the degree to which absolute returns during such 
events load onto the decay structures of equations (2.7) - (2.8). Figure 2.7b depicts the volatility 
response patterns following slow release macroeconomic announcements. Also in this case, 
such patterns are determined by the degree to which absolute returns during such events load 
onto decay structure of equation (2.9). Figure 2.7c and 2.7d display the response patterns for 
the fast release macroeconomic data announcements where the volatility decay structure is 
specified in equation (2.10). The volatility persists at a higher level and for a longer time horizon 
during ECB and FOMC rate decisions. For slow release public information, the immediate 
volatility response is smaller but decays at a slower rate. The volatility response to fast release 
economic data announcements, is more immediate but volatility decays at a far faster rate.  
Table 2.5 reports the empirical estimates of the loading coefficient ?̂?𝑘 for all 20 macroeconomic 
information announcements. Such coefficients are OLS estimates of equation (2.5) where the 
𝐼𝑘(𝑡, 𝑛) dummy variable refers to the predetermined volatility response patterns associated with 
the relevant type of macroeconomic information, as determined by equations (2.7) - (2.10). All 
but two of the 20 public information announcements are significant at the 5% level. The 
announcements are ranked by order of largest instantaneous impact on absolute returns, 
calculated as exp (?̂?𝑘 ∙ 𝛾(0) 2⁄ ) − 1. 
To provide an example, the estimated FOMC rate decision loading coefficient implies that 
exp (?̂?𝑘 ∙ 𝛾(0) 2⁄ ) = exp ((0.729 ∙ 8.856)/2) = 25.23 - this is tantamount to approximately 
2423% ((25.23 − 1) ∙ 100) instantaneous increase in the one-minute absolute returns 
following FOMC rate decisions. The cumulative impact as outlined in equation (2.12) would 
be 678.64. Given that one-minute average absolute returns, during the 1800 to 2000 GMT time 
120-minute horizon for FOMC rate decisions, are approximately equal to 0.008% and that 
average cumulative absolute returns for the trading days in the sample equals 11%, on days 
when FOMC rate decisions take place there is an average increase of approximately (678.64 ∙
0.008)/11 = 49.36% in cumulative absolute returns.  
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The results presented in Table 2.5 show that public announcements - ‘fundamental’ to the price 
formation process by proponents of the Efficient Market Hypothesis - do have a considerable 
immediate and cumulative impact on price variability. The relative infrequency of such events, 
however, means that a very small proportion of overall sample volatility can be attributed to 
such events. Nonetheless, these results show that FFF regression model in use is able to capture 
the effects of macroeconomic announcement events, and therefore it can be used as useful term 
of comparison for the results of the next section.   
  
Table 2.5 
Public information arrival effects on the volatility of 1-minute EUR-USD of exchange rate returns. (R2 = 0.0933) 
Public information 
announcements   
Coefficient 
?̂?(𝒌) 
t-Stat Instantaneous 
increase in 
volatility (%) 
Effect on daily 
cumulative 
absolute returns 
(%) 
FOMC Rate Decision   0.729 36.551 2423.563 49.356 
US Employment Report  1.382 19.819 2183.577 19.354 
US CPI (Cat 1) 0.973 9.981 805.590 6.619 
US Retail Sales (Cat 2) 0.935 10.779 730.839 9.602 
US GDP (Cat 1) 0.894 9.155 656.767 8.890 
German ZEW (Cat 1) 0.861 8.860 602.211 8.349 
FOMC Minutes 0.955 22.424 528.481 6.675 
ECB Rate Decision  0.656 21.486 523.766 35.534 
German IFO (Cat 1) 0.792 8.188 501.201 5.737 
Eurozone Manufacturing PMI (Cat 2) 0.772 7.973 474.424 5.510 
ECB Speakers 0.776 9.454 345.261 6.619 
FOMC Speakers 0.704 9.268 287.847 4.693 
US ISM (Cat 1) 0.505 4.928 213.608 3.819 
German Factory Orders (Cat 2)  0.491 5.214 203.625 2.364 
US Durable Goods (Cat 2) 0.474 4.838 192.256 3.513 
German Employment Report (Cat 2) 0.332 3.426 111.979 1.772 
Eurozone CPI YoY (Cat 1) 0.313 3.216 102.876 1.349 
German Industrial Production (Cat 2) 0.295 3.137 95.057 1.541 
US Consumer Confidence  (Cat1) 0.118 1.191 30.526 0.707 
US Manufacturing PMI (Cat 2) 0.093 0.897 23.406 0.512 
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Figure 2.7 
(a) Estimated volatility response pattern for FOMC and ECB rate decision event windows. (b)  Estimated volatility response 
pattern for slow release public information events. (c and d)  Estimated volatility response pattern for fast release public 
information events. 
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2.5.5 ECB rumours arrival effects 
I take two approaches in identifying the impact of ECB rumour events on the volatility of EUR-
USD absolute returns. The first is to model each ECB rumour event as a sixty-minute dummy 
variable in equation (2.5). Here the 𝐼𝑘(𝑡, 𝑛) dummy variables (for k=1, .., 63), included in the 
full FFF regression take unity value for rumour event k for the sixty minutes after rumour 
arrival. In this case, the macroeconomic event dummy variables also take unity value for their 
respective event windows. The coefficient estimates ?̂?𝑘 for this approach captures the degree to 
which volatility is affected during the full sixty-minute rumour event window. The second 
approach consists of including each ECB rumour event as the sixty-minute volatility response 
pattern as specified by equation (2.11).11 In this case, also the macroeconomic control variables 
are modelled through their volatility responses as specified by equations (2.7) - (2.10). The 
coefficient estimates ?̂?𝑘 for this second approach captures the degree to which absolute returns, 
during each rumour event window, load onto the pre-specified volatility response pattern.  
Table 2.6 provides empirical results for the first approach. The rumour events are ranked by the 
magnitude of their coefficient estimates attached to the sixty-minute dummy variables. Of the 
63 rumour events, 25 events result in a significant increase in the volatility of absolute returns. 
The largest increase is associated with the arrival of a rumour stating that the ECB Governing 
Council has drawn up a proposal which calls for quantitate easing to the magnitude of €50 
billion on a monthly basis. To provide an example, the coefficient estimate of 3.475 for this 
rumour, implies an exp(3.475/2) − 1 = 209.05% increase in the volatility of absolute returns 
for the respective event arrival.  
The results presented in Table 2.6 show that the significant rumour events have a positive shock 
on absolute returns. In line with expectations, all of these rumours produce a positive impact 
on volatility, with no rumour having a significant and negative impact. 
The above analysis based on the use of dummy variables provides little insight into how the 
volatility process during the event window evolves. I therefore move on to the second approach 
outlined that should allow greater insight into the immediate and ensuing volatility impact of 
rumour events.  
  
                                                             
11 In this case, the 𝐼𝑘(𝑡, 𝑛) variables take the value of the volatility response pattern as specified in equation (2.11) for all the 63 rumour 
events. 
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Table 2.6 
Rumours of European Central Bank action: effects on the volatility of 1-minute EUR-USD of exchange rate 
absolute returns for a sixty-minute event window per event. Details given for coefficient estimates of the 25 
ECB rumour events found to be statistically significant. (R2 = 0.1018) 
ECB rumour events  Coefficient 
𝝀?̂? 
t-Stat Inferred 
increase in 
volatility (%)  
ECB Sources: QE proposal calls for roughly €50 billion in 
bond buying per month  
3.475 4.745 209.054 
ECB Sources: Governing council considering negative 
deposited rate of 0.1% 
3.102 4.237 173.531 
ECB Sources: Existential threat to Euro if fiscal policy reform 
is not tackled 
3.061 4.181 169.986 
ECB Sources: Governing council may not have reached lower 
bound on key rate 
2.894 3.953 156.389 
ECB Sources: Central bankers to challenge Draghi on 
leadership style 
2.644 3.611 138.006 
ECB Sources: Governing council likely to refrain from new 
measures for next few months  
2.609 3.563 135.594 
ECB Sources: Said to allow 24 hours to make smaller ABS 
purchases  
2.598 3.549 134.883 
ECB Sources: New ECB action next week is unlikely 2.514 3.434 129.317 
ECB Sources: ECB raising ELA for Greek banks to €71 
billion 
2.110 2.882 105.663 
ECB Sources: ECB and Treasury building emptied under 
security concern   
2.096 2.862 104.906 
ECB Sources: Rate change unlikely. LTRO not on top of the 
communication agenda 
2.079 2.839 104.021 
ECB Sources: ECB to accept Greek bonds as collateral if deal 
is reached  
2.026 2.759 101.293 
ECB Sources: ECB won't accept Greek bond swap and wants 
full repayment 
2.017 2.755 100.860 
ECB Sources: ECB has approved additional €400 billion for 
Greek banks as emergency liquidity  
1.860 2.540 93.239 
ECB Sources: ECB cites barriers to QE. Need to let old 
measures work 
1.799 2.456 90.418 
ECB Sources: ECB to allow Greek banks ELA up to €60 
billion 
1.723 2.352 87.047 
ECB Sources: Bundesbank still striving to put limits on ECB 
QE 
1.716 2.344 86.765 
ECB Sources: Bundesbank sources say they are willing to 
accept significant stimulus package  
1.652 2.180 84.038 
ECB Sources: Weidmann opposed to today's rate cut 1.574 2.113 80.810 
ECB Sources: No major policy change expected in January  1.537 2.099 79.335 
ECB Sources: ECB buying Spanish short dated covered bonds 1.401 2.091 74.108 
ECB Sources: Markets over interpreting possibility of QE. No 
consensus but intense debate 
1.385 2.068 73.543 
ECB Sources: Preparing package of measures, including cuts 
to all 3 rates for June meeting  
1.324 1.976 71.312 
ECB Sources: Governing council prefer additional time to 
assess current measures 
1.277 1.972 69.672 
ECB Sources: G.C discussing ABS purchases worth up to 
€500 billion which could start this year 
1.268 1.970 69.351 
 
Table 2.7 reports empirical results of the loading coefficient ?̂?𝑘 for rumour events k. The 
coefficient estimates are based on OLS estimation of equation (2.5) where the 𝐼𝑘(𝑡, 𝑛) variables 
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refer to the predetermined volatility response patterns associated with the ECB rumour event 
windows, as specified in equation (2.11). Of the 63 event windows following ECB rumour 
arrival, 20 events are found to have significant loading coefficient ?̂?𝑘.  
The rumour events are ranked by order of biggest instantaneous impact on absolute returns 
calculated as exp (?̂?𝑘 ∙ 𝛾(0) 2⁄ ) − 1. To provide an example, the estimated loading coefficient 
for the ECB rumour; “ECB Sources: QE proposal calls for roughly €50 billion in bond buying 
per month” implies exp (?̂?𝑘 ∙ 𝛾(0) 2⁄ ) = exp ((3.692 ∙ 0.615)/2) = 3.11. This is equivalent 
to approximately 211%  ((3.11 − 1) ∙ 100)) instantaneous increase in the one-minute absolute 
return interval following the arrival of this rumour.  
The cumulative impact obtained by applying equation (2.12) is as large as 262.41. Given that 
one-minute average absolute returns, during the 1430 to 1530 GMT event window for this 
rumour, are approximately equal to 0.013% and that average cumulative absolute returns for 
the trading days in the sample equals 11%, the arrival of this ECB rumour has an average 
increase of approximately (134.95 ∙ 0.013)/11 = 15.95% in cumulative absolute returns.  
The twenty rumour events found to significantly load onto the volatility response patterns of 
equation (2.11) are the same as those found to have the most significant coefficients in Table 
2.6 - when the rumour event window was a basic 60-minute dummy variable for each event. 
This would suggest that rumour events with the biggest volatility impact load onto the 
predetermined volatility response pattern more effectively.  
Figure 2.8 depicts the shape of the estimated volatility response patterns calculated as  ?̂?(𝑘, 𝑖) =
?̂?𝑘 ∙ 𝛾(𝑖) for the 5 ECB rumour event windows with the biggest loading coefficients. Such 
patterns are dependent on the degree to which absolute returns during ECB rumour events load 
onto the decay structures given by equation (2.11).  
The volatility decay structure following rumour arrival is more complex than that of 
macroeconomic information. There are instantaneous jumps in the volatility of absolute returns 
in the first minute interval following rumour arrival.  
Such jumps are then followed by a sharp increase is volatility that reaches its peak at the 6th 
minute interval. At this point the volatility declines gradually before increasing again following 
the 40th one-minute interval. For flexibility, by design, the 7th order polynomial set out in 
equation (2.11) does not reach zero. This is justified given that volatility persistence is evident, 
form Figure 2.8, up to the 60th minute and beyond.   
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Table 2.7 
Rumours of European Central Bank action: effects on the volatility of 1-minute EUR-USD exchange rate absolute 
returns. Details given for the 20 Rumour events which are found have significant ‘loading’ coefficient ?̂?(𝑘, 𝑖)  
estimates for the volatility decay structure set out by equation (2.11). (R2 = 0.1032) 
ECB rumour events  Coefficient 
?̂?(𝒌) 
t-Stat Instantaneou
s increase in 
volatility (%) 
Increase 
in daily 
cumulativ
e absolute 
returns 
(%) 
ECB Sources: QE proposal calls for roughly €50 
billion in bond buying per month  
3.692 4.544 211.199 15.949 
ECB Sources: Governing council considering 
negative deposited rate of 0.1% 
3.190 3.926 166.647 13.166 
ECB Sources: Existential threat to Euro if fiscal 
policy reform is not tackled 
2.775 3.415 134.711 10.415 
ECB Sources: Governing council may not have 
reached lower bound on key rate 
2.720 3.347 130.774 9.363 
ECB Sources: Central bankers to challenge Draghi 
on leadership style 
2.671 3.287 127.350 9.796 
ECB Sources: Governing council likely to refrain 
from new measures for next few months  
2.624 3.230 124.089 9.523 
ECB Sources: Said to allow 24 hours to make 
smaller ABS purchases  
2.512 3.092 116.500 8.894 
ECB Sources: New ECB action next week is 
unlikely 
2.249 2.768 99.674 7.519 
ECB Sources: ECB raising ELA for Greek banks to 
€71 billion 
2.185 2.688 95.760 6.689 
ECB Sources: ECB and Treasury building emptied 
under security concern   
2.184 2.688 95.712 6.685 
ECB Sources: Rate change unlikely. LTRO not on 
top of the communication agenda 
2.177 2.680 95.318 6.656 
ECB Sources: ECB to accept Greek bonds as 
collateral if deal is reached  
2.154 2.650 93.904 4.535 
ECB Sources: ECB won't accept Greek bond swap 
and wants full repayment 
2.110 2.597 91.333 6.359 
ECB Sources: ECB has approved additional €400 
billion for Greek banks as emergency liquidity  
2.086 2.567 89.919 5.292 
ECB Sources: ECB cites barriers to QE. Need to let 
old measures work 
2.067 2.544 88.829 4.274 
ECB Sources: ECB to allow Greek banks ELA up 
to €60 billion 
2.067 2.539 88.793 6.646 
ECB Sources: Bundesbank still striving to put 
limits on ECB QE 
1.935 2.382 81.313 5.620 
ECB Sources: Weidmann opposed to today's rate 
cut 
1.911 2.351 79.961 4.672 
ECB Sources: No major policy change expected in 
January  
1.895 2.332 79.063 5.876 
ECB Sources: Bundesbank sources say they are 
willing to accept significant stimulus package  
1.792 2.206 73.510 3.498 
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Figure 2.8 
Estimated volatility response pattern for ECB rumour event windows. Five Rumour events with the largest 
volatility response factor are graphed below.  
 
 
All in all, the empirical findings detailed in this section show that there is a significant increase 
in the volatility of EUR-USD absolute returns for 60-minute event windows during which ECB 
rumours arrive and circulate on Twitter. The rumour events with the biggest volatility impact 
follow quite similar volatility response patterns - producing jumps in absolute returns as large 
as 211% and increases in cumulative daily absolute returns as large as 15%. These findings 
point to the existence of a form of actionable market information able to explain a significant 
share of the large volatility in the EUR-USD spot exchange rate.   
As a further test of the central hypothesis, I carry out empirical estimates of equation (2.5) for 
a split sample of days with rumour and days without rumour. Due to the existence of days with 
multiple rumours, this is tantamount to 58 days (83,520 observations) with rumours and 356 
days (512,640) without rumours. The R2 for the sample with and without ECB rumours 
calculate to 0.1032 and 0.0933 respectively. This is tantamount to a 10.61% improvement in 
explaining excess volatility with the discernment of ECB rumours.  
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2.6 Conclusions 
This chapter identifies market relevant rumours as a form of public information that has been 
largely overlooked by price discovery literature. I present a new database of previously 
undetected public information that is able to explain a substantial share of the excess volatility 
observed on foreign exchange markets. I therefore assert that such rumours are actionable 
information as - by changing market consensus upon broadcast - they have substantial impact 
on the volatility of the EUR-USD exchange rate. More specifically, I pinpoint the arrival of 63 
rumours of forthcoming ECB action, as broadcast via Twitter, to within 1-minute accuracy. I 
show that 25 of such rumours have a pronounced impact on the volatility of 1-minute EUR-
USD of exchange rate returns for a 420-day sample period. The instantaneous increase in 
volatility during the first minute of rumour arrival is up to 211%, while the cumulative increase 
in volatility over a 60-minute window is as much as 2614. 
The findings of this chapter demonstrate the existence of financial market relevant information 
seemingly discerned by market agents but overlooked by economists.  The identification of 
rumour information events as a determinant in the price formation process offers new 
opportunities to understand the shares of volatility in financial markets left unexplained by the 
arrival of scheduled and unscheduled public information as broadcast via incumbent financial 
market news sources such as Bloomberg and Reuters. Furthermore, the hypothesis attributing 
market volatility to private information can be, to some extent, scaled down in the light of the 
existence of market rumours previously misidentified as private information that can be 
classified as public information.  
Our empirical results highlight a number of implications for both central banks and market 
regulators. The existence of such ‘actionable information’ suggests that an unofficial channel 
of communication exists between central banks and market participants. This may be a 
transmission mechanism through which sensitive information can be incrementally passed onto 
the market in order to prevent overwhelming volatility events. Alternatively, the existence of 
such rumours may be in direct violation of the central banks intent, in which case the 
acknowledgement and repudiation of such rumours is of vital importance for the central bank. 
For the market regulator there are implications in terms of informational efficiency. It is 
plausible to argue that the existence of ‘actionable rumours’ via Twitter increases the 
informational efficiency of financial markets. The network of ‘in the know’ market 
commentators provides market participants with a source of free market relevant information 
at the point of delivery – the same type of information that is often highly expensive to retrieve 
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in real time via incumbent newswires. In principle, such a reduction in the cost of information 
might mitigate informational asymmetries, making informed trading less costly and therefore 
reducing the role of speculative trading. This assertion remains valid with the caveat that 
rumours are actionable and not ‘noise’. The efficient distinction between ‘actionable rumours' 
and ‘noise' can depend on the market agent’s ability to discern reliable ‘in the know’ 
commentators. Further, the lack of regulatory jurisdiction over Twitter needs to be addressed 
given the degree to which information disseminated through Twitter can impact market prices, 
as I have shown in this chapter. The deliberate distribution of false market-relevant news via 
Twitter may result in significant volatility events beneficial to the distributor.  
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Appendix A  
Appendix A1 
List of ‘ECB sources’ stories quoted by more than 50 Twitter accounts.  
Timestamp ECB Rumour Quote  
01/10/2013 1320 ECB Sources: New LTRO may not yield benefit if launched now 
22/10/2013 1433 ECB Sources: ECB to Impose 8% capital buffer on Eurozone banks  
25/10/2013 1115 ECB Sources: Governing council hesitant over negative rates 
29/10/2013 1423 ECB Sources: No realistic prospect of refinancing or deposit rate cut 
06/11/2013 1449 ECB Sources: Rate change unlikely. LTRO not on top of the communication agenda 
07/11/2013 1605 ECB Sources: Weidmann opposed to today's rate cut 
11/11/2013 1047 ECB Sources: Considering package of stimulus for December meeting  
20/11/2013 1514 ECB Sources: Governing council considering negative deposited rate of 0.1% 
26/11/2013 1449 ECB Sources: 25 basis point rate cut and negative repo rate discussed  
06/01/2014 1530 ECB Sources: No major policy change expected in January  
28/01/2014 1139 ECB Sources: Governing council content with current monetary policy stance  
04/02/2014 0649 ECB Sources: Draghi looking closer at ending SMP sterilization  
05/02/2014 0953 ECB Sources: No consensus among Governing Council members on action tomorrow  
26/02/2014 0910 ECB Sources: No consensus among governing council members for March policy move  
13/03/2014 1423 ECB Sources: ECB and Treasury building emptied under security concern   
19/03/2014 1039 ECB Sources: Spanish banks face property reviews for ECB check-up 
02/04/2014 0909 ECB Sources: Markets over interpreting possibility of QE. No consensus but intense debate 
24/04/2014 1141 ECB Sources: No consensus among governing council members for May policy action 
13/05/2014 1104 ECB Sources: Bundesbank sources say Bubba willing to accept significant stimulus  
14/05/2014 0827 ECB Sources: Preparing package of measures, including cuts to all 3 rates for June meeting  
20/05/2014 1102 ECB Sources: Considering 6 week meeting schedule to help write minutes, take policy 
decisions  
02/06/2014 1651 ECB Sources: ECB to lead revamp of global FX code of conduct  
04/06/2014 0641 ECB Sources: Draghi is likely to signal rate cut this week, won't necessarily be last  
16/06/2014 1341 ECB Sources: Governing council likely to refrain from new measures for next few months  
26/06/2014 1434 ECB Sources: Governing council may not have reached lower bound on key rate 
22/07/2014 1251 ECB Sources: June rate cut affecting markets exactly the way Governing council want 
27/08/2014 1510 ECB Sources: New ECB action next week is unlikely  
28/08/2014 0010 ECB Sources: ECB policy action unlikely without inflation slump 
29/08/2014 1127 ECB Sources: No consensus among governing council members on QE next week 
04/09/2014 1137 ECB Sources: G.C discussing ABS purchases worth up to €500 billion which could start 
this year 
08/09/2014 0757 ECB Sources: Policy measures could amount to €500 billion 
21/10/2014 1025 ECB Sources: ECB buying Spanish short dated covered bonds 
27/10/2014 1231 ECB Sources: ECB cites barriers to QE. Need to let old measures work 
27/10/2014 1451 ECB Sources: Current stimulus may lack desired scale. QE an option 
31/10/2014 1512 ECB Sources: Existential threat to Euro if fiscal policy reform is not tackled 
03/11/2014 1023 ECB Sources: ECB considering improvement to LTRO if economy deteriorates, too early 
to say 
04/11/2014 1513 ECB Sources: Central bankers to challenge Draghi on leadership style 
06/11/2014 1055 ECB Sources: Governing council members did NOT confront Draghi at council dinner 
14/11/2014 1534 ECB Sources: Said to allow 24 hours to make smaller ABS purchases  
26/11/2014 1249 ECB Sources: Governing council prefer additional time to assess current measures 
04/12/2014 1633 ECB Sources: German ECB members opposed to new balance sheet language 
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19/12/2014 1012 ECB Sources: Considering making weaker Eurozone countries bear greater risk burden in 
QE plan  
06/01/2015 0639 ECB Sources: ECB is working on a discussion paper to execute government bond buying.  
09/01/2015 0951 ECB Sources: €500 billion plan showed to Governing council members but no decision 
made 
09/01/2015 1114 ECB Sources: ECB considering risk sharing mix for QE plan  
16/01/2015 1640 ECB Sources: QE timing, size and scope yet to be decided 
19/01/2015 1445 ECB Sources: Bundesbank still striving to put limits on ECB QE 
21/01/2015 1430 ECB Sources: QE proposal calls for roughly €50 billion in bond buying per month  
03/02/2015 0957 ECB Sources: 3 Greek banks have tapped ECB ELA window 
03/02/2015 1420 ECB Sources: ECB won't accept Greek bond swap and wants full repayment 
04/02/2015 1927 ECB Sources: ECB believes Greece may run out of cash as early as March  
05/02/2015 1347 ECB Sources: ECB to allow Greek banks ELA up to €60 billion 
10/02/2015 1202 ECB Sources: ECB to accept Greek bonds as collateral if deal is reached  
17/02/2015 1645 ECB Sources: ECB member resisting support from ECB for Greek banks 
18/02/2015 1642 ECB Sources: ECB divided over extra funds for Greek banks 
18/02/2015 2011 ECB Sources: Greek banks asked for €5 billion extra in ELA funding  
19/02/2015 0709 ECB Sources: ECB has extended ELA to Greek banks from €65 billion to €68.3 billion 
02/03/2015 1442 ECB Sources: Staff projections may show 2017 inflation target return, signal end to QE Sep 
2016 
09/03/2015 0827 ECB Sources: ECB has started QE programme 
19/03/2015 0925 ECB Sources: ECB has approved additional €400 billion for Greek banks as emergency 
liquidity  
25/03/2015 1400 ECB Sources: ECB raising ELA for Greek banks to €71 billion 
01/04/2015 1921 ECB Sources: ECB raised emergency funding cap by €700 million for Greek banks 
17/04/2015 1914 ECB Sources: ECB examines possibility of I.O.U currency in case of default 
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Appendix A2 
Histograms of parameter estimates from Monte Carlo simulation of the second step procedure. The 
following histograms are derived from 2000 trial simulations of the FFF regression. There are 53 histograms 
for each of the parameter estimates specified in equation 2.5 for the normalising constants and cosinor control 
parameters. The histograms show that parameter estimates converge to that predicted by the OLS estimation of 
equation 2.5 presented in table 2.4.  
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Chapter 3. Buy the Rumour, Sell Before the Fact 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I explore the potential effect of rumours on financial market price formation in 
the central bank pre-announcement period. I find stock market excess returns are statistically 
significantly large and positive in the 24-hour trading period immediately before scheduled 
monetary policy announcements. These excess returns are particularly observable in recent 
years, between 2011 and 2015, during which the ECB (European Central Bank) has exercised 
policy measures considered to be accommodative. The initial conjecture drawn from this 
finding is that such pre-announcement excess returns are simply a result of anticipatory 
speculation. This is in line with observations of a similar pattern in pre-announcement price 
formation found by Lucca and Moench (2015) for trading windows prior scheduled FOMC 
(Federal Open Market Committee) announcements. However, given the findings of the 
previous chapter, the following question is examined: Is the central bank pre-announcement 
anticipatory effect simply the result of new public information flows which have previously 
gone undetected?  
Based on the findings of the previous chapter, this chapter provides a simple but effective 
explanation of Lucca and Moench’s (2015) pre-FOMC drift puzzle. Chapter 2 results suggest 
that market relevant rumours broadcast by ‘in the know’ financial market commentators on 
Twitter have a significant real-time impact on the volatility of exchange rate returns. I observe 
substantial instantaneous jumps in volatility at times of rumour arrivals. Furthermore, results 
show that realised excess volatility ex-post rumour broadcast, is highly persistent and decays 
slowly. The overall finding being that the observations of the timed effect of market relevant 
rumour can explain sizable proportions of overall excess volatility. Based on these findings, it 
would be reasonable to pose the following question: can rumour occurrences, during pre-
announcement trading hours, explain the pre-central bank drift and therefore solve the pre-
announcement puzzle. 
I expand the data set from the previous chapter to six years of observations for ‘ECB sources’ 
stories broadcast on Twitter and corresponding stock and currency intraday return observations. 
Employing the same model as Lucca and Moench (2015), I isolate pre-ECB return windows 
and test for excess returns above other non-pre-ECB trading periods. Empirical results here, 
show that average excess returns earned on the stock market, in the 24-hour trading window 
immediately prior the 55 ECB Governing Council’s scheduled policy announcement in the 
sample, are positive, statistically significant and substantially higher than all other days. The 
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implication is that the pre-announcement drift is also observable in European markets pre-ECB 
windows. This contrasts with Lucca and Moench (2015) findings that show the pre-
announcement drift is only observable for scheduled FOMC announcements and no other 
central banks. I conjecture that this is simply due to the sample period in question. Their sample 
period concludes in 2011, whereas the sample period here is from November 2010 through 
November 2015. I suggest that the major changes in the ECB’s balance sheet, policy mandate 
and expansion of policy tools from 2011 onwards may be, in part, the reason behind the 
divergence in results.  
Then I carry out the same analysis for a corresponding sample of EUR/USD exchange rate 
returns to test for a potential pre-announcement exchange rate drift. The EUR/USD exchange 
rate is the most actively traded spot currency market in the world, the economic valuation of 
which is fundamentally linked to investor expectations of the future monetary policy decisions 
of central banks in the E.U and U.S. Findings show no pre-ECB drift for the currency market 
over various specifications of return windows. I also find no statistically significant drift when 
the sample is split to account for any potential divergence in the anticipatory effect between 
periods of policy tightening and easing.  
Having established the existence of a pre-ECB announcement drift in the DAX index 
(Deutscher Aktienindex), yet no existence of pre-ECB drift in the EUR/USD exchange rate, I 
test for the effect of rumours on the pre-announcement anticipatory effect. 
I survey a five-year dataset (November 2010 through November 2015) of ‘ECB sources’ 
(Appendix 3.1) and isolate ‘in the know’ rumour broadcasts on Twitter which occur in any 36-
hour window prior scheduled ECB Governing Council policy announcements. In total, there 
are 30 pre-ECB windows where a relevant rumour has been observed on Twitter and 25 
windows for which no rumours are detected12. By re-estimating Lucca and Moench’s (2015) 
model, with a rumour/no-rumour conditional pre-ECB explanatory factor I show that the pre-
ECB drift is in fact rumour conditional. I show that for pre-ECB return windows where rumours 
are observed, average excess returns earned on the DAX above all other days are large and 
statistically significant. Further, average excess returns are orders of magnitude smaller and 
statistically insignificant on pre-ECB windows where there are no observations of ‘ECB 
sources’ stories. This finding is consistent for a variety of pre-ECB return windows and for full 
and split samples.  
                                                             
12 For the slightly longer currency market sample window of 56 schedule ECB Governing Council 
announcements we observe 31 pre-ECB windows with rumours and 25 without. 
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I repeat the rumour/no-rumour specified model again, for the corresponding currency market 
sample. I find no drift when the full return sample is tested of both rumour and rumour-less pre-
ECB return windows. When the full sample of EUR/USD exchange rate returns are split 
between policy tightening and easing periods, the pre-ECB drift is highly significant and 
rumour dependent. Results show that pre-ECB return windows with observations of a rumour, 
produce average excess returns which are statistically significant and positive for the tightening 
cycle and, statistically significant and negative for the easing cycle. Meanwhile for pre-ECB 
windows where no rumours are observed, excess returns are not statistically different from zero.  
Empirical results show that the pre-announcement drift is rumour conditional and less puzzling 
than previously assumed. This finding is in line with the most compelling case put forward by 
Lucca and Moench (2015) for explaining the ‘drift’. They suggest that investors could be 
subject to more complex information flows than those detected in standard theory. In this 
chapter, I assert that those information flows include the arrival of new publicly available 
information in rumour form pertaining to forthcoming ECB policy action. These rumours have 
the standard theoretical effect of an ensuing risk adjusted price formation process.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the pre-
announcement effect in more detail and formally reviews the relevant literature covering this 
topic. Section 3.3 outlines in more detail the rumour driven price formation process in the pre-
announcement window and relevant literature. Section 3.4 presents a review of the ECB’s 
mandate, policy tools, recent monetary policy decisions and meeting schedule. Section 3.5 
provides a description of the datasets used. Section 3.6 sets out the methodological approach. 
Section 3.7 discusses the empirical findings. Section 3.8 presents the concluding remarks.      
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3.2 Pre-Announcement Price Formation 
Scheduled financial market relevant macroeconomic public information events have been 
shown to have variable influence on the price formation process for a cross section of 
international securities markets (see Andersen et al. (2003), French and Roll (1986) and 
Mitchell and Mulherin (1994) among others). The price impact is however, considerably more 
apparent and larger in magnitude when the subject of the macroeconomic public information 
announcement is a major data release (CPI, GDP and Employment reports) or central policy 
directive (Andersen and Bollerslev (1997)). Further, the market variation is larger still, if the 
content of the announcement departs significantly from expectations (see Kuttner (2001) and 
Faust et al. (2007)). The ex-post macroeconomic public information announcement price 
discovery process is well documented. The ex-ante macroeconomic public information 
announcement price formation process has not been fully explained yet. Volatility jumps 
(Bauwens et al. (2005)) and liquidity slumps (Riordan et al. (2013)) have been noted as price 
formation properties in stock, currency and bond markets during pre-announcement return 
windows for scheduled macroeconomic public information events. Pre-announcement volatility 
has been largely attributed to private information flows (Li et al. (2015)). Order flow 
irregularities found during pre-announcement windows where public information is under 
embargo agreements, has been identified as further evidence of pre-announcement trading 
based on asymmetric information (Bernile et al. (2016)). Overall though, returns earned (the 
first moment of price) in such pre-announcement windows have been found to be statistically 
and economically insignificant (Lucca and Moench (2015)).  
However, pre-central bank policy announcement returns have been found to differ from other 
schedule macroeconomic public information announcements. For instance, Lucca and Moench 
(2015) find that the pre-FOMC announcement price formation departs from most pre-
announcement price discovery studies. More specifically, they find significant consistent large 
excess returns prior to scheduled FOMC meetings. This pre-announcement effect, which they 
refer to as ‘drift’, is also in contradiction to the expected pre-announcement price formation 
process as defined by fundamental theories of financial economics. According to the standard 
asset pricing theory, excess returns earned on the market should be zero during pre-
announcement periods when there are no observations of new market relevant information. 
Scholars have proposed a number of theories to explain such price formation anomalies, 
including the high volatility/low liquidity market maker premium (Campbell and Hentschel 
(1992) and Amihud (2002)), systematic risk premium due to the oversensitivity to central bank 
policy decisions (Bernanke and Kuttner (2005)) and informational frictions (Tetlock (2011)). 
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Factors associated with such theories are accounted for and ruled out by Lucca and Moench 
(2015). They find no evidence of significant variation in volatility and trading volume when 
compared to other return windows. Informational asymmetry is largely dismissed due to the 
mandated FOMC ‘blackout period’13. Although this finding is contradicted with recent findings 
presented by Berline et al. (2015), who show significant order flow disparity during the pre-
central bank announcement period which are assumed to lead to significant abnormal profits. 
They infer that such order flows must be associated with asymmetrically informed traders. 
Moreover, the systematic risk premium argument is contradicted by their findings which show 
that pre-FOMC excess returns substantially exceed the almost zero average excess returns 
earned on all post-FOMC windows studied. It is these contradictions that lead Lucca and 
Moench (2015) to label the pre-FOMC drift a ‘puzzle’. The pre-FOMC excess returns are 
categorised as unconditional realised earnings and Lucca and Moench 2015 focus their analysis 
on the searching for a risk based explanation of both the pre-announcement earning and the lack 
of post-announcement excess returns.  
This study contributes to the existing literature by using a previously untapped database of 
central bank relevant rumours observed on Twitter, to provide an explanation of the above 
puzzle. More specifically, I show that pre-ECB announcement excess returns, are positive, 
significant and rumour conditional. Moreover, the pre-announcement rumours I observe on 
Twitter are mostly market positive in tone, potentially explaining the consistent positive 
direction of excess returns. I also conjecture that post-announcement earnings are subdued due 
to the ex-ante risk adjusted price formation process anecdotally referred to as ‘buying the 
rumour and selling the fact’. That is, the information content of the announcement has been in 
part, priced when market agents trade on the rumour in the pre-announcement window. This 
argument is supported with a simple comparative look at rumours and respective realised policy 
outcomes. The ECB’s policy decisions predominantly lead to the maintenance of the status quo 
rather than to take action, thus resulting in a negative market reaction following positive rumour 
driven drift. This coupled with large positive excess returns when new measures are announced 
plausibly cancel out to an almost zero ex-post stock market excess return.  
                                                             
13 The ‘blackout period’ is a mandatory quiet period prior FOMC meetings during which member are barred 
from speaking about their opinions of the policy development process.  
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3.3 Rumour Driven Price Formation 
Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) were among the first to consider the price effect of market 
relevant rumours by considering takeover stories published in financial newspapers. They 
found that speculative stories of potential mergers and acquisitions published in the Wall Street 
Journal result in significant changes in the ‘price trends’ for the acquired firm’s equity during 
the pre-acquisition windows. Similar findings of rumour conditional equity price variation have 
been presented by Zivney et al. (1996), Gao and Oler (2012) and Chou et al. (2015). More 
recently, Ahern and Sosyura (2015) carry out more in-depth analysis of similar rumours 
published in the mainstream financial U.S. press. They find that the majority (circa 67%) of 
firm specific rumours printed at source do not lead to a realised true outcome. Their findings 
show that stock prices of rumoured takeover targets are rumour conditional and that such price 
movements are unconditional of the accuracy of the reported rumour. There is, therefore, 
substantial empirical evidence pointing to a rumour conditional stock price effect.    
The above literature finds evidence that rumours pertaining to firm specific factors such as 
takeovers, earnings reports, hiring and firing, have been found to play some role in the price 
formation process. This finding is in part supportive of the findings in this and the previous 
chapter. At an elementary level, they all show that rumours, irrespective of realised accuracy 
have a market price impact.  However, the findings presented in the literature fail to show the 
real-time price formation effect of rumours. This is usually a by-product of rumour datasets 
which are not timestamped to a high enough frequency. Moreover, the rumours studied are all 
pertaining to firm specific factors and it would be valid to suggest that the role of firm specific 
rumours is limited given that they amount to idiosyncratic noise in the wider market context, 
which based on fundamental financial theory, can be diversified away in any long run return 
window.  
There is very limited research into the systematic influence of rumours on macro-markets. 
Oberlechner and Hocking (2004) show, using questionnaire and interview data, that traders 
implement currency market transactions based on informal communications with ‘in the know’ 
journalists and sources. Their intuition and survey findings are in line with the empirical results 
of this thesis, however in the absence of an empirical sample of timestamped market relevant 
rumours, it is difficult to identify an associated real-time price discovery process. The intuition 
is that market relevant rumours carry an informational risk premium. Kosfeld’s (2005) build on 
Banerjee’s (1993) findings to show that if the spread of a rumour is wide enough, through word 
of mouth, then such rumours can cause a significant ‘price run-up’. The model is built on the 
assumption that rumours transmit more effectively in locality and not in global informational 
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networks. I would argue that this theoretical model can be expanded to include a more global 
outreach for a given rumour since the existence of social media outlets have been shown to lead 
to rapid rumour diffusion (Nekovee et al. (2007)). The rapid global transmission combined with 
the macroeconomic information content of ECB Twitter rumours, would intuitively suggest 
that a systematic risk factor is at play so that a market return premium must be commanded.     
In the second chapter of this thesis results showed real-time price discovery in the foreign 
exchange markets associated with the real-time arrival of central bank relevant rumours. This 
finding provides fundamental evidence that market relevant rumours, as broadcast on Twitter, 
if discerned by market agents, convey a certain amount of new information which is then at 
least in part priced.  
In this chapter, I find evidence showing that investors can earn significant excess returns (the 
first moment of price) on both stock and currency markets in correspondence of rumours 
relating to forthcoming macroeconomic news. The pre-ECB drift can be characterised, based 
on the results of this chapter, as a rumour conditional systematic risk premium. This finding 
asserts the importance of financial market rumours as a price determining factor, for which risk 
premium should be demanded based on rational expectations theory. 
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3.4 European Central Bank Policy and Governing Council Meetings 
The European Central Bank (ECB) Governing Council is the independent monetary policy 
setting body for the Eurosystem. The Governing Council consists of six members of the 
Executive Board and the governors of the national central banks of all Eurozone (euro area) 
countries. They are mandated to supervise the banking system in the Eurosystem and to set the 
monetary policy for the euro area. The latter is the primary mandate of concern for this chapter. 
The council convenes twice per month. At one of these meetings the council discuss the 
ancillary tasks associated with the ECB and Eurosystem. Whereas, at the other, the council 
convenes to assess economic and monetary changes and takes monetary policy decision. The 
monetary policy decision had, up until January 2015, been taken once a month and announced 
to the financial press under embargoed conditions to be broadcast at 1345 CET on the day of a 
Governing Council meeting14. The monetary policy decision is followed by a press conference 
at 1430 CET, where the president and vice president of the Executive Board explain to the 
world press the decisions taken during the monetary policy meeting. These meetings and 
announcements are scheduled in advance, the times and dates of which are known to traders 
and investors. The ECB has historically convened for unscheduled meetings and ensuing 
associated announcements resulting from such meetings, however by definition such 
unscheduled meetings are of little interest to the research presented in this chapter since they 
don’t tend to command sufficient associated rumour/chatter. Further, such meetings have 
occurred relatively infrequently, accordingly any comparative analysis of pre-ECB 
schedule/unscheduled announcement return windows would suffer from small sample bias. 
Governing council members also frequently give interviews and provide comments to the world 
press, however for a 7-day window prior key meetings they observe a compulsory quiet period 
(formerly termed “purdah”) during which Governing Council members must have no 
communication with market participants or the press. I see it as intuitive that during such quiet 
periods, rumours may carry more traction. The analysis in this chapter by construction, utilises 
this quiet period, particularly the 36-24-hour window immediately before scheduled 
announcements.      
Given that the financial market sample length is selected based on the availability and 
widespread use of Twitter from November, 2010 through November, 2015, the ensuing 
discussion will focus on ECB policy implementation during this sample window.     
                                                             
14 Since January 2015 the Governing Council takes monetary policy decisions once every six weeks rather than 
every month. The announcement procedure and timing has remained the same.  
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The ECB’s statutory monetary policy mandate has, since its inception, been to set key interest 
rates and to supply reserves with the primary objective of maintaining stable inflation 
expectations. From the onset of the financial crisis and subsequent European debt crisis, this 
mandate has evolved to include alternative non-standard policy tools beyond rate setting and 
money supply. The mandated objective of managing inflation expectations has also evolved to 
include objectives of boosting economic growth, maximising employment and sovereign bond 
market stability (see Eser and Schwaab (2016), Lenza et al. (2010) and Eser et al. (2012)) by 
means of non-standard policy tools. The first of these non-standard policies, such as the 
Securities Market Programme (SMP) were introduce under the presidency of Jean Claud 
Trichet. During the latter year of his presidency (October 2010 through October 2011), 
accommodative policy tools were adopted alongside the upward adjustment of key interest rates 
to curb sovereign debt market instability while anchoring inflation above the ECB’s medium-
term target of 2%. I consider this period to be a period of relative policy tightening, particularly 
for the EUR/USD currency market given the interest rate fundamentals at play.      
Mario Draghi’s tenure began in November, 2011 with a significant shift in the ECB’s policy 
stance with a reduction to the key interest rate by 25 basis points. The years since have included 
further interest rate reductions, as well as the introduction of further accommodative monetary 
policy tools. These non-standard policy measures, along with the bank’s balance sheet have 
been significantly expanded during the presidency of Mario Draghi from November, 2011 
through November, 2015. I consider this period to be a policy easing cycle during which I 
expect some differences in the market price formation. This expectation is based on the findings 
presented by Andersen et al. (2007) which show a notable difference in the price formation 
process during alternative business cycles. The findings show that both stock and currency 
market excess returns earned during pre-ECB announcement windows differ considerably 
during tightening and easing cycles.   
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3.5 Data Description 
3.5.1 DAX Stock Index Data 
The Deutscher Aktienindex (DAX) is a stock market index consisting of the 30 largest German 
companies trading on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. The exchange opens 0900 CET and closes 
1730 CET. The market trades during, prior and post ECB monthly policy announcements and 
news conferences. It is widely considered to be the benchmark stock index for the largest 
economy in the Eurozone and one of the most actively traded indices globally. I consider the 
DAX to be a good indicator of equity market price formation prior ECB policy decisions due 
to the relative size and the prominence of the index in the Eurozone economy. Further, given 
the macroeconomic implications of ECB policy decisions, systemic risk factors associated with 
such policy decisions should be part of the price formation process in the Eurozone’s largest 
national benchmark index.  
I source the DAX index data from OLSENDATA (www.olsendata.com), one of the largest 
global suppliers of historical intraday data. I have chosen to utilise 5-minute interval 
observations of index level data to accommodate the creation of different length trading 
windows to investigate price formation during the periods prior to ECB announcements. The 
data supplied consists of index level quotes for a period spanning from November 05, 2010 to 
September 16, 2015 (245 weeks, 1225 trading days), totalling in 124,950 observations. The 
sample is filtered to exclude non-trading days, partial trading days and public holidays. The 
sample period is specifically chosen to coincide with the availability of Rumour data sourced 
from Twitter.com. Descriptive statistics for the log returns in percentage points for this sample 
are provided in Table 3.1 below: 
Table 3.1 
Descriptive statistics for full sample intraday five-minute DAX returns (%). 
 Mean St. Dev  Skewness Kurtosis Min Max Obs. 
DAX 5-minute 
Returns 
3.499x10-4 0.1284 -1.012 84.06 -3.854 3.396 124,950 
 
The analysis focuses primarily on DAX returns around scheduled ECB Governing Council 
meetings, the associated policy decisions announcement and press conference. The DAX 
sample spans a period during which 55 ECB Governing Council meeting policy decisions are 
announced. The intraday 5-minute interval data is chosen to accommodate the formation of 
various trading periods prior the policy announcement and press conference window. The 
cumulative five-minute returns are calculated for the 24-hour period from 1300 CET on the day 
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before a scheduled ECB policy decision announcement until 1300 CET on the day of the 
announcement or 45 minutes before the scheduled policy decision announcement. By 
construction cumulative returns calculated during this time period do not include ECB 
Governing Council decision outcomes, thus allowing the investigation of the rumour impact 
and the anticipatory effects associated with ECB announcements. For the purpose of 
completeness, I also compute and investigate samples of returns for the close-close period for 
the trading day 24-hours prior the ECB announcement window, as well as partial trading day 
cumulative returns for the Close-1300 CET trading window before ECB announcements.  
Table 3.2 
Descriptive statistics for the cumulative excess returns (%) on the DAX index for all computed daily and partial 
day samples  
Sample Mean St. Dev.  Skewness Kurtosis Min Max Obs. 
Pre-ECB Announcement Window 
DAX Open-Close 
 
0.0847 1.233 1.213 5.884 -2.579 4.416 55 
DAX 1300-1300 
 
0.5016 1.184 -0.1091 3.770 -2.534 3.390 55 
DAX Close-1300 
 
0.5510 0.7300 0.0083 4.675 -1.924 2.315 55 
Other (Non-Pre-ECB days) 
DAX Open-Close 
 
0.0321  1.309 -0.3165 5.569 -6.237 5.443 1169 
DAX 1300-1300 
 
0.0132 1.341 -0.5702 6.601 -6.936 7.238 1169 
DAX Close-1300 
 
0.0342 1.029 -0.4116 6.1791 -5.755 4.450 1169 
 
I use Bloomberg to collect data on the risk-free rate throughout the entire November 05, 2010 
to September 16, 2015 sample. To capture any potential impact on risk adjusted investment 
decisions from the variability in the risk-free asset returns, I use the daily rate on three-month 
German bills to calculate the log excess returns for each tested sample. Table 3.2 provides 
descriptive statistics for the pre-ECB windows and for all other non-pre-ECB trading periods. 
DAX Open-Close is the log excess returns on the DAX index. DAX 1300-1300 is the cumulative 
log excess returns on the DAX index from 1300 CET on date 𝑡 − 1 to 1300 CET on date 𝑡. 
DAX Close-1300 is the cumulative log excess returns on the DAX index from the closing price 
on date 𝑡 − 1 to 1300 CET on date t.   
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3.5.2 Euro-US Dollar Exchange Rate Data 
The Euro-US dollar currency market is the largest in the world by number of transactions per 
day. It opens 2300 CET Sunday and is subject to a 24-hour trading day until 2300 CET Friday. 
Pre-market (weekend) trading is available through some exchanges, however trading volume is 
relatively illiquid when compare to standard non-weekend trading (Chaboud et al. 2014). The 
markets opening hours overlap geographic trading days in Tokyo, Sydney, Frankfurt, London 
and New York; the most active financial centres. This 24-hour trading day allows the 
investigation of price formation during the full weekly information cycle.  
I source EUR/USD exchange rate data from OLSENDATA (www.olsendata.com). I utilise 
observations of 5-minute interval exchange rate data to accommodate the creation of non-
standard trading windows to investigate price formation during the pre-ECB window in the 
currency market. Exchange rate observations consists of exchange rate quotes for a period 
spanning from November 09, 2010 to November 20, 2015 (253 weeks, 1264 trading days), 
totalling in 364,032 observations. Quote data is available for weekend trading hours (Sunday) 
however, I choose to omit these observations due to poor levels of liquidity and the prevalence 
of non-trading intervals. Further, I omit half trading days and major holidays during which 
trading is considerably less active. Descriptive statistics for the log returns in percentage points 
for this sample are provided in Table 3.3 below: 
Table 3.3 
Descriptive statistics for full sample intraday five-minute EUR/USD exchange rate returns (%). 
 Mean St. Dev.  Skewness Kurtosis Min Max Obs. 
EUR/USD       
5-minute 
Returns 
-6.312x10-5 0.0361 -0.1757 68.13 -1.918 1.586 364,032 
 
I perform additional analysis on EUR/USD returns around scheduled ECB Governing Council 
meetings, the associated policy decisions announcement and press conference. The EUR/USD 
sample is a slightly longer sample which spans a period during which 56 ECB Governing 
Council meeting policy decisions are announced. The cumulative five-minute log returns are 
calculated for the 24-hour period from 1300 CET on the day before a scheduled ECB policy 
decision announcement until 1300 CET on the day of the announcement, i.e. 45 minutes before 
the scheduled policy decision announcement. By construction cumulative returns calculated 
during this time period do not include ECB Governing Council decision outcomes, thus 
allowing the investigation of the rumour impact and the anticipatory effects associated with 
ECB announcements. I also compute and investigate cumulative log returns on the EUR/USD 
67 
 
from 2300 CET on date 𝑡 − 2 to 2300 CET on date 𝑡 − 1. This timeframe by design captures 
any potential anticipatory effect on the trading day prior the ECB announcement window and 
excludes the morning trading period of the ECB announcement day.  
The entire sample spans a period during which the ECB conducts monetary policy measures 
which could be described as ‘tightening’ and ‘easing’. Such measures include increases, as well 
as decreases to the benchmark interest rates and quantitative easing. I define a ‘tightening cycle’ 
as the period during which the ECB increases interest rates to a peak of 1.75%. This period 
coincides with the sample period spanning November 09, 2010 to October 20, 2011. I define 
the ‘easing cycle’ as the period during which the ECB decreases interest rates from the peak of 
1.75% to 0.050%. The ‘easing cycle’ coincides with the sample period spanning October 21, 
2011 to November 20, 2015.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 charts the ECB’s key interest rate for the sample period. The chart indicates the 
tightening as well as the easing cycles defined for the sample period. It is reasonable to conclude 
that the anticipatory effect on the EUR/USD exchange rate for pre-ECB announcement 
windows which take place during tightening cycles would be very different to those observed 
during ‘easing cycles’. For this reason, I split the entire sample into ‘tightening’ and ‘easing’ 
sub-sample for further analysis.  
  
Figure 3.1 
European Central Bank benchmark interest rates during the ‘Tightening’ and ‘Easing’ cycles for entire sample 
period. 
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Table 3.4 
Descriptive statistics for the cumulative returns (%) on the EUR/USD exchange rate for all computed 24-hour 
samples.  
Sample Mean St. Dev.  Skewness Kurtosis Min Max Obs. 
Pre-ECB Announcement Window 
EUR/USD 1300-1300 
 
0.0163 0.4827 0.0618 3.647 -1.150 1.321 56 
EUR/USD 2300-2300 
 
0.0177 0.5687 1.043 4.671 -0.8797 2.060 56 
EUR/USD 1300-1300 
(Tightening) 
0.2581 0.6791 -0.4650 2.296 -1.035 1.227 11 
EUR/USD 2300-2300 
(Tightening) 
0.3699 0.7062 -0.3826 1.774 -0.7261 1.199 11 
EUR/USD 1300-1300 
(Easing) 
-0.0678 0.3959 0.7291 5.5783 -1.011 1.218 45 
EUR/USD 2300-2300 
(Easing) 
-0.0684 0.5023 1.612 8.352 -0.8797 2.060 45 
Other (Non-Pre-ECB days) 
EUR/USD 1300-1300 
 
-0.0193 0.5756 -0.4101 4.956 -3.631 1.909 1207 
EUR/USD 2300-2300 
 
-0.0198 0.5934 -0.1592 4.105 -2.198 2.201 1207 
EUR/USD 1300-1300 
(Tightening) 
-0.0276 0.7106 -0.3319 2.824 -2.267 1.686 227 
EUR/USD 2300-2300 
(Tightening) 
-0.0354 0.7328 -0.2372 2.916 -1.947 1.733 227 
EUR/USD 1300-1300 
(Easing) 
-0.0163 0.5404 -0.4477 5.921 -3.631 1.909 980 
EUR/USD 2300-2300 
(Easing) 
-0.0162 0.5565 -0.0987 4.507 -2.198 2.201 980 
 
Table 3.4 provides descriptive statistics for the pre-ECB windows and for all other non-pre-
ECB trading periods. EUR/USD 1300-1300 is the cumulative log returns on the EUR/USD 
exchange rate on date 𝑡 − 1 to 1300 CET on date 𝑡. EUR/USD 2300-2300 is the cumulative log 
returns on the EUR/USD exchange rate from 2300 CET on date 𝑡 − 2 to 2300 CET on date 𝑡 −
1. Samples labelled ‘Tightening´ are the cumulative log returns for each respective 24-hour 
period during the ECB’s tightening cycle which spans 11 ECB announcement windows and 
227 non-ECB days. Samples labelled ‘Easing´ are the cumulative log returns for each respective 
24-hour period during the ECB’s easing cycle which spans 45 ECB announcement windows 
and 980 non-ECB days.  
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3.5.3 European Central Bank  
The ECB Governing Council convenes twelve times per year (although in 2015 this schedule 
was changed to include only eight scheduled meetings per year) as part of their mandated 
monetary policy operations to review, set or adjust monetary policy for the Euro area. Following 
this meeting the ECB announces the monetary policy stance at the pre-scheduled time of 1300 
CET on a pre-scheduled date. Prior to this scheduled announcement the ECB mandates a ‘quiet 
period’ during which members of the Governing Council are not permitted to comment 
publicly, on their own opinions or the banks policy stance. The analysis is primarily concerned 
with this ‘quiet’ window, particularly the 24-hour period immediately prior the ECB policy 
announcement. For this purpose I collect the times and dates of pre-scheduled ECB Governing 
Council meetings, policy decision announcement and press conference times. I also take note 
of the key policy stance arrived upon at each meeting, as well as any significant announcements 
made during the post-meeting press conference. I source this data from the ECB’s website 
(www.ecb.europa.eu) and further details of exact announcement times from Bloomberg. Table 
3.5 presents details of ECB Governing Council meetings which are covered by the sample 
period.  
Table 3.5 
This table shows dates and outcomes of the European Central Bank’s scheduled Governing Council meetings 
throughout the sample. The second column shows the key interest rate set by the Governing Council. The 
tightening cycle is defined as that up to October 20, 2011 and the easing sample from October 21, 2011 
through November 20, 2015.  
Scheduled Date Benchmark Interest Rate Monetary Policy Decision (1345 CET) 
December 2, 2010 1.00 No Change 
January 13, 2011 1.00 No Change 
February 3, 2011 1.00 No Change 
March 3, 2011 1.00 No Change 
April 7, 2011 1.25 Increased 25 basis points  
May 5, 2011 1.25 No Change 
June 9, 2011 1.25 No Change 
July 7, 2011 1.50 Increased 25 basis points 
August 4, 2011 1.50 No Change 
September 8, 2011 1.50 No Change 
October 6, 2011 1.50 No Change 
November 3, 2011 1.25 Decreased 25 basis points 
December 8, 2011 1.00 Decreased 25 basis points 
January 12, 2012 1.00 No Change 
February 9, 2012 1.00 No Change 
March 8, 2012 1.00 No Change 
April 4, 2012 1.00 No Change 
May 3, 2012 1.00 No Change 
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June 6, 2012 1.00 No Change 
July 5, 2012 0.75 Decreased 25 basis points 
August 2, 2012 0.75 No Change 
September 6, 2012 0.75 No Change 
October 4, 2012 0.75 No Change 
November 8, 2012 0.75 No Change 
December 6, 2012 0.75 No Change 
January 10, 2013 0.75 No Change 
February 7, 2013 0.75 No Change 
March 7, 2013 0.75 No Change 
April 4, 2013 0.75 No Change 
May 2, 2013 0.50 Decreased 25 basis points 
June 6, 2013 0.50 No Change 
July 4, 2013 0.50 No Change 
August 1, 2013 0.50 No Change 
September 5, 2013 0.50 No Change 
October 2, 2013 0.50 No Change 
November 7, 2013 0.25 Decreased 25 basis points 
December 5, 2013 0.25 No Change 
January 9, 2014 0.25 No Change 
February 6, 2014 0.25 No Change 
March 6, 2014 0.25 No Change 
April 3, 2014 0.25 No Change 
May 8, 2014 0.25 No Change 
June 5, 2014 0.15 Decreased 10 basis points 
July 3, 2014 0.15 No Change 
August 7, 2014 0.15 No Change 
September 4, 2014 0.05 Decreased 10 basis points 
October 2, 2014 0.05 No Change 
November 6, 2014 0.05 No Change 
December 4, 2014 0.05 No Change 
January 22, 2015 0.05 No Change 
March 5, 2015 0.05 No Change 
April 15, 2015 0.05 No Change 
June 3, 2015 0.05 No Change 
July 16, 2015 0.05 No Change 
September 3, 2015 0.05 No Change 
October 22, 2015 0.05 No Change 
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3.5.4 Rumour Data 
It is the primary question of this chapter to determine if the circulation of rumours among 
investors and market agents can set the tone for the pre-ECB announcement anticipatory market 
price movement. It is therefore appropriate, that I focus on highly relevant market rumours 
relating to forthcoming European Central Bank actions or changes in remit. Such highly 
relevant market rumours are appropriate examples of actionable information discerned by 
market actors but not yet investigated by economists in relation to pre-event anticipatory price 
discovery.  
I source rumours and their respective time and date of broadcast through Twitter. Rumours of 
this type are quoted as ‘ECB sources’ stories. These rumours are reported by ‘in the know’ 
financial market commentators via Twitter regularly. ECB sources stories occur throughout the 
sample but they are particularly prevalent within a one-week window of the ECB’s Governing 
Council meetings. Throughout this one week window the bank mandates that members 
maintain a ‘quiet period’, during which they must not communicate any policy opinions and 
inclination. I can gauge the popularity of the ECB sources story by the number of times the 
quoted rumour is repeated. It is relatively simple to search Twitter archives for the phrase ‘ECB 
sources’. I select ECB rumour events where the quoted story is repeated by more than 10 
financial market commentators. I then perform an advanced search for the full quoted story i.e. 
“ECB Sources: ECB is working on a discussion paper to execute government bond buying 3 
different options”, and pinpoint the time of the first broadcast of the quote. For a period 
spanning November 2010 to November 2015 I observe 236 ECB rumour events. Some 
‘sources’ stories gain so much traction among financial commentators that they are then 
reported via Bloomberg professional services. A full list of 236 ‘ECB sources’ events are given 
in the appendix. 
Of the 236 observations of ECB rumours events, 33 occur during 31 of the 24-hour pre-ECB 
announcement window of the 56 pre-announcement windows. For pre-ECB windows during 
which these 31 rumours are observed the rumour dummy variable in the main regression takes 
unity value. Table 3.6 gives dates, times, details about these 31 rumour events, as well as noting 
whether the rumours signify a potential hawkish or a dovish policy decision.  
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Table 3.6 
Rumours pertaining to forthcoming ECB Governing Council policy decisions recorded on Twitter in the 24-
hour window prior the scheduled Governing Council policy announcement.  
Pre-ECB Period Time 
(CET) 
Rumour 
February 2, 2011 1554 Sources say Axel Weber not to be candidate for ECB president 
April 6, 2011 1621 ECB rate hike only start of policy process 
May 4, 2011 1317 More ECB rate hikes on the way; discussion on timing 
August 3, 2011 1711 ECB ready to buy Italian, Spanish bonds if Berlusconi commits to 
bringing reforms forward 
October 5, 2011 1312 ECB no longer pursuing plans to wean troubled banks off its lending 
support  
November 3, 2011 1104 Greek socialist MPs forging proposal for coalition government headed 
by former ECB vice-president Papademos 
December 8, 2011 1121 ECB sources say ECB sovereign bond buying remains capped at 
maximum €20bn a week 
February 8, 2012 1612 ECB not yet decided on whether to contribute to Greek debt 
restructuring 
May 2, 2012 1452 ECB getting progressively more nervous about Spain fallout. The new 
LTRO may be coming sooner than expected 
June 5, 2012 1738 Source says the ECB is facing pressure to take more non-standard 
measures but it wants governments to commit to financial integration. 
August 1, 2012 1806 According to sources, Greece is expected to finalize €11.5B of cuts in 
early-August 
August 2, 2012 0905 ECB's Draghi faces leadership test over euro pledge 
September 5, 2012 1400 ECB "sources" say bond buying will be unlimited but remain sterilized 
October 3, 2012 1359 ECB has not closed door to Greek debt maturity extension 
November 8, 2012 0940 ECB sources indicated OMT program won't be initiated any time soon 
February 6, 2013 1421 Market sources report buying of Italian bonds. The 10-year BTP yield 
is just hovering above 4.50% level. 
March 6, 2013 1750 German press reports ECB considering exiting Troika, sources then say 
reports are incorrect. 
May 01, 2013 1639 Eurosystem sources: conditions for ECB rate cut are there 
May 01, 2013 1644 ECB eyeing country-specific approach for SME lending 
June 5, 2013 1430 ECB divided on further rate cuts, further rate cut may not deliver 
desired results 
October 01, 2013 1321 ECB SOURCES: ECB likely to base LTRO decision on 2014 stress 
tests 
November 06, 2013 1452 ECB rate change unlikely. Sources Confirm No ECB Rate Cut 
Tomorrow 
January 08, 2014 1531 No major ECB policy changes expected in January 
February 05, 2014 1355 Another ECB sources rumour that board split over deflation, unclear if 
Draghi acts tomorrow 
April 02, 2014 1530 Over interpretation by market of QE possibility  
June 04, 2014 1849 Sources suggest that ECB Draghi likely to signal cut this week. 
September 04, 2014 1146 Sources report ECB Governing Council discussing ABS purchases, 
worth up to €500 billion, could start this year 
October 01, 2014 1917 Greek banks win restructuring plan reprieve in ECB tests 
November 05, 2014 1516 Central bankers to challenge Draghi on ECB leadership style 
December 03, 2014 1634 ECB sources said to prepare broad based QE package for January 
meeting 
January 21, 2015 1432 ECB exec board's QE proposal calls for roughly €50b in bond buys a 
month 
April 14, 2015 1955 ECB raises Greek bank ELA by €800 million, bringing the ceiling to 
€74 billion 
July 16, 2015 0946 Greece asks ECB for €1.5bn increase in ELA 
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3.6 Methodology 
In this section, I detail the methodological approach adopted for the findings of this chapter. I 
first outline the basic dummy variable regression model used by Lucca and Moench (2015) in 
their findings of the pre-FOMC drift. I explain how this model is adapted and developed further 
to incorporate the effect of rumours on pre-event drift. This last specification is then re-
estimated in Maximum Likelihood to account for any clusters of volatility, which are typically 
present in daily financial series.  
I begin by investigating the pre-ECB window for any potential stock market and currency 
market drift. The intention is to see if the pre-FOMC drift observed by Lucca and Moench 
(2015) is mirrored in Eurozone’s largest markets for the respective pre-ECB window. Figure 
3.2 suggests that positive stock market drift should be observable for pre-ECB announcement 
windows. Further, Figures 3.4 and 3.5 illustrate the potential existence of positive currency 
market drift during tightening cycles and negative drift for samples covering easing cycles.  
To gauge more formally the magnitude of excess returns during the 24-hour anticipatory period 
prior ECB announcements, I perform the following regression 
𝑋𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑝𝑟𝑒𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
where 𝑋𝑅𝑡 is the cum-dividend log excess daily return on the DAX over the risk free rate in 
percent.15 It is calculated by summing the 5-minute returns on the DAX for a specified trading 
period. For example, if the trading day is defined as the 24-hour period between 1300 CET on 
date 𝑡 − 1 to date 𝑡, the cumulative 5-minute returns during this return window will form a one 
day return observation for the 𝑋𝑅𝑡 vector. The sole explanatory variable is a dummy variable 
that takes unity value on 56 pre-ECB announcement periods (55 for the DAX dataset) and zero 
for all other trading periods. That is, the dummy variable takes value 1 for the daily return 
window immediately prior the scheduled ECB policy announcement (e.g. the trading day 
defined as 1300 CET at date 𝑡 − 1 to 1300 CET at date  𝑡). Coefficient 𝛽1 is the average excess 
return differential on pre-ECB periods versus all other trading periods when the constant is 
present. The constant 𝛼 is the unconditional average excess return earned on all periods other 
than pre-ECB periods.  
I define a second regression in order to isolate excess returns earned during the pre-ECB periods 
where rumours are present, from those periods with no rumour diffusion. The objective being 
                                                             
15 For the currency market sample 𝑋𝑅𝑡 is the log excess returns for the EUR/USD exchange rate in percent for a samples 
covering both tightening and easing cycles. 
[3.1] 
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to deduce the magnitude of the pre-ECB announcement drift which may be attributable to 
anticipatory effects resultant from rumour prevalence. I split the sole explanatory variable from 
equation (3.1) into two separate dummy variables and perform the following regression  
𝑋𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑜𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
where the dummy variable 𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡 takes unity value for 31 pre-ECB periods (30 for the 
DAX dataset) with the presence of rumours about forthcoming ECB policy announcements and 
zero for all other periods. The dummy variable 𝑁𝑜𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡 takes unity value for 25 pre-ECB 
periods where no rumours are observed about forthcoming ECB policy announcements and 
zero for all other periods. The 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 coefficients capture the average excess return 
differential on pre-ECB periods with rumours and pre-ECB periods without rumours, versus all 
other trading periods.  
I then define a third regression, by supplementing equation (3.2) with lagged dummies for the 
pre-announcement windows with and without the presence of rumours. The objective being to 
capture any potential drift that maybe taking place beyond the 24-hour window prior the 
Governing Council’s scheduled meeting. This equation is defined as follows 
𝑋𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑜𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡−2
+ 𝛽5𝑁𝑜𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑁𝑜𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡−2 + 𝜀𝑡 
where 𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡−1 and 𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡−2 are dummy variables which take unity value for trading 
windows at 2 and 3 days, respectively, prior scheduled ECB announcements when rumours are 
present. 𝑁𝑜𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡−1 and 𝑁𝑜𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡−2 are dummy variables which take unity value for 
trading windows at 2 and 3 days, respectively, prior scheduled ECB announcements when 
rumours are not present. 
The residuals from OLS regressions present departures from normality and serial correlation 
which might impair the statistical properties (asymptotic) of the estimates obtained. The next 
section details the tests implemented to determine a more appropriate method for coefficient 
estimation.  
Statistical features of the return periods generated by summing 5-minute DAX and EUR/USD 
log returns demonstrate departures from normality and could potentially suffer from serial 
correlation and conditional heteroscedasticity. Since the disturbance terms in equations (3.1) 
and (3.2) may inherit such features, least square estimators might lose consistency and deliver 
potentially spurious results (see Chien, Lee, and Wang (2002)). Based on these considerations, 
[3.2] 
[3.3] 
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I supplement the estimation strategy by using alternative methods such as HAC sandwiches 
estimators and WLS, which can better cope with ill-conditioned data.  
I re-estimate equations (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) using the following three GARCH specifications:  
𝑋𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑝𝑟𝑒𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛼2𝜎𝑡−1
2  
𝑋𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑜𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛼2𝜎𝑡−1
2  
𝑋𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑜𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡−2
+ 𝛽5𝑁𝑜𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑁𝑜𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡−2 + 𝜀𝑡 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛼2𝜎𝑡−1
2  
 
The joint estimations of mean and GARCH variance equations, which include dummy variables 
with structures similar to those defined above, can generate multi-modality in likelihood 
functions, with the peril of achieving local rather than global maxima (Doornik and Oms 
(2008)). As the number of dummy variables in the mean equation increases, the issue of multi-
modality becomes more severe. To avoid this problem, I conduct two-stage empirical 
estimations of the above GARCH models. First, I carry out OLS estimation of equation (3.4) 
and then use the residuals so obtained to estimate equation (3.5). 16 I posit that this approach is 
more suitable to deliver robust estimators with a negligible impact on the asymptotic efficiency. 
This is particularly valid given the large sample of daily returns in use. Furthermore, it has been 
shown that for similar GARCH specifications, the two-step approach is asymptotically 
equivalent to the joint estimation of the mean and variance equations (Lin, Engle, and Ito 
(1994)). 
  
                                                             
16 The same empirical exercise is carried out for equations (3.6) – (3.7) and (3.8) – (3.9). 
[3.7] 
[3.6] 
[3.9] 
[3.8] 
[3.4] 
[3.5] 
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3.7 Empirical Findings 
Throughout this section, I present the empirical findings of this chapter. First, I document 
excess return on the DAX index in anticipation of the ECB’s scheduled policy decision. I then 
investigate the nature of the pre-announcement anticipatory effect for tightening and easing 
monetary policy cycles. The influence of pre-announcement rumours on the anticipatory effect 
are then provided. Here I present the main findings of this chapter demonstrating that a sizable 
majority of the pre-announcement anticipatory effect can be attributed to the existence of pre-
event rumours. A section documenting similar findings, but for the EUR/USD dataset is then 
reported. I complete the empirical findings of this chapter by calculating, formally, the 
profitability of a trading strategy based the findings of this chapter.  
3.7.1 The Pre-ECB Announcement Stock Market Drift 
I begin by investigating 3-day return windows around scheduled ECB monetary policy 
announcement for the DAX index. I compare these to all other day triplets when there are no 
scheduled ECB scheduled announcements. Figure 3.2 illustrates the comparison between 3-day 
ECB announcement windows and all other 3-day trading windows. The bold dashed black line 
represents the average pointwise cumulative 5-minute intraday percentage return on the DAX 
for all 3-day ECB announcement windows. The announcement window is from the market open 
of the day prior to schedule ECB monetary policy announcements to the market close on the 
day following the announcement day. The average pointwise cumulative intraday return is 
calculated for 55 ECB announcement windows from November 01, 2010 to September 16, 
2015. The bold blue dashed line gives the average pointwise cumulative intraday returns, but 
for all 3-day return windows of the same definition where there are no scheduled ECB policy 
announcements. 
It is apparent from Figure 3.2 that returns on the DAX show significant upward drift in trading 
hours prior the ECB policy decision. Between the 100th trading interval (market close prior 
ECB day) and the 102nd trading interval (market open on ECB day), there is a notable jump in 
cumulative returns. This upward drift in returns continues until the ECB policy decision and it 
peaks around the time of the scheduled press conference. Just before the ECB policy 
announcement DAX returns reach levels 40 basis points higher than the market open on the 
previous day. There is a notable drop during the press conference window, followed by a period 
of consolidation for the remainder of the day. 
On the following day, returns drift negatively from open to close. The pointwise 95% 
confidence interval for average cumulative returns indicated by the grey shaded area, would 
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suggest that cumulative pre-ECB returns are positive and significantly different from zero. 
Moreover, when compare to the cumulative returns on the DAX on all other day triplets and 
associated 95% confidence interval, the pre-ECB DAX drift appears noteworthy.  
Figure 3.2 
Cumulative returns on the DAX index. This figure shows the average cumulative returns on the DAX index 
for 3-day trading windows. The dashed black line is the average cumulative returns on the DAX from 0900 CET 
24 hours prior ECB announcement days to 1730 CET 24-hours following the ECB announcement days. The 
dashed blue line shows average cumulative returns on the DAX on all other 3-day windows that do not include 
scheduled ECB announcements. The shade black and blue areas are pointwise 95% confidence intervals around 
the average cumulative returns for corresponding data sets. The sample period is from November 05, 2010 to 
September 16, 2015. The first blue arrow is set at 1345 CET, when ECB policy decisions are made public. The 
second blue arrow is set at 1430 CET, when the ECB press conference takes place. 
 
 
The pre-ECB DAX drift found for the sample appears similar to that found by Lucca and 
Moench (2015) for the S&P 500 for pre-FOMC windows. The evidence in Figure 3.2 is 
however notable, given that no pre-ECB drift was observed for their sample which spans a far 
longer time horizon. It would be plausible though, given the expansion of the ECB’s balance 
sheet and remit in recent years, that a pre-announcement anticipatory effect would be 
significantly more observable in the shorter and more recent sample. Further, Lucca and 
Moench (2015) refer to the pre-FOMC anticipatory stock market drift as a ‘puzzle’. A puzzle 
for which they offer a number of potential explanations through fundamental financial 
economic theory, yet their conclusions acknowledge; that the pre-announcement drift is an 
economic puzzle.  Having found that rumours play a significant role in the price formation 
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process in chapter 2 of this thesis; I investigate the impact of rumours on the pre-announcement 
stock market drift. I do this by re-specifying the pre-ECB return window into two independent 
return windows; those pre-ECB return windows with the presence of a relevant rumour 
broadcast by in the know market commentators on Twitter and, those pre-ECB return windows 
where no such rumour is observed. The pre-ECB trading periods where rumours are observed 
are noted and reported in Table 3.6   
The average 5-minute cumulative returns in Figure 3.2 are crude in calculation. Further, the 
cumulative returns here do not account for dividend payments and do not factor in the possible 
influence of the risk-free return. I set the dependant variable as the cum-dividend log excess 
return over the risk-free rate in percentage points on the DAX, and formally investigate the 
magnitude of the pre-ECB announcement drift by estimating the single dummy variable 
equation (3.1). To estimate the magnitude of the impact of rumour prevalence on the pre-ECB 
announcement returns, I estimate equation (3.2). For the purpose of completeness, I expand 
equation (3.2) to include return windows, which extend beyond just one day prior scheduled 
ECB announcements. The purpose being to test for a pre-announcement effect persistent 
beyond one-day prior announcements, in the presence of rumours or otherwise. I formally 
measure any persistence by estimating equation (3.3). 
I estimate all three equations with basic OLS methodology. The result of the OLS coefficient 
estimates for all three equations are presented in appendix B. Results of standard specification 
tests, show that OLS estimates may be inefficient or inaccurate due to the presence of an ARCH 
effect. To control for the latent ARCH effect, I re-estimate using the GARCH(P,Q) 
specifications outlined in equations (3.4) – (3.9). Following further robustness checks, results 
show that the conditional variance component (P) is an over-specification of the model. This 
term is subsequently dropped from the final model the results of which are presented in Tables 
3.7 – 3.11.      
Table 3.7 reports coefficient estimates for all three specification. Here, the dependant variable 
is the cum-dividend log excess daily return over the risk-free rate in percentage points on the 
DAX calculated as the sum of 5-minute returns 1300 CET on date 𝑡 − 1 to 1300 CET on date 
𝑡. The dependant variable is denoted in the table as 𝑋𝑅𝑡. This is the primary data set of interest 
given that it captures, by design, a full 24-hour return window closing before any realised ECB 
monetary policy announcement.  
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Table 3.7 
This table shows the results for the maximum likelihood estimation of equations (3.4) – (3.5), (3.6) – (3.7) and 
(3.8) – (3.9). The dependant variable is the cum-dividend log excess return (𝑋𝑅𝑡) on the DAX from 1300 CET 
on date 𝑡 − 1 to 1300 CET on date 𝑡. The sample period is from November 05, 2010 to September 16, 2015 
(1223 obs.).  This sample contains 50 scheduled ECB announcements.  In order to account for the effect of tight 
and loose monetary policies the sample is partitioned into the periods from November 05, 2010 through October 
20, 2011 (238 obs.) and from October 21, 2011 through September 2015 (987 obs.) respectively. Each partition 
contains 11 and 44 ECB announcements respectively. Results for sub-samples accounting for monetary policy 
stance are presented in the second and third panel. Coefficient estimates and standard errors are presented 
adjacent to their respective parameters. Q(4) is the Ljung-Box statistic for serial correlation up to lag 4 in 
residuals. ARCH (4) is the ARCH-LM test for heteroscedasticity in residuals up to lag 4. P-values for 
specification tests are reported in brackets. ***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. 
*** Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. 
 DAX 1300-1300 CET 
 Eq. (3.4) – (3.5) Eq. (3.6) – (3.7) Eq. (3.8) – (3.9) 
 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Constant 0.0343 0.0341 0.0349 0.0341 0.0562 0.0353 
Pre-ECBt ***0.483 0.161     
Rumourt   **0.795 0.327 **0.768 0.337 
NoRumourt   0.190 0.191 0.180 0.191 
Rumourt -1     -0.239 0.294 
Rumourt-2     -0.187 0.208 
NoRumourt-1     -0.0772 0.273 
NoRumourt-2     -0.332 0.230 
α0 ***1.144 0.0460 ***1.140 0.0469 ***1.339 0.0454 
α1 ***0.353 0.0355 ***0.355 0.0356 ***3.57 0.0373 
R2 0.005  0.009  0.011  
Q(4) 1.561 0.816 1.624 0.804 1.611 0.807 
ARCH(4) 9.988 0.000 9.918 0.000 9.650 0.000 
 DAX 1300-1300 CET (Tightening) 
Constant 0.0363 0.0943 0.0354 0.0943 0.0691 0.0990 
Pre-ECBt 0.421 0.425     
Rumourt   0.621 1.471 0.572 1.410 
NoRumourt   0.288 0.433 0.301 0.431 
Rumourt -1     0.192 0.669 
Rumourt-2     0.254 0.815 
NoRumourt-1     0.435 0.884 
NoRumourt-2     **-1.220 0.607 
α0 ***1.559 0.137 ***1.558 0.137 ***1.495 0.126 
α1 ***0.580 0.116 ***0.604 0.119 ***0.600 0.119 
R2 0.001  0.003  0.010  
Q(4) 4.324 0.364 4.345 0.361 4.426 0.351 
ARCH(4) 3.935 0.001 3.947 0.001 4.041 0.001 
 DAX 1300-1300 CET (Easing) 
Constant 0.0260 0.0378 0.0266 0.0376 0.0486 0.0391 
Pre-ECBt ***0.506 0.180     
Rumourt   **0.816 0.322 **0.789 0.331 
NoRumourt   0.159 0.236 0.151 0.237 
Rumourt -1     -0.300 0.353 
Rumourt-2     **-0.384 0.179 
NoRumourt-1     -0.0936 0.316 
NoRumourt-2     -0.0835 0.268 
α0 ***1.099 0.0541 ***1.093 0.0538 ***1.088 0.0534 
α1 ***0.168 0.0365 ***0.171 0.0365 ***0.173 0.0377 
R2 0.007  0.010  0.014  
Q(4) 1.262 0.868 1.526 0.822 1.565 0.815 
ARCH(4) 6.736 0.000 6.090 0.000 6.049 0.000 
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Result presented in column 2 of the table show that excess returns earned during 1300 – 1300 
CET pre-ECB trading windows are on average 48 basis points higher than those earned on all 
trading days, with the empirical estimate significant at the 1% level. This would indicate that 
the DAX exhibits significant positive drift in excess returns during the 24-hours immediately 
preceding the ECB policy decision announcements. The estimated coefficient on the constant 
parameter would suggest that on average 1300 – 1300 CET DAX excess returns are not 
significantly different from zero. This finding is strikingly similar to that found by Lucca and 
Moench (2015), who find a pre-FOMC drift of 49 basis points for 2pm – 2pm pre-FOMC 
windows.  
I split the sample into two periods; a tightening and an easing period to explore the potential 
for a heightened anticipatory effect based on a change in the ECB’s mandated monetary policy 
goals. The results for the tightening sample period (November 05, 2010 to October 20, 2011), 
show no significant average excess returns for 1300 – 1300 CET windows before ECB 
announcements. In stark contrast, for the easing sample period (October 21, 2011 to September 
16, 2015) I find larger, significant average excess returns of over 50 basis points for 1300 – 
1300 CET windows before policy decision announcements. These findings would indicate that 
pre-ECB drift is only observable on the DAX for the sample period during which the ECB’s 
mandate, balance sheet, and monetary policy tools were notably expanded.  
In column 3 of the same table, I report results for the coefficient estimates for parameters 
defined in equations (3.6) – (3.7). The Rumourt dummy represents the 30 pre-ECB windows 
where a relevant rumour has been observed on Twitter. The NoRumourt dummy takes unity 
value for the remaining pre-ECB windows (25) where no relevant rumours have been detected. 
Findings show that DAX excess returns, for 1300 – 1300 CET pre-ECB windows where 
rumours are observed, are statistically significant and orders of magnitude greater that all 1300 
– 1300 CET windows and pre-ECB windows without rumours. Results show that excess returns 
earned on the DAX for pre-ECB windows with rumour are on average almost 80 basis points 
higher than all other 1300 – 1300 CET windows. I find that excess returns earned on pre-ECB 
windows without rumours are on average not statistically different from all other non-ECB 
announcement periods. This result indicates that the pre-ECB anticipatory effect can be 
rationalised with the simple fundamental financial economic theory that investors trade on 
informational risk, updating their prior expectation of future large scope information events. 
This result confirms the initial hypothesis that pre-announcement effect are not due to arbitrary 
re-allocation prior to a significant public information event. Contrarily, it is a price formation 
process due to the risk weighted trading decisions made by publicly informed investors. The 
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puzzle occurs simply due to traders’ awareness about market relevant information (such as that 
available on Twitter) not yet identified by academics.  
Column 4 reports results for the coefficient estimates for parameters defined in Equations (3.8) 
– (3.9). Here I include lagged dummies to test 24-hour trading windows beyond that 
immediately prior the ECB Governing Council decision.   
Table 3.8 reports the coefficient estimates for all equation parameters as above, but where the 
dependent variable is the cum-dividend excess return on the DAX for partial trading days. The 
partial trading day is defined as the market close on date 𝑡 − 1 to 1300 CET on date 𝑡. This 
partial trading day is calculated by summing the 5-minute returns on the DAX from market 
close on date 𝑡 − 1 to 1300 CET on the following day. The dependant variable is denoted in 
the table as 𝑋𝑅𝑡. I investigate this particular return window due to the pattern observed for ECB 
day triplets in Figure 3.2. The cumulative intraday returns earned on the trading day prior ECB, 
don’t appear to exhibit drift from market open to close. The drift appears to result from an 
overnight jump followed by continuing drift during morning trading hours.  
Table 3.8 
This table shows the results for the maximum likelihood estimation of equations (3.4) – (3.5), (3.6) – (3.7) and 
(3.8) – (3.9). The dependant variable is the cum-dividend log excess return (𝑋𝑅𝑡) on the DAX from the close 
on date 𝑡 − 1 to 1300 CET on date 𝑡. The sample period is from November 05, 2010 to September 16, 2015. 
Coefficient estimates and standard errors are presented adjacent to their respective parameters.  
*** Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. 
 DAX Close-1300 CET 
 Eq. (3.4) – (3.5) Eq. (3.6) – (3.7) Eq. (3.8) – (3.9) 
 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Constant **0.0588 0.0287 **0.0588 0.0287 **0.0653 0.0297 
Pre-ECBt ***0.458 0.168     
Rumourt   **0.554 0.259 **0.548 0.259 
NoRumourt   0.348 0.223 0.341 0.223 
Rumourt -1     -0.00379 0.269 
Rumourt-2     -0.246 0.173 
NoRumourt-1     0.00138 0.193 
NoRumourt-2     -0.0345 0.190 
α0 ***0.800 0.0313 ***0.800 0.0313 ***0.800 0.0317 
α1 ***0.227 0.0288 ***0.226 0.0287 ***0.224 0.0311 
R2 0.010  0.011  0.014  
Q(4) 1.340 0.247 1.263 0.261 1.280 0.258 
ARCH(4) 15.205 0.000 15.113 0.000 14.559 0.000 
 
The empirical results in column 2 of the table confirm the initial observation made in Figure 
3.2. Despite a trading window of only four hours, 4.5 hours shorter than the 1300 – 1300 CET 
return window, the pre-ECB drift observed is almost of the same magnitude. Coefficient 
estimates of the parameters specified in equations (3.4) – (3.5)  show that excess returns earned 
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during Close – 1300 CET pre-ECB trading mornings are significant, and on average almost 46 
basis points higher than those earned on all Close – 1300 CET trading windows. This would 
suggest that a sizable majority of the pre-ECB announcement DAX drift is earned from the 
close of the previous day to just before the ECB’s policy decision announcement.  
The results set out in column 3 suggest that only pre-ECB return windows with observed 
relevant rumours generate significant excess returns over all trading periods. For the close – 
1300 CET pre-ECB trading period, cum-dividend excess returns on the DAX are on average 
55 basis points higher than that earned on earned on all close – 1300 CET trading return 
windows. In contrast, average excess returns earned on the DAX during pre-ECB windows of 
the same description with no rumour observations, are not statistically significant. However, 
the average excess return of almost 80 basis points earned for rumour driven drift is notably 
higher for the longer pre-announcement trading window (1300 – 1300 CET), than that earned 
for the pre-ECB morning trading period (CLOSE-1300 CET). This finding would suggest that 
trading on the rumour during the afternoon prior ECB days would generate significantly greater 
excess returns than on ECB mornings.  
Table 3.9 reports the coefficient estimates of equations (3.4) – (3.5), (3.6) – (3.7) and (3.8) – 
(3.9). when the dependent variable is the cum-dividend excess daily return on the DAX for 
standard open – close return windows. The dependant variable is denoted in the table as 𝑋𝑅𝑡. 
The Pre-ECB, Rumour and NoRumour dummies take unity value for trading day before the 
ECB announcement day. The findings reported in Figure 3.2 appears to show that the pre-ECB 
drift predominantly takes place on the morning and overnight periods before the scheduled ECB 
announcement. From Figure 3.2 it appears that there is almost no drift for the pre-ECB trading 
day (Open – Close on date 𝑡 − 1). The parametric results reported in Table 3.9 confirm this.  
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Table 3.9 
This table shows the results for the maximum likelihood estimation of equations (3.4) – (3.5), (3.6) – (3.7) and 
(3.8) – (3.9). The dependant variable is the cum-dividend log excess return (𝑋𝑅𝑡) on the DAX from market 
open to market close. The sample period is from November 05, 2010 to September 16, 2015. The sample is split 
between tightening and easing cycles and all 3 equations are re-estimated with the results presented below. 
Coefficient estimates and standard errors are presented adjacent to their respective parameters.  
*** Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. 
 DAX Open – Close  
 Eq. (3.4) – (3.5) Eq. (3.6) – (3.7) Eq. (3.8) – (3.9) 
 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Constant **0.0743 0.0357 **0.0741 0.0357 **0.0937 0.0372 
Pre-ECBt -0.0346 0.193     
Rumourt   0.0336 0.347 0.0306 0.339 
NoRumourt   0.109 0.231 -0.128 0.233 
Rumourt -1     -0.290 0.248 
Rumourt-2     0.0282 0.224 
NoRumourt-1     -0.00660 0.248 
NoRumourt-2     **-0.558 0.240 
α0 ***1.288 0.0463 ***1.290 0.0464 ***1.286 0.0466 
α1 ***0.253 0.0353 ***0.251 0.0351 ***0.247 0.0357 
R2 0.001  0.001  0.008  
Q(4) 6.454 0.168 6.603 0.158 6.292 0.178 
ARCH(4) 15.696 0.000 15.994 0.000 15.891 0.000 
    
Overall the findings of this section show that trading on the rumour during pre-ECB 
announcement windows and selling immediately before the schedule ECB monetary policy 
outcome produce the greatest excess average returns. I discuss the merits of trading strategies 
designed around ECB announcements in greater detail in section 3.7.3.    
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3.7.2 The Pre-ECB Announcement Currency Market Rumour Drift 
In this section, I perform similar analysis on the EUR/USD currency market to that carried out 
in the previous section for the DAX index. The approach is pointedly more focus on tightening 
and easing periods. Currency markets by nature have a markedly different price formation 
response to hawkish policy decisions than to dovish announcements given the underlying 
fundamental economic factors at play. The anticipatory effect and associated rumours are 
expected therefore to have a markedly different result when the sample is split into tight and 
loose monetary policy periods.  
I begin by investigating day triplets around schedule ECB monetary policy announcement for 
EUR/USD exchange rate returns. I compare these to all other day triplets when there are no 
scheduled ECB scheduled announcements. Figure 3.3 illustrates the comparison between 3-day 
return windows when there is a schedule ECB announcement and all other 3-day return 
windows. The bold dashed black line represents the average pointwise cumulative 5-minute 
intraday percentage return on the EUR/USD exchange rate for all 3-day ECB announcement 
windows. The announcement window is from the market open at 0000 CET of the day prior to 
schedule ECB monetary policy announcements to the market close on the day following the 
announcement day at 2300 CET. The average pointwise cumulative intraday return is calculated 
for 56 ECB announcement windows from November 09, 2010 to November 20, 2015. The bold 
blue dashed line gives the average pointwise cumulative intraday returns, but for 3-day return 
windows of the same specification where there are no scheduled ECB policy announcements. 
Figure 3.3 shows that pointwise cumulative returns on the EUR/USD are largely flat for the 
trading day prior to ECB announcement days. From the market open at 0000 CET on the day 
before, cumulative returns increase by 5 basis points during overnight trade before returning to 
approximately zero. For the remainder of the pre-ECB trading day, overnight and the morning 
of ECB day up to the ECB policy decision announcement, cumulative returns are approximately 
zero. Following the policy decision announcement, there is a significant dip in returns of more 
than 20 basis points until the start of the Governing Council president’s press conference. 
During the press conference returns drift a little higher but the currency trade mostly lower than 
the pre-ECB period for the remainder of the ECB announcement day. On the following trading 
day returns on the EUR/USD consolidate during the overnight period and in morning European 
trade. This is followed by a sharp decline in returns from noon trading into the market close.  
The pointwise 95% confidence interval for average cumulative returns indicated by the grey 
shaded area, suggests that cumulative pre-ECB returns are not significantly different from zero 
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or that earned on other days. The blue dashed line suggests the same but for all other non-ECB 
announcement periods.   
According to the findings presented in Figure 3.3, the pre-announcement anticipatory effect 
found for the DAX index does not seem to apply to the EUR USD currency market. There is 
however, factors of fundamental foreign exchange economics at play. Encompassed in the 
period for which the EUR/USD sample is observed there are cycles of policy tightening and 
easing. Further, part way through the sample there is a departure of the ECBs’ balance sheet 
structure from that of the FED, as well as an expansion in the ECB’s monetary policy mandate 
and tools. The implications of this can be observed in Figures 3.4 and 3.5.   
Figure 3.3 
Cumulative returns on the EUR/USD exchange rate (Full Sample). This figure shows the average 
cumulative returns on the EUR/USD exchange rate for 3-day trading windows. The dashed black line is the 
average cumulative returns on the EUR/USD from 0000 CET on the day prior ECB announcement days to 2300 
CET on the day following the ECB announcement days. The dashed blue line shows average cumulative returns 
on the EUR/USD on all other 3-day windows that do not include scheduled ECB announcements. The shade 
black and blue areas are pointwise 95% confidence intervals around the average cumulative returns for 
corresponding data sets. The sample period is from November 09, 2010 to November 20, 2015. The red arrow 
is set at 1345 CET, when ECB policy decisions are made public. The blue arrow is set at 1430 CET, when the 
ECB press conference takes place. 
 
 
Figure 3.4 illustrates the average cumulative return comparisons for day triplets during the 
sample period considered to be a tightening cycle. The bold dashed black line represents the 
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average pointwise cumulative 5-minute intraday percentage return on the EUR/USD exchange 
rate for the 11, 3-day ECB announcement windows considered to be part of the tightening cycle. 
The bold blue dashed line gives the average pointwise cumulative intraday returns, but for all 
3-day return windows during the policy tightening sample period (November 09, 2010 through 
October 20, 2011) where there are no scheduled ECB policy announcements. 
Figure 3.4 
Cumulative returns on the EUR/USD exchange rate (Tightening Sample). This figure shows the average 
cumulative returns on the EUR/USD exchange rate for 3-day trading windows. The dashed black line is the 
average cumulative returns on the EUR/USD from 0000 CET on the day prior ECB announcement days to 2300 
CET on the day following the ECB announcement days. The dashed blue line shows average cumulative returns 
on the EUR/USD on all other 3-day windows that do not include scheduled ECB announcements. The shade 
black and blue areas are pointwise 95% confidence intervals around the average cumulative returns for 
corresponding data sets. The sample period is from November 09, 2010 through October 20, 2011 encompassing 
a regime of tightening monetary stance. The blue arrow is set at 1345 CET, when ECB policy decisions are 
made public. The red arrow is set at 1430 CET, when the ECB press conference takes place. 
 
 
In contrast to the lack of drift observed in Figure 3.3, it is evident from Figure 3.4 that pre-
announcement return drift is observable for the ‘tightening’ period of the sample. The bold 
dashed black line shows returns rising sharply from the open of the pre-ECB day (0000 CET) 
to a peak of almost 40 basis points above zero at the close. Returns on the EUR/USD then 
consolidate through overnight trade, then dip lower during early morning trade before the 
schedule ECB announcement. Following the announcement there is a sharp drop in cumulative 
returns back to zero before the commencement of the ECB press conference. Following the 
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press conference returns drift higher to about 10 basis points. There is a period of consolidation 
during overnight trade and in morning trade of the post-ECB trading day, followed by a drop 
off in the afternoon.  
The pointwise 95% confidence interval for average cumulative returns indicated by the grey 
shaded area suggests that EUR/USD cumulative pre-ECB returns are positive and significantly 
different from zero during the tightening cycle. The 95% confidence interval indicated by the 
blue shaded area shows that cumulative returns on the EUR/USD on all other day triplets during 
the tightening sample period are approximately zero. Comparing the two, the tightening cycle 
pre-ECB EUR/USD drift appears economically important. I further explore the significance of 
this positive drift in Table 3.10.  
Figure 3.5 illustrates the average cumulative return comparisons for day triplets during the 
sample period defined as an easing cycle (October 21, 2011 - November 20, 2015). The bold 
dashed black line represents the average pointwise cumulative 5-minute intraday percentage 
return on the EUR/USD exchange rate for the 44, 3-day ECB announcement windows during 
the easing cycle. The bold blue dashed line gives the average pointwise cumulative intraday 
returns, but for all 3-day return windows where there are no scheduled ECB policy 
announcements. 
In contrast to the lack of drift observed in Figure 3.3 and the positive drift apparent in Figure 
3.4, that pre-announcement return drift is visibly negative for pre-ECB return windows in the 
easing sample period. The bold dashed black line shows cumulative returns dropping from zero 
on the morning open of European trade at 0830 CET (100th return interval) to a maximum low 
of approximately -10 basis points in afternoon trade of the pre-ECB day. There is a period of 
consolidation from this minimum to just before the scheduled ECB policy announcement. 
Following the announcement there is a new sharp drop in cumulative returns to -30 basis points 
before the start of the ECB press conference. Following the press conference returns drift higher 
by about 10 basis points. There is a period of consolidation during overnight trade and in 
morning trade of the post-ECB trading day, followed by a drop off in the afternoon.  
The pointwise 95% confidence interval for average cumulative returns indicated by the grey 
shaded area suggests that the EUR/USD cumulative pre-ECB returns are negative and 
significantly different from zero during easing cycles. The 95% confidence interval indicated 
by the blue shaded area shows that cumulative returns on the EUR/USD on all other day triplets 
during the easing sample period are approximately zero. Comparing the two, the easing cycle 
pre-ECB EUR/USD drift appears notable. Such drift however, does not appear to be as large as 
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that found for the tightening cycle.  I explore the significance of this negative drift in Table 
3.10.  
Figure 3.5 
Cumulative returns on the EUR/USD exchange rate (Easing Sample). This figure shows the average 
cumulative returns on the EUR/USD exchange rate for 3-day trading windows. The dashed black line is the 
average cumulative returns on the EUR/USD from 0000 CET on the day prior ECB announcement days to 2300 
CET on the day following the ECB announcement days. The dashed blue line shows average cumulative returns 
on the EUR/USD on all other 3-day windows that do not include scheduled ECB announcements. The shade 
black and blue areas are pointwise 95% confidence intervals around the average cumulative returns for 
corresponding data sets. The sample period is from October 21, 2011 through November 20, 2015, 
encompassing a regime of expansionary monetary stance. The blue arrow is set at 1345 CET, when ECB policy 
decisions are made public. The red arrow is set at 1430 CET, when the ECB press conference takes place. 
 
 
The figures above report 5-minute cumulative simple returns on the EUR/USD exchange rate 
using simple statistical properties. I set the dependant variable as the excess daily return on the 
EUR/USD, that is, the 24-hour return over the mean 24-hour return earned on all trading 
periods, and formally investigate the magnitude of the pre-ECB announcement drift by 
estimating the single dummy variable equation (3.1). The daily excess returns are computed by 
summing the 5-minute returns for a specified 24-hour window. To estimate the magnitude of 
the impact of rumour prevalence on the pre-ECB announcement returns, I then estimate 
equation (3.2). I then supplement equation (3.2) by including return windows which extend 
beyond just one day prior scheduled ECB announcements. The purpose being to test whether 
the pre-announcement effect persists beyond one day prior announcements. I formally gauge 
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such persistence by estimating equation (3.3). I perform all 3 regressions for the full sample, as 
well as the tightening and easing sub samples to unravel any differences in the currency market 
pre-announcement effects when the monetary policy stance shifts.  
All three equations are estimated using OLS methodology. Empirical estimates for all the three 
equations are set out in tables 3.10 and 3.11. Standard specification tests show that, show that 
OLS estimates are robust and sufficient for all EUR/USD currency samples.  
Table 3.10 summarises coefficient estimates for all three equations where the dependant 
variable is the excess daily return over the mean sample return in percentage points on the 
EUR/USD from 1300 CET on date 𝑡 − 1 to 1300 CET on date 𝑡. The daily excess return is 
computed by summing the 5-minute returns for a 24-hour window, from 1300 CET on date 𝑡 −
1 to 1300 CET on date 𝑡. The dependant variable is denoted in the table as 𝑋𝑅𝑡. This is the 
primary data set of interest given that it captures, by design, a full 24-hour return window 
closing before any realised ECB monetary policy announcement. The independent parameters, 
as defined in section 3.6.1, are given in the first column.  
Result presented in column 2 of the table show that excess returns earned during 1300 – 1300 
CET (full sample period) pre-ECB trading windows, on average, are not significantly different 
from all other days.  The t-statistic being less than 0.5 based on standard errors quoted in the 
table. This would indicate that the EUR/USD currency exhibits no drift in excess returns during 
the 24-hours immediately before the ECB policy decision announcement. The estimated 
coefficient on the constant parameter would suggest that on average the 1300 – 1300 CET 
EUR/USD excess returns on all other (non-pre-ECB) days are also not significantly different 
from zero. 
I split the currency sample into two periods; a tightening and an easing period to explore the 
potential for a heightened anticipatory effect based on a change in the ECB’s mandated 
monetary policy goals. The results in column one show that for both the tightening and easing 
sub samples, there appears to be no significant average excess returns for 1300 – 1300 CET 
windows before ECB announcements. The magnitude of the coefficient estimates for pre-ECB 
average excess returns are in line with that shown in Figures 3.4 and 3.5. However, the 
heightened scrutiny of parametric estimation shows that independent pre-ECB announcement 
drift cannot be confirmed for the EUR/USD currency market for the full sample period or either 
sub sample periods.  
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Table 3.10 
This table shows the results for the OLS estimation of equations (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3). The dependant variable 
is the return (𝑋𝑅𝑡) on the EUR/USD from 1300 CET on date 𝑡 − 1 to 1300 CET on date 𝑡. The sample period 
is from November 09, 2010 to November 20, 2015. The sample is split between tightening and easing cycles 
and all 3 specifications are re-estimated with the results set out in the mid and lower panel. In order to account 
for the effect of tight and loose monetary policies the sample is partitioned into the periods from November 09, 
2010 through October 20, 2011and from October 21, 2011 through November 20, 2015 respectively, so that 
each partition contains as many as 11 and 45 ECB announcements respectively. Coefficient estimates and 
standard errors are presented adjacent to their respective parameters.  
*** Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. 
 EUR/USD 1300 – 1300 CET  
𝑋𝑅𝑡  Equation (3.1) Equation (3.2) Equation (3.3) 
 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Constant -0.00169 0.0165 -0.00169 0.0165 0.00822 0.0173 
Pre-ECBt 0.0381 0.0781     
Rumourt   -0.0742 0.106 -0.0841 0.106 
NoRumourt   0.168 0.113 0.158 0.113 
Rumourt -1     -0.0165 0.106 
Rumourt-2     -0.117 0.106 
NoRumourt-1     -0.119 0.113 
NoRumourt-2     -0.188 0.113 
Obs: 1263 R2:  0.001 R2: 0.002 R2: 0.006 
 EUR/USD 1300 – 1300 CET (Tightening) 
Constant -0.00981 0.0471 -0.00981 0.0468 0.00906 0.0491 
Pre-ECBt 0.286 0.219     
Rumourt   **0.640 0.292 **0.621 0.291 
NoRumourt   -0.140 0.319 -0.159 0.318 
Rumourt -1     -0.678 0.291 
Rumourt-2     0.00465 0.291 
NoRumourt-1     0.0940 0.318 
NoRumourt-2     -0.143 0.318 
Obs: 238 R2:  0.007 R2: 0.021 R2: 0.045 
 EUR/USD 1300 – 1300 CET (Easing) 
Constant 0.000193 0.0171 0.000193 0.0170 0.00803 0.0178 
Pre-ECBt -0.0223 0.0816     
Rumourt   **-0.253 0.110 **-0.260 0.110 
NoRumourt   0.241 0.218 0.233 0.217 
Rumourt -1     0.149 0.110 
Rumourt-2     -0.147 0.110 
NoRumourt-1     -0.169 0.217 
NoRumourt-2     -0.198 0.217 
Obs: 1025 R2:  0.001 R2: 0.009 R2: 0.018 
 
In column 3 of the table, I report the empirical for equation 3.2. The Rumourt dummy represents 
the 31 pre-ECB windows where a relevant rumour has been observed on Twitter. The 
NoRumourt dummy takes unity value for the remaining 25 pre-ECB winodws, where no 
relevant rumours have been detected on Twitter. Empirical estimates for the full sample show 
that there is no pre-ECB rumour driven drift in EUR/USD excess returns. However, when the 
sample is split into tightening and easing periods, rumours driven drift is statistically significant. 
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For the sub-sample period defined as the tightening cycle (November 09, 2010 to October 20, 
2011), average excess returns earned on the EUR/USD during the pre-ECB windows with 
rumour observation (5 in total) are 64 basis points higher than all other days. Further, returns 
earned on pre-ECB windows with rumour are 64 basis points higher than no-rumour (6 in total) 
windows. The positive rumour driven drift in the currency market during tightening monetary 
policy periods is in line with expectation given the underlying economics. It is particularly 
notable since tightening cycle rumours are mostly indicative or supportive of hawkish 
expectations.   
For the sub-sample period defined as the easing cycle (October 21, 2011 to November 20, 
2015), average excess returns earned on the EUR/USD during the pre-ECB windows with 
rumour observation (26 in total) are over 25 basis points less than all other days. Further, returns 
earned on pre-ECB windows with rumour are over 25 basis points lower than no-rumour (19 in 
total) windows. Negative rumour driven drift in the currency market during easing monetary 
policy periods is in line with the fundamental economics of foreign exchange markets. It is 
particularly notable since easing cycle rumours are mostly hinting at or encouraging of dovish 
expectations.   
This result adds further support to the initial hypothesis that pre-announcement effects are not 
due to arbitrary re-allocation prior to a significant public information event. In fact, in the 
currency market pre-announcement anticipatory effects are almost unobservable when the 
presence of rumours is not considered. Rumours appear to be noteworthy in the price formation 
process due to the risk weighted trading decisions made by informed investors. Empirical 
estimates for the parameters of equation 3.3 are set out in the last column of Table 3.10. Here I 
include lagged dummies to test 24-hour trading windows beyond that immediately prior the 
ECB Governing Council decision to include 2 and 3 days return observations prior the 
announcement.  
Table 3.11 reports the coefficient estimates for all three equations as above but where the 
dependant variable (denoted as 𝑋𝑅𝑡)  is the excess daily return over the mean sample return in 
percentage points on the EUR/USD from 2300 CET on date 𝑡 − 2 to 2300 CET on date 𝑡 − 1. 
I investigate this particular return window due to the pattern observed for ECB day triplets in 
Figures 3.4 and 3.5. The cumulative intraday returns earned on the 24- hour trading day prior 
ECB announcement days appear to exhibit drift. However, the drift appears to consolidate 
during overnight and morning trading hours on ECB day up to the announcement time.  
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Table 3.11 
This table shows the results for the OLS estimation of equations (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3). The dependant variable 
is the excess return (𝑋𝑅𝑡) on the EUR/USD from 2300 CET on date 𝑡 − 2 to 2300 CET on date 𝑡 − 1. The 
sample period is from November 09, 2010 to November 20, 2015. The sample is split between tightening and 
easing cycles and all 3 specifications are re-estimated with the results set out in the second and bottom panel. 
In order to account for the effect of tight and loose monetary policies the sample is partitioned into the periods 
from November 09, 2010 through October 20, 2011and from October 21, 2011 through November 20, 2015 
respectively, so that each partition contains as many as 11 and 45 ECB announcements respectively. Coefficient 
estimates and standard errors are presented adjacent to their respective parameters.  
*** Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. 
 EUR/USD 2300 – 2300 CET  
𝑋𝑅𝑡  Equation (3.1) Equation (3.2) Equation (3.3) 
 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Constant 0.00685 0.0165 0.00643 0.0165 0.00696 0.0170 
Pre-ECBt -0.0234 0.0796     
Rumourt   -0.0954 0.106 -0.0993 0.107 
NoRumourt   0.0719 0.123 0.0714 0.124 
Rumourt -1     0.0619 0.160 
Rumourt-2     -0.00985 0.128 
NoRumourt-1     -0.00342 0.123 
NoRumourt-2     -0.0780 0.122 
Obs: 1263 R2:  0.001 R2: 0.001 R2: 0.003 
 EUR/USD 2300 – 2300 CET (Tightening) 
Constant -0.0173 0.0486 -0.0173 0.0482 -0.00428 0.0509 
Pre-ECBt *0.405 0.226     
Rumourt   ***0.855 0.300 ***0.842 0.302 
NoRumourt   -0.134 0.328 -0.147 0.330 
Rumourt -1     -0.0450 0.302 
Rumourt-2     -0.440 0.302 
NoRumourt-1     0.0684 0.330 
NoRumourt-2     -0.0765 0.330 
Obs: 238 R2:  0.014 R2: 0.034 R2: 0.044 
 EUR/USD 2300 – 2300 CET (Easing) 
Constant 0.00765 0.0171 0.00658 0.0170 0.00518 0.0175 
Pre-ECBt -0.0962 0.0892     
Rumourt   **-0.311 0.163 **-0.312 0.161 
NoRumourt   0.144 0.125 0.148 0.127 
Rumourt -1     0.0817 0.178 
Rumourt-2     0.0480 0.144 
NoRumourt-1     -0.0238 0.139 
NoRumourt-2     -0.0676 0.117 
Obs: 1025 R2:  0.001 R2: 0.010 R2: 0.011 
 
Empirical results in column 2 confirm the initial observation made in Figure 3.4 and 3.5, i.e. 
that the pre-announcement drift takes place predominantly in the 24-hour pre-ECB return 
window. The magnitude on the coefficient estimates for the pre-ECB parameter similar to those 
set out in Table 3.10, but more positive for the tightening sub sample and more negative for the 
easing sub sample, with the impact of announcements being this time significant at the 10% 
level for the latter period.  
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In column three, results reaffirm the hypothesis of rumour driven drift further. Average excess 
return earned during pre-ECB windows where rumours are observed, during periods of policy 
tightening, are over 85 basis points higher than on all other days and almost 100 basis points 
higher than no-rumour pre-ECB windows. The drift here is higher than that observed for the 
1300 – 1300 CET window (tightening period), suggesting some level of profit taking during 
overnight and morning trade immediately prior the scheduled announcement.  
For the sub-sample period defined as the easing cycle (October 21, 2011 to November 20, 
2015), average excess returns earned on the EUR/USD during the pre-ECB windows with 
rumour observation are over 31 basis points less than all other days and over 45 basis points 
less than no-rumour pre-ECB windows. The drift is more negative than that observed for the 
1300 – 1300 CET (easing period), suggesting some level of short covering during overnight 
and morning trade on ECB day.  
Overall the findings of this section show that for the currency market, trading on the rumour 
during pre-ECB announcement windows and covering the trade at the close of the day prior 
schedule ECB policy announcement, produces the greatest excess average returns. I discuss the 
merit of such trading strategy in greater detail in the coming section.    
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3.7.3 Buy the Rumour, Sell Before the Announcement 
Empirical results show that pre-announcement abnormal excess returns are statistically 
significant on both stock and currency markets. In this section I investigate whether investor 
can reap profits by implementing trading rules designed around the ECB announcements as 
previously defined. I will then compare the magnitude of such profits with those earned from 
various other return windows. I will also assess the risk adjusted performance of pre-
announcement trading, rumour guided pre-announcement trading and risk adjusted earnings on 
all other return periods. I conclude that the most efficient trading strategy during the pre-ECB 
announcement window is to buy the DAX on when rumours of forthcoming central bank policy 
action are circulating on Twitter and sell out of this position 45 minutes prior the disclosure of 
the realised policy decision. For the currency market, the most profitable trading rule would be 
to replicate the above strategy for periods during which the ECB is considered to follow a tight 
monetary policy stance. And, for times when the bank is considered to be in an accommodative 
monetary policy cycle, to sell the euro in the pre-ECB window and buy back 45 minutes prior 
the scheduled announcement.  
A simple strategy of buying the DAX index at 1300 CET the day prior to a scheduled ECB 
monetary policy announcement and selling back at market price 24-hours later on ECB day, 
will on average earn significant excess returns over all other non-pre-ECB return periods. To 
contextualise this result, Table 3.12 provides basic statistics and annualised excess returns (in 
bold) for each defined trading period. It also presents the level of annualised risk adjusted excess 
return earned on the DAX based on a strategy of buying 1300 CET and selling back at 1300 
CET the following day. The annualised Sharpe ratio (highlighted in bold font) is calculated as 
𝑆𝑅𝑇𝑆 =  (𝑅𝑇𝑆−𝑟𝑓/𝜎𝑇𝑆) × √𝐾, where 𝑅𝑇𝑆 is the average 24-hour return on the trading strategy, 
𝑟𝑓is the appropriate risk-free rate for the same period and 𝜎𝑇𝑆 is the respective standard 
deviation. I multiply the simple Sharpe ratio by √𝐾 to annualise the Sharpe ration, where K is 
the number of times that particular trading strategy would be executed per year.  
Results show that for the full sample period (November 2010 through September 2015), buying 
the DAX at 1300 CET the day before scheduled ECB announcements and selling it back 45 
minutes before the announcement would earn annualised excess returns of 5.708%. This is 
tantamount to over 64% of annualised returns for the almost five-year sample. It is substantially 
greater than the 3.192% annualised earnings on all other trading days of the same time window. 
Further, this annualised return is earned by trading only 12 times in any given year for a 24-
hour period versus all other days. A close look at the pre-ECB announcement trading strategy 
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reveals, as per the results in the previous section that pre-ECB earnings are not arbitrarily earned 
on all pre-ECB trading windows. Of the aforementioned 5.708% pre-ECB excess returns, 
almost 90% of this is earned on pre-ECB windows where rumours are observed. This is 
tantamount to an annualised return of 4.986% on such pre-ECB trading periods. This return is 
significantly higher than the 0.322% annualised return of pre-ECB windows where no rumours 
are present. It is worth noting that transaction costs are ignored in the above calculations due to 
the possible inaccuracy of pinpointing an acceptable rate. However, given the relatively small 
number of trades required per year to profit from this trade it is fair to state that the impact of 
transaction cost would pale in comparison to the large profit potential.     
Table 3.12 
This table provides summary statistics for the excess return over the risk-free rate (𝑋𝑅𝑡) on the DAX from 
1300 CET on date 𝑡 − 1 to 1300 CET on date 𝑡. The sample period is from November 05, 2010 to September 
06, 2015. The sample is split between tightening and easing cycles. Column one defines the summary statistics 
provided in adjacent cells. Average annualised excess returns (Annual XRt) are computed by summing the 
excess daily returns for the specified days and dividing by the total number of years. SRTS is the annualised 
Sharpe ratio of the trading strategy as defined in the text. The return period for which the summary statistics 
are calculated are defined in the first row. Outliers are defined return observations exceeding the 99% 
confidence interval. 
 DAX 1300 - 1300 CET  
 All Observations Excluding Outliers 
 Pre-
ECB Rumour 
No 
Rumour Other 
Pre-
ECB Rumour 
No 
Rumour Other 
Mean 0.502 0.831 0.060 0.013 0.502 0.831 0.060 0.034 
St. Dev. 1.184 0.911 1.331 1.341 1.184 0.911 1.331 1.261 
Annual XRt  5.708 4.986 0.322 3.192 5.708 4.986 0.322 8.204 
SRTS 1.468 2.040 0.100 0.152 1.468 2.040 0.100 0.419 
Max 3.390 3.355 2.355 7.238 3.390 3.355 2.355 4.702 
Min -2.534 -0.239 -2.569 -6.936 -2.534 -0.239 -2.569 -5.406 
Obs. 55 30 25 1169 55 30 25 1163 
 DAX 1300 - 1300 CET (Tightening) 
Mean 0.540 1.191 -0.068 0.011 0.540 1.191 -0.068 0.011 
St. Dev. 1.601 1.370 1.662 1.880 1.601 1.370 1.662 1.880 
Annual XRt  6.474 6.495 -0.442 2.650 6.474 6.495 -0.442 2.650 
SRTS 1.118 1.944 -0.100 0.085 1.118 1.944 -0.100 0.085 
Max 3.491 3.456 2.063 7.339 3.491 3.456 2.063 7.339 
Min -2.117 -0.009 -2.152 -6.349 -2.117 -0.009 -2.152 -6.349 
Obs. 11 5 6 227 11 5 6 227 
 DAX 1300 - 1300 CET (Easing) 
Mean 0.492 0.752 0.103 0.014 0.492 0.752 0.103 0.021 
St. Dev. 1.078 0.836 1.258 1.175 1.078 0.836 1.258 1.154 
Annual XRt  5.526 4.606 0.525 3.331 5.526 4.606 0.525 5.108 
SRTS 1.580 2.059 0.200 0.182 1.580 2.059 0.200 0.285 
Max 3.311 3.276 2.330 4.675 3.311 3.276 2.330 4.675 
Min -2.559 -0.265 -2.594 -6.962 -2.559 -0.265 -2.594 -4.773 
Obs. 44 25 19 943 44 25 19 942 
 
The Sharpe ratio further reflects the efficiency of the rumour trading strategy in terms of the 
mean variance relationship. While an annualised Sharpe ratio of 1.468 for a pre-ECB only 
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strategy is impressive when compared to the 0.152 for all other days, it is substantially lower 
that the annualised Sharpe ratio of 2.040 for a trading strategy of buying the rumour in the pre-
ECB window and selling before the announcements are disclosed. This finding is consistent 
when the sample is split into sub-samples accounting for the policy stance of the ECB’s 
Governing Council. 
A similar trading strategy of buying/selling the EUR/USD index at 2300 CET the two days 
prior to a scheduled ECB monetary policy announcement and selling/buying back at market 
price 24-hours later on the night before ECB day, will on average earn significant returns over 
all other non-pre-ECB return periods. To contextualise this trading strategy, Table 3.13 
provides basic statistics and annualised returns (in bold) for each defined trading period. It also 
presents the level of annualised risk adjusted return earned on the EUR/USD based on the 
outlined trading strategy. The annualised Sharpe ratio (highlighted in bold font) is calculated as 
before, however since a short position is taken in the currency during pre-ECB windows in the 
loose monetary policy regime, the Sharpe ratio reflects in this case the direction of the position. 
Results show that for the full sample period there are no notable advantage in taking a position 
in the EUR/USD market during pre-ECB windows. However, there is a noticeable advantage 
in implementing a similar strategy to that adopted in the DAX above when the ECB is 
considered to be in a tightening cycle. Taking a long position in the EUR/USD from 2300 CET 
two days before ECB day and liquidating 14 hours before the scheduled announcement, yields 
annualised returns (over the sample mean) of 4.421%. This level of return is remarkably greater 
in magnitude than those obtained by applying the same rule to all other days with no ECB 
announcements, which produced average annualised returns of -9.134%. A short position 
during the pre-ECB window when the Governing Council is judged to be in an easing cycle 
would produce annualised returns of 0.847% versus 3.666% for being long EUR/USD on all 
other days. In the presence of rumours the annualised returns increases to 5.356% for the 
tightening pre-ECB windows, suggesting a long position when rumours are not observed would 
generate losses. For a short position when rumours are present the annualised return earned is 
1.809%.  
The Sharpe ratio reflects the efficiency of the rumour trading strategy in the currency market in 
terms of the mean variance relationship. During the tightening cycle an annualised Sharpe ratio 
of 1.730 for a pre-ECB only strategy is observed when compared to the -0.746 for all other 
days. This Sharpe ratio is however, lower that the annualised Sharpe ratio of 4.626 for a trading 
strategy of buying the rumour in the pre-ECB window and selling before the fact.  
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The risk adjusted return for a short position in the Euro during easing pre-ECB windows is 
found to be 0.545. This is notably lower than the 2.345 Sharpe ratio found for a short position 
in the presence of rumours.   
Table 3.13 
This table provides summary statistics for the return (𝑅𝑡) on the EUR/USD from 2300 CET on date 𝑡 − 2 to 
2300 CET on date 𝑡 − 1. The sample period is from November 09, 2010 to November 20, 2015. The sample is 
split between tightening and easing cycles. Column one defines the summary statistics provided in adjacent 
cells. The return period for which the summary statistics are calculated are defined in the first row. Average 
annualised excess returns (Annual XRt) are computed by summing the excess daily returns for the specified 
days and dividing by the total number of years. SRTS is the annualised Sharpe ratio of the trading strategy as 
defined in the text. Outliers are calculated as return observations exceeding the 99% confidence interval. 
 EUR/USD 2300 – 2300 CET  
 All Observations Excluding Outliers 
 Pre-
ECB Rumour 
No 
Rumour Other 
Pre-
ECB Rumour 
No 
Rumour Other 
Mean 0.010 -0.085 0.120 -0.019 -0.028 -0.085 0.042 -0.019 
St. Dev. 0.564 0.573 0.544 0.594 0.495 0.573 0.381 0.594 
Annual XRt  0.107 -0.508 0.616 -4.653 -0.301 -0.508 0.207 -4.653 
SRTS 0.059 -0.366 0.491 -0.507 -0.193 -0.366 0.245 -0.507 
Max 2.060 1.217 2.060 2.201 1.199 1.217 0.809 2.201 
Min -0.880 -0.880 -0.726 -2.198 -0.880 -0.880 -0.726 -2.198 
Obs. 56 31 25 1207 55 31 24 1207 
 EUR/USD 2300 – 2300 CET (Tightening) 
Mean 0.368 0.818 -0.171 -0.037 0.368 0.818 -0.171 -0.037 
St. Dev. 0.706 0.433 0.587 0.733 0.706 0.433 0.587 0.733 
Annual XRt  4.421 5.356 -0.935 -9.134 4.421 5.356 -0.935 -9.134 
SRTS 1.730 4.626 -0.653 -0.746 1.730 4.626 -0.653 -0.746 
Max 1.197 1.197 0.678 1.731 1.197 1.197 0.678 1.731 
Min -0.728 0.039 -0.728 -1.949 -0.728 0.039 -0.728 -1.949 
Obs. 11 5 6 227 11 5 6 227 
 EUR/USD 2300 – 2300 CET (Easing) 
Mean -0.078 -0.311 0.189 -0.015 -0.126 -0.311 0.095 -0.015 
St. Dev. 0.494 0.325 0.524 0.557 0.375 0.325 0.310 0.557 
Annual XRt 
17 0.847 1.809 -0.962 3.666 1.346 1.809 0.462 3.666 
SRTS 0.545 2.345 -0.806 0.429 1.166 2.345 0.689 0.429 
Max 2.061 0.264 2.061 2.202 0.809 0.264 0.809 2.202 
Min -0.880 -0.879 -0.546 -2.197 -0.880 -0.879 -0.546 -2.197 
Obs. 45 26 19 981 44 24 18 981 
   
Evidence that the pre-ECB announcement drift is rumour conditional is clearly apparent from 
the results set out in both section 3.7.1 and 3.7.2. In this section, I demonstrate further that such 
conditional drift is not realised ex-post, but must have been apparent to traders at the time. In 
addition, the basic calculations presented above show that a simple strategy of buying the 
rumour and selling it before the announcement would earn significantly higher annual returns 
than holding the stock market for all other days. Moreover, the risk-adjusted returns by 
                                                             
17 The figures in bold here are calculated for a short position taken in the EUR/USD for the specified return 
windows during the easing sample defined in the text.  
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implementing such strategy presents orders of magnitude greater than holding the market all 
other days in both currencies and stocks.   
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3.8 Conclusion 
The chapter begins by applying the central hypothesis of this thesis to the pre-announcement 
price formation puzzle. The pre-announcement window of scheduled central bank policy 
releases is identified as a pre-information window worthy of testing. Such pre-event windows 
had been shown to exhibit puzzling price formation processes by Lucca and Moench (2015). 
The assertion in this chapter is that a Bayesian updating process of traders’ prior expectations 
is taking place in the pre-announcement window prior to large scope macroeconomic news 
events. Such updating is posited to be as a result of new information, perhaps public, which has 
been detected by market agents but not by academics. The information is therefore, not private 
but also not public in the regulatory sense. That is, it is not published and/or archived by 
mandated outlets such as Bloomberg or Reuters. Should the content of such information change 
the weighted average expectation of market agents, about the scale, probability or timing about 
the forthcoming large scope central bank announcement, then pre-announcement price 
formation process should be observable.  
This chapter documents large excess returns on the DAX stock exchange during 24-hour trading 
windows prior to 55 scheduled ECB policy announcements. These pre-announcement excess 
returns are earned during policy tightening, as well as policy easing periods. The average 
earning on the DAX during the pre-ECB window is almost 50 basis points. Buying the index 
24 hours prior the announcement and selling immediately before the announcement is found to 
produce a far greater return than simply holding the index for a full year. Further, the risk 
weighted efficiency of such a strategy is also found to be far greater far greater.  
The finding of this particular pre-announcement price formation process is novel. A similar 
price formation process is observed by Lucca and Moench (2015) for the pre-FOMC window 
but not for other central banks. Lucca and Moench (2015) conclude that such a price formation 
puzzle is puzzling. This thesis asserts that the price formation process is not a puzzle and simply 
an intact price discovery process.  
A survey of Twitter.com reveals 236 information events, rumours pertaining to forthcoming 
ECB policy broadcast by market agents and commentators. Of these 236 rumours, 30 are 
observed during the 24-hour pre-ECB announcement window. The observation of such 
information events presents the opportunity to test the central hypothesis of this thesis further. 
The pre-announcement windows with and without rumour are tested for the latent price 
formation process.  
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Results show that during 25 pre-ECB announcement windows absent of rumour observation, 
no significant excess returns can be earned on the DAX. Whereas, during the 30 pre-ECB 
windows with rumour observations, 80 basis point can be earned on average. To quantify the 
economic significance of the rumour driven pre-ECB price discovery process; the excess 
returns on the DAX in the 24-hour pre-ECB window are tantamount to almost 60% of the 
annualised total excess returns on the DAX for the full sample period. The annualised Sharpe 
ratio of trading the ECB rumour and selling prior the announcement is 2.04. This is compared 
to 1.47 for simply buying the 24-hour pre-announcement period and 0.15 for holding the DAX 
for all other days of the year. 
This chapter sets out to solve a price formation puzzle and identify the puzzle as an intact price 
discovery process with a dataset of public market relevant information in the form of market 
rumours. The pre-central bank announcement price formation process is shown to be one of 
price discovery. Findings in this chapter show that information delivered as rumour has 
significant value to market agents through observable and sizable risk adjusted excess earnings. 
The information is clearly identified by such market agents but previously undetected by 
academics.    
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Appendix B 
Appendix B1 
Rumours pertaining to potential ECB policy decisions broadcast on Twitter by ‘in the know’ financial market 
commentators 
Date  Time Rumour 
17/11/2010 6.59 pm According to sources, the ECB has bought Portuguese and Greek 
gov't bonds today to curb fallout to the ongoing Ireland issues. 
26/11/2010 5.41 am Without revealing sources FT Deutschland says € zone nations and 
ECB are urging Portugal to get bailout funds 
8/12/2010 5.54 am Currency reserves create temptation for intervention; says new 
sources of international liquidity needed for systemic crises 
13/12/2010 5.59 pm ECB considering request for more (potentially double) capital, says 
Reuters citing Eurozone central bank sources. 
20/12/2010 1.50 pm ECB wants liquidity included in new stress 
07/01/2011 11.02 am Market sources say ECB was seen buying Portuguese bonds this 
morning. 
18/01/2011 11.22 am ECB EXPECTS MORE BANKS TO FAIL 2011 TESTS THAN IN 
2010 
BECAUSE OF THE LIQUIDITY CRITERION 
28/01/2011 3.18 pm ECB Mulling Higher Rate On Loans To ‘Addicted’ Banks 
02/02/2011 3.54 pm SOURCES SAY AXEL WEBER  NOT TO BE CANDIDATE FOR 
ECB PRESIDENT 
9/02/2011 10.48 am BUNDESBANK'S AXEL WEBER WILL NOT BE CANDIDATE 
TO REPLACE TRICHET AS ECB PRESIDENT 
6/4/2011 4.21 pm ECB rate hike only start of policy process 
19/04/2011 6.25 am ECB FOCUS-Greek restructuring could slow pace of rate hikes 
28/04/2011 8.10 pm Government sources say Angela Merkel has approved Italy's Mario 
Draghi as the next ECB president 
4/05/2011 1.17 pm MORE ECB RATE HIKES ON THE WAY; DISCUSSION ON 
TIMING 
19/05/2011 6.18 pm Eurozone eyes new deal for Greece; ECB issues threat: The sources 
told of the new strategy on Thursday 
2/06/2011 12.15 pm  EU/IMF/ECB inspectors plan to issue joint statement on Greece 
23/06/2011 1.28 pm GREECE'S PAPANDREOU, ECB'S TRICHET, MERKEL, 
SARKOZY AND VAN ROMPUY TO MEET AHEAD OF EU 
LEADERS' SUMMIT 
24/06/2011 9.47 am Italian ECB board member Bini-Smaghi gave EU president Van 
Rompuy assurances that he will step down according to EU sources 
21/07/2011 10.49 am German gov't sources on Reuters saying ECB would accept 
selective default 
28/07/2011 9.08 am New sources of inflationary pressure could emerge 
3/8/2011 5.11 pm ECB READY TO BUY ITALIAN, SPANISH BONDS IF 
BERLUSCONI COMMITS TO BRING FORWARD SPECIFIC 
REFORMS 
5/08/2011 9.486 am Four ECB Governing Council members voted against re-activating 
bond buying - Eurozone central bank sources 
6/8/2011 2.55 pm ECB split over whether to buy Italy bonds 
6/8/2011 6.08pm ECB to discuss crisis action on Sunday 
8/8/2011 10.01 am Market sources so far say ECB has bought around E700mln 
combined bonds in both Italy & Spain so far this morning 
9/8/2011 3.13 pm Market sources say ECB is back in the market again buying Italy 
bonds 
9/9/2011 1.54 pm ECB chief economist Stark is about to retire according to sources  // 
after German market close 
11/9/2011 10.42 pm French banks braced for credit-rating downgrade 
12/9/2011 2.29 pm ECB announces bond purchases for the last week in a few minutes.: 
The expectations according to sources is 10 B 
4/10/11 8.52 am Market sources say ECB is in the market buying 10-year 
Italian bonds via SMP 
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5/10/11 1.12 pm ECB no longer pursuing plans to wean troubled banks off its lending 
support according to sources 
13/10/2011 10.58 am French for making EFSF into a bank; ECB and Germany are against 
20/10/2011 8.27 am IMF AT ODDS WITH EU/ECB ON SUSTAINABILITY OF 
GREEK DEBT, WANTS CLEARER PICTURE BEFORE 
RELEASING NEXT AID TRANCHE 
25/10/2011 12.22 pm EU SOURCES SAY "NON-STANDARD MEASURES" REFERS 
TO ECB BUYING DISTRESSED COUNTRIES' BONDS IN 
SECONDARY MARKET 
27/10/2011 8.56 pm Market sources say ECB is in buying Italian bonds via Securities  
Market Program (SMP) 
1/11/2012 10.25 am ECB IN DEBT REPURCHASE OPS TARGETING ITALY AND 
SPAIN 
3/11/2011 11.04 am GREEK SOCIALIST MPS FORGING PROPOSAL FOR 
COALITION GOVT HEADED BY FORMER ECB VICE-
PRESIDENT PAPADEMOS 
7/11/2011 8.46 am Market sources say ECB is buying Italy 10-year BTPs via 
Securities Market Program -- Italy 10-year spread 
7/11/2011 8.51 am Market sources also reported that ECB was seen buying Spain  
10-year via SMP 
10/11/2011 5.34 pm #ECB Seen Buying Covered Bonds In Secondary Market 
14/11/2011 11.42 am ITALY: Market sources say ECB is in buying Italy via its Securities 
Market Program (SMP) 
17/11/2011 2.11 pm Discussions have taken place on possible ECB lending to IMF for 
on lending to EZ states 
17/11/2011 2.47 pm Talk of #ECB lending to #IMF may be revived, but ECB funding 
IMF EU bailouts shot down by Germany 
22/11/2011 2.46 am Market talk that the ECB is targeting short and medium term Italian 
paper according to sources 
23/11/2011 2.22 pm Rumours about an increase of eligible collateral to ECB for Italian 
banks in few days 
24/11/2011 12.01 pm ECB examining possibility of extending term over which it offers 
bank liquidity 
25/11/2011 9.53 am Market sources now acknowledging ECB is in buying short-dated 
Italian bonds via SMP 
25/11/2011 1.38 pm Market sources report that the ECB is buying Irish bonds via 
its Securities Market Program (SMP) 
27/11/2011 12.52 pm MF to offer Italy a 600 billion euro bailout via ECB funding 
8/12/2011 11.21 am ECB sources say ECB sovereign bond buying remains capped at 
maximum E20bn a week 
15/12/2011 11.55 am ECB's Draghi says stable sources of funding are reducing for 
banking system 
20/12/2011 8.03 pm Italian banks aim to use state-guaranteed bonds as collateral for 
ECB 3yr loans to be launched tomorrow according to sources 
21/12/2011 2.51 pm Italian banks tapped at least 49bln of ECB loans 
22/12/2011 5.33 pm Spanish banks will use ECB cash to cover maturing debt in 2012 
according to sources 
3/1/2012 3.43 pm Market sources say the ECB is also buying Portuguese bonds as 
well now via its Securities Market Program 
4/1/2012 11.00 am Market sources report ECB is in the market buying Spain 10-year 
bond via Securities Market Program (SMP) 
4/1/2012 11.00 am Sources note that ECB buying Italian and Spanish bonds 
6/1/2012 11.03 am EU CRISIS BREAKING: ECB's Draghi 'ready to go full-tilt at QE 
9/1/2012 10.37 am ECB funding to Italian banks at EUR 209.995bln in December 
(Prev. EUR 153.203bln) 
16/1/2012 8.36am Market sources say ECB is buying Spain 5-year Bono issue this 
morning via its Securities Market Program (SMP) 
16/01/2012 9.35 am Market talk of ECB buying Italian paper via SMP 
19/01/2012 9.45 am ECB discussing possibility of engaging in US style quantitative 
easing according to anonymous sources cited  
27/01/2012 8.42 am ITALY: Market sources report ECB is buying Italian bonds via its 
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Securities Market Program (SMP) 
30/01/2012 2.05pm PORTUGAL: Market sources say ECB is buying Portuguese bonds 
via its 
Securities Market Program (SMP) 
7/02/2012 8.57 pm ECB willing to exchange Greek bonds with EFSF; won't take losses 
on exchange 
8/02/2012 4.12 pm ECB NOT YET DECIDED ON WHETHER TO CONTRIBUTE 
TO GREEK DEBT  RESTRUCTURING - EURO ZONE 
SOURCES 
13/02/2012 6.35 pm ECB, National Central Banks Would Agree To Bond Repayment 
Below Face Value 
14/02/2012 4.34 pm Greece Headed For A Default Say Central Bank Sources   
16/02/2012 5.27 pm ECB to swap Greek bonds to avoid forced losses 
17/02/2012 1.18 pm ECB CONSIDERING ALLOWING GREEK BONDS HELD BY 
EURO ZONE CENTRAL BANKS IN INVESTMENT 
PORTFOLIOS TO BE SUBJECTED TO PSI WRITEDOWNS 
17/02/2012 2.16 pm Sources saying that ECB/Greek bond exchange has taken place 
20/02/2012 10.12 am Greek Fin Min sources: Questions remain over whether ECB's 
Greek bond portfolio profits should be transferred to Greece 
9/03/2012 10.50 am Deutsche Bank (DB) tapped the ECB's lending program last week 
for €5B-10B 
16/03/2012 2.39 pm ECB to boost liquidity for Greek banks 
26/03/2012 6.00 pm Spain eyes female  #ESM nominee as grip on  #ECB seat slips 
2/05/2012 2.52 pm ECB getting progressively more nervous about Spain fallout. the 
NEW LTRO may be coming up sooner than expected 
16/05/2012 7.58 pm According to sources, the ECB is increasingly refusing requests for 
liquidity from Greek banks 
16/05/2012 4.05 pm ECB STOPS MONETARY POLICY OPERATIONS TO SOME 
GREEK BANKS AS RECAPITALISATION NOT IN PLACE 
18/05/2012 10.45 am Official sources report that the EU and ECB are working on a Greek 
exit as part of a contingency plan. 
1/06/2012 2.44 pm hearing from banking sources ECB buying Spanish bonds 
5/06/2012 5.38 pm Source says the ECB is facing pressure to take more non-standard 
measures but it wants governments to commit to financial 
integration. 
21/06/2012 1.02 pm Ecb Discussing Medium Term Plans To Make Own Assessment Of  
Sovereign Bonds Rather Than Use Rating Agencies 
21/06/2012 1.23 pm ECB mulls scrapping rating rules for government bonds 
26/06/2016 3.00 pm EU and ECB mission to begin work on bailout in Cyprus early next 
week 
28/06/2012 3.13 pm Two EU sources say decision about Eurogroup President, ESM and 
ECB Jobs will be taken tomorrow at Eurozone summit 
2/07/2012 1.11 pm EU Summit may smooth path for #ECB Interest Rate Cut 
18/07/2012 1.59 pm ECB pushes to overhaul Euribor rate setting: sources ECB pushes to 
overhaul Euribor rate setting 
27/07/2012 4.40 pm Greece Likely To Seek ECB Debt Forgiveness Before New Funds 
27/07/2012 6.35 pm ECB's Draghi proposal said to include bond buys, rate cut or new 
LTRO 
1/08/2012 1.18 am Germany and the ECB Want More Cuts in Spain Before Lowering 
Yields 
1/08/2012 11.17 am ECB's watchdog could get power to order bank closures 
1/08/2012 6.06 pm According to sources, Greece is expected to finalize €11.5B of cuts 
in early-August 
2/08/2012 9.05 am ECB's Draghi faces leadership test over euro pledge 
23/08/2012 8.52 am ecb may set bond buys yield target but keep it secret and flexible 
23/08/2012 3.47 pm PREFERRED OPTION IS EFSF BUYING SPANISH BONDS ON 
PRIMARY MARKET,  ECB BUYING ON SECONDARY 
MARKET 
28/08/2012 10.57 am ECB considering plan to allow banks to borrow against €1 trillion of 
asset-backed securities, according to sources 
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4/09/2012 11.14 am ECB "sources" now leaking data to Dutch paper: Weidman Isolated 
in Resistance Against Draghi Plan 
5/09/2012 2.00 pm ECB "sources" say bond buying will be unlimited but remain 
sterilized 
5/09/2012 2.04 pm Draghi set to unveil MOT for Spain and Italy - unlimited, sterilised 
bond buying 
5/09/2012 3.55 pm ECB READY TO DROP PREFERRED CREDITOR STATUS ON 
GOVT BONDS IT  BUYS UNDER NEW PROGRAMME 
5/09/2012 3.56 pm ECB WILL NOT ANNOUNCE SPECIFIC INTEREST RATE OR 
YIELD TARGETS  FOR BOND MARKET INTERVENTION ON 
THURSDAY 
14/09/2012 7.53 pm ECB, IMF IN TALKS OVER €300B RESCUE PLAN- 
14/09/2012 9.52 am Eurogroup and #Ecb sources deny talks for a Ecb-Imf plan to help 
#Spain with 300 billions 
03/10/2012 1.59 pm ECB has not closed door to Greek debt maturity extension 
05/10/2012 10.31 am Ecb Would Buy "Heavily" In Bond Markets For 1-2 Months Under 
Omt Programme, Then Stop For Assessment Period 
08/10/2012 3.45 pm ECB to wind down covered bond purchase programme 
19/10/2012 9.54 am $EUR/USD EU Leaders Splinter On ECB Supervisory Role: 
Sources: Leaders of European Union star 
05/11/2012 8.31 pm ECB Could Return To Greece Up To EUR11 Billion, But Legal 
Issues Loom 
08/11/2012 9.40 am ECB sources indicated OMT program won't be initiated any time 
soon 
16/11/2012 10.23 am Eu Leaders To Decide At Summit Next Week On Nomination Of 
Yves Mersch To Ecb Executive Board 
07/12/2012 12.51 pm MAJORITY OF #ECB GOVERNING COUNCIL SAID TO 
SUPPORT RATE CUT 
17/12/2012 10.46 am ECB will supervise banks representing 80pc of European banking 
sector assets 
15/01/2013 3.42 pm European #banks to repay ~€80-300B of #ECB #LTRO loans in 
2013 
26/01/2013 3.27 pm ECB rejects Irish bid on promissory note 
30/01/2013 7.25 am According to Elpais, Spanish #banks will repay EUR 44bn in the 3y 
#LTRO today, citing EU and ECB sources 
5/02/2013 4.10 pm EUR still not strong enough to prompt action out of the ECB 
5/02/2013 2.21 pm ECB FLOWS: Market sources report buying of Italian bonds. The 
10-year BTP yield is just hovering above 4.50% level. 
7/02/2013 12.18 pm ECB and Ireland reach deal on cutting Irish cost of servicing debt 
for winding up Anglo Irish Bank according to sources 
7/02/2013 12.59 pm Irish sources deny reports of Government deal with ECB   
6/03/2013 5.50 pm German press reports ECB considering exiting Troika, sources then 
say reports are incorrect. 
18/03/2013 1.21 pm ECB said to oppose taxing Cypriot savings accounts under 100,000 
euros 
19/03/2013 8.37 pm ECB Officials Working on Capital-Control Plans 
20/03/2013 3.23 pm ECB likely to delay a decision on whether to continue to supply 
#Cyprus banks with emergency funds 
16/04/2013 12.02 pm Spain to stick to plan to use deposit fund for risky debt losses 
despite ECB's negative opinion 
22/04/2013 9.10 am sources told MNI that Morgan Stanley has changed its ECB rate 
forecast calling 25bps cut by June 
24/04/2013 11.27 am ECB poised to cut rates to help recession-hit euro zone Reuters 
01/05/2013 4.39 pm EUROSYSTEM SOURCES: CONDITIONS FOR ECB RATE CUT 
ARE THERE 
01/05/2013 4.44 pm ECB EYEING COUNTRY-SPECIFIC APPROACH FOR SME 
LENDING 
5/06/2013 2.30 pm ECB divided on further rate cuts, further rate cut may not deliver 
desired results 
28/06/2013 9.30 am ECB mulling government bond-buying programme that would 
extend all 17 Euro countries 
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8/07/2013 10. 00 am ECB considers consultancies for asset quality review 
11/07/2013 2.08 pm ECB PREPPING DETAILS OF CNY800BN SWAP LINE WITH 
PBOC 
27/08/2013 1.54 pm Easing Shot Down - High Level Committee’s View: Ext 
vulnerability & adverse implications for Finance sector 
1/10/2013 1.21 pm ECB SOURCES: ECB likely to base LTRO decision on 2014 stress 
tests 
22/10/2013 3.13 pm ECB TO ASK EURO ZONE BANKS TO HOLD 8 PCT CORE 
TIER ONE CAPITAL RATIO IN ASSET QUALITY REVIEW 
25/10/2013 12.21 pm 'HESITANCY' AT ECB OVER NEGATIVE RATE 
CONSEQUENCES,  BUT NEGATIVE RATE MOVE STILL 
POSSIBLE 
6/11/2013 2.52 pm ECB rate change unlikely 
6/11/2013 3.07 pm Sources" Confirm No ECB Rate Cut Tomorrow, Euro Soars 
Pushing Dow Jones To New Record High 
20/11/2013 3.21 pm EUR heading lower, #ECB sources say ECB said to consider 
negative deposit rate of 0.1% if stimulus needed 
26/11/2013 2.45 pm ECB sources say no consensus now for action in December 
08/01/2014 3.31 pm No major ECB policy changes expected in January 
05/02/2014 1.55 pm Another ECB sources rumour that board split over deflation, unclear 
if Draghi acts tomorrow 
26/02/2014 9.11 am NO CONSENSUS WITHIN GC NOW FOR MARCH POLICY 
MOVE 
10/03/2014 10.32 am ECB Set To Give Euro Zone Banks Details Of Asset Quality Test 
Approach On Dealing With Bad Loans 
18/03/2014 10.42 am Sources close to negotiations of #Greece authorities with #troika: 
An agreement has been reached 
19/03/2014 10.45 am Spanish banks face fresh property reviews for ECB check-up 
01/04/2014 10.34 am BOE, ECB, BOJ and Fed to announce synchronised bi-annual 
monetary policy meetings 
2/04/2014 3.30 pm 'OVER-INTERPRETATION' BY MARKET OF QE POSSIBILITY 
24/04/2014 11.42 am ECB sources are saying there is no consensus on need for May 
policy action 
13/05/2014 11.12 am Bundesbank sources say BUBA willing to accept significant 
stimulus at next ECB mtg 
14/05/2014 8.33 am ECB sources on the wires saying ECB is preparing a package of 
measures, including cuts to all three rates 
14/05/2014 9.21 am ECB SOURCES SAY "QE STILL SOME WAY OFF 
14/05/2014 9.22 am ECB Rate Cut Would be complemented With Either targeted LTRO 
or ABS Purchase Plan 
14/05/2014 6.16 opm Yields, sterling fall on ECB outlook; U.S. stocks dip: Euro zone 
sources said the ECB plans a package 
20/05/2014 11.05 am ECB said to be looking at six-week meeting schedule in order to 
help write minutes + take monetary policy decisions. 
22/05/2014 7.05 pm ECB supervisors to ease stress tests for Belgium's Dexia 
02/06/2014 4.55 pm ECB to lead revamp of global FX codes of conduct 
04/06/2014 6.49 pm sources suggest that ECB Draghi is likely to signal cut this week, 
won’t necessarily be the last 
16/06/2014 3.33 pm $EUR/USD pokes higher on @ecb sources indicating that no new 
easing measures are likely in coming months 
26/06/2014 2.40 pm ECB may not have reached lower bound on key rate 
09/07/2014 7.54 pm ECB aims to give banks 48 hours to sign off comprehensive 
assessment results before publication in October 
27/08/2014 3.15 pm New ECB Action Next Week Unlikely, But Outcome Much 
Depends On  August Inflation Data 
29/08/2014 11.35 am No ECB consensus on QE next week 
04/09/2014 11.46 am Sources report ECB Governing Council discussing ABS purchases, 
worth up to €500 billion, could start this year 
07/09/2014 11.44 am latest ECB measures could amount up to €800bn 
01/10/2014 7.17 pm Greek banks win restructuring plan reprieve in ECB tests 
13/10/2014 11.56 am Commerzbank set to pass ECB bank stress test 
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21/10/2014 10.30 am ECB BUYING SPAIN SHORT-DATED COVERED BONDS 
21/10/2014 10.31 am ECB considering buying corporate bonds - sources familiar with 
situation say #forex #EUR/USD 
21/10/2014 11.04 am ECB Is Buying French Covered Bonds, Maturities Up To 5-Years 
24/10/2014 2.34 pm According to credible sources, ECB set to "fail" 25 banks 
27/10/2014 12.36 pm ECB SOURCES CITE BARRIERS TO QE, NEED TO LET OLD 
MEASURES WORK this is neg risk no QE coming from ECB 
27/10/2014 2.55 pm ECB stimulus may lack desired scale, QE an option 
03/11/2014 10.26 am ECB NOT SET TO CHANGE TLTRO TERMS AT NOV POLICY 
MEETING 
05/11/2014 3.16 pm Central bankers to challenge Draghi on ECB leadership style 
06/11/2014 10.59 am ECB governors didn't confront Draghi at council dinner 
14/11/2014 3.41 pm ECB Said To Allow 24hrs To Make Smaller ABS Purchases 
26/11/2014 12.50 pm Q1 TIME FRAME FOR QE DECISION LARGELY AGREED 
04/12/2014 4.35 pm German ECB policymakers opposed new balance sheet language 
03/12/2014 4.34 pm ECB sources said to prepare broad based QE package for January 
meeting 
19/12/2014 10.13 am ECB officials consider making weaker Eurozone countries bear 
larger risk burden in any quantitative easing plan 
01/01/2015 6.42 am ECB is working on a discussion paper to execute government bond 
buying over 3 different option 
09/01/2015 9.54 am Eur500bn suggested as potential QE programme by ECB sources 
09/01/2015 11.51 am ECB CONSIDERS DUAL QE APPROACH INVOLVES ECB 
BUYING GOVT BONDS WITH EURO ZONE RISK-SHARING 
AND NATIONAL CENBANKS BUYING AT OWN RISK 
16/01/2015 5.07 pm QE will not include Greek bonds due to ratings, ECB says 
19/01/2015 2.48 pm BUNDESBANK STILL STRIVING TO PUT LIMITS ON ECB 
QUANTITATIVE  EASING 
21/01/2015 2.32 pm  ECB EXEC BOARD'S QE PROPOSAL CALLS FOR ROUGHLY 
EUR50B IN BOND BUYS A MONTH 
29/01/2015 6.41 pm ECB will not comment on MNI sources story that Greece refuses to 
enter new Troika programme 
03/02/2015 2.22 pm ECB won't accept bond swap and wants full repayment 
04/02/2015 7.59 pm Greece may run out of cash as early as March 
10/02/2015 12.06 pm ECB TO ACCEPT GREEK BOND AS COLLATERAL IF DEAL 
REACHED 
10/02/2015 12.10 pm EU Commission to propose 6 month extension for Greece 
12/02/2015 11.58 am ECB POLICYMAKERS HELD THURSDAY 
TELECONFERENCE ON OPTIONS FOR EMERGENCY 
FUNDING FOR GREEK BANKS 
12/02/2015 5.45 pm ECB lifts amount of emergency lending available to Greek banks 
18/02/2015 4.44 pm ECB divided over extra emergency funds for Greek banks 
18/02/2015 8.17 pm Greece Asked ECB for Extra 5 Bln Euros in ELA Funding-Sources 
19/02/2015 7.25 am ECB wants Greece to introduce capital controls 
19/02/2015 8.20 pm ECB may push Greek banks to shed state debt if talks fail 
01/03/2015 9.30 pm ECB may begin QE purchases on 9 March 
02/03/2015 2.44 pm ECB Staff Projections Could Signal End Of QE In Sept 2016 
09/03/2015 8.30 am Market sources report that ECB has started QE programme 
18/03/2015 9.32 pm ECB granted Greece less emergency liquidity than requested 
19/03/2015 9.30 pm Sources say ECB Governing Council has approved an additional 
EUR 400mln for Greek banks as emergency liquidity 
24/03/2015 2.22 pm Greece hoping to get EUR1.9bn in ECB profits on Greek bonds; 
EUR1.2bn bank rescue funds if EG approves reform list 
25/03/2015 2.02 pm Sources indicate that the ECB are to increase the limit of the ELA 
funding for Greek banks to EUR 71bln 
01/04/2015 7.24 pm ECB raises emergency funding cap for Greek banks by €700m 
09/04/2015 1.45 pm ECB Raises Greek ELA By EUR1.2 Bln 
14/04/2015 7.55 pm ECB raises Greek bank ELA by €800 million, bringing the ceiling to 
€74 billion 
17/04/2015 7.17 pm ECB examines possibility of Greek IOU currency in case of default 
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21/04/2015 8.46 am ECB Proposal Sees Haircut Of 90% In Disorderly Default 
28/04/2015 7.32 am Deutsche's radical revamp foiled by ECB stress test 
06/05/2015 3.36 pm ECB officials are considering tighter liquidity rules for Greek banks 
19/05/2015 5.25 am ECB would not lower ELA if Greece misses its IMF payment 
20/05/2015 7.04 pm ECB will raise Greek bank emergency cash by 200 million euros 
27/05/2015 10.04 am Sources suggest Greek ELA ceiling will be unchanged at EUR 
80.2bln by ECB 
10/06/2015 3.57 pm ECB to raise Greece's ELA ceiling to €83Bn from €80.7Bn 
19/06/2015 12.56 pm ECB said to raise emergency funding cap for Greek banks 
25/06/2015 11.46 am ECB limits funding lifeline for Athens amid Bundesbank protest 
28/06/2015 9.25am ECB to pull the plug on Greek banks later today 
28/06/2015 11.17 am ECB CONSIDERING INCREASING HAIRCUT ON SECURITY 
OFFERED BY GREEK BANKS FOR ELA, WHILE KEEPING 
ELA AVAILABLE 
28/06/2015 11.45 am ECB considers tightening emergency funding for Greek banks 
28/06/2015 1.21 pm Greece to consider closing banks on Monday, says finance minister 
03/07/2015 9.46 am ECB considers tightening emergency funding for Greek banks 
05/07/2015 9.08 pm ECB Seen Maintaining Emergency Liquidity Assistance For Greek 
Banks At Current Restricted Level When Governing Council Talks 
On Mon 
13/07/2015 9.55 am ECB'S Governing Council to hold ELA for Greek banks steady 
today 
16/07/2015 9.46 am Greece asks ECB for €1.5bn increase in ELA 
16/07/2015 11.16 am AUSTRIAN FINANCE MINISTER SCHELLING SAYS HEARD 
FROM ECB SOURCES  THAT ELA FOR GREECE WILL BE 
EXTENDED 
22/07/2015 2.41 pm ECB SAID TO RAISE #GREEK ELA CEILING BY EU900M 
28/07/2015 2.44 pm ECB has approved modified plan for reopening #Greece's stock 
market 
05/08/2015 12.57 pm ECB keeps Greek #ELA unchanged for the next 2 weeks 
09/09/2015 11.48 am ECB Has Modestly Raised Capital Requirements For Italian Banks 
After SREP Review 
29/10/2015 2.20 pm CB HEALTH CHECK OF GREECE'S FOUR BIG BANKS TO 
SHOW TOTAL CAPITAL SHORTFALL OF ABOUT  14 BLN 
EUROS 
09/11/2015 1.10 pm Arguing for more deposit rate cut in December than the markets are 
expecting some on the ECB 
10/11/2015 1.48 am ECB May Struggle With QE vs Rate Cut 
10/11/2015 6.36 pm ECB divided over supervisor's tough stance on banks 
11/11/2015 3.47 pm ECB EXAMINES POSSIBLE EXTENSION OF QE PURCHASES 
TO MUNICIPAL BONDS (EUROPEAN CITIES AND REGIONS) 
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Appendix B2 
This table shows the results for the OLS estimation of equations (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3). The dependant variable 
is the cum-dividend log excess return (𝑋𝑅𝑡) on the DAX from 1300 CET on date 𝑡 − 1 to 1300 CET on date 𝑡. 
The sample period is from November 05, 2010 to September 16, 2015. The sample is split between tightening 
and easing cycles and all 3 specifications are re-estimated with the results set out in the second and bottom 
panel. In order to account for the effect of tight and loose monetary policies the sample is partitioned into the 
periods from November 05, 2010 through October 20, 2011 and from October 21, 2011 through September, 
2015 respectively. Each partition contains 11 and 44 ECB announcements respectively. Coefficient estimates 
and standard errors are presented adjacent to their respective parameters. Specification test results for each 
regression are provided in the bottom four rows of each panel.  
*** Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. 
 DAX 1300-1300 CET 
 
Equation (3.1) Equation (3.2) Equation (3.3) 
Observations: 1224 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Constant 0.013 0.039 0.013 0.039 0.033 0.041 
Pre-ECBt ***0.488 0.184     
Rumourt   ***0.853 0.251 ***0.834 0.251 
NoRumourt   0.082 0.264 0.062 0.264 
Rumourt -1     -0.027 0.251 
Rumourt-2     -0.321 0.251 
NoRumourt-1     -0.140 0.264 
NoRumourt-2     -0.342 0.264 
F Statistic 7.03 5.82 2.51 
ARCH LM: χ2 = 120.12 Yes χ2 = 118.67 Yes χ2 = 121.83 Yes 
White’s test: χ2 = 0.53 No χ2 = 1.62 No χ2 = 0.59 No 
Breusch-Godfrey: χ2 = 0.15 No χ2 = 0.10 No χ2 = 0.10 No 
Observations: 238 DAX 1300-1300 CET (Tightening) 
Constant -0.047 0.120 -0.047 0.120 -0.029 0.126 
Pre-ECBt 0.485 0.577     
Rumourt   1.172 0.845 1.154 0.847 
NoRumourt   -0.086 0.773 -0.104 0.775 
Rumourt -1     0.785 0.847 
Rumourt-2     -0.010 0.847 
NoRumourt-1     -0.132 0.775 
NoRumourt-2     -1.246 0.775 
F Statistic 0.71 0.97 0.91 
ARCH LM: χ2 = 36.71 Yes χ2 = 36.66 Yes χ2 = 36.15 Yes 
White’s test: χ2 = 0.30 No χ2 = 0.56 No χ2 = 0.94 No 
Breusch-Godfrey: χ2 = 0.03 No χ2 = 0.07 No χ2 = 0.09 No 
Observations: 987 DAX 1300-1300 CET (Easing) 
Constant 0.029 0.038 0.029 0.038 0.049 0.040 
Pre-ECBt ***0.488 0.178     
Rumourt   ***0.783 0.239 ***0.764 0.239 
NoRumourt   0.134 0.261 0.115 0.261 
Rumourt -1     -0.200 0.239 
Rumourt-2     -0.389 0.239 
NoRumourt-1      -0.139 0.261 
NoRumourt-2     -0.069 0.261 
F Statistic 7.49 5.48 2.41 
ARCH LM: χ2 = 14.67 Yes χ2 = 14.71 Yes χ2 = 16.71 Yes 
White’s test: χ2 = 0.24 No χ2 = 1.61 No χ2 = 1.28 No 
Breusch-Godfrey: χ2 = 0.23 No χ2 = 0.20 No χ2 = 0.25 No 
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Appendix B3 
This table shows the results for the OLS estimation of equations (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3). of equations of equations 
(3.1), (3.2) and (3.3). The dependant variable is the cum-dividend log excess return (𝑋𝑅𝑡) on the DAX from the 
close on date 𝑡 − 1 to 1300 CET on date 𝑡. The sample period is from November 05, 2010 to September 16, 
2015. Coefficient estimates and standard errors are presented adjacent to their respective parameters. 
Specification test results for each regression are provided in the bottom four rows.  
*** Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. 
 DAX Close-1300 CET 
 
Equation (3.1) Equation (3.2) Equation (3.3) 
Observations: 1224 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Constant 0.034 0.030 0.034 0.030 0.041 0.031 
Pre-ECBt ***0.517 0.140     
Rumourt   ***0.633 0.191 ***0.626 0.192 
NoRumourt   0.387 0.202 0.380 0.202 
Rumourt -1     0.163 0.192 
Rumourt-2     -0.378 0.192 
NoRumourt-1     -0.064 0.202 
NoRumourt-2     0.001 0.202 
F Statistic 13.53 7.16 3.19 
ARCH LM: χ2 = 52.07 Yes χ2 = 51.95 Yes χ2 = 51.94 Yes 
White’s test: χ2 = 2.69 No χ2 = 2.87 No χ2 = 9.22 No 
Breusch-Godfrey: χ2 = 2.15 No χ2 = 2.01 No χ2 = 2.19 No 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B4 
This table shows the results for the OLS estimation of equations (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3). of equations of equations 
(3.1), (3.2) and (3.3). The dependant variable is the cum-dividend log excess return (𝑋𝑅𝑡) on the DAX from 
market open to market close. The sample period is from November 05, 2010 to September 16, 2015. Coefficient 
estimates and standard errors are presented adjacent to their respective parameters. Specification test results for 
each regression are provided in the bottom four rows.  
*** Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. 
 DAX Open – Close 
 
Equation (3.1) Equation (3.2) Equation (3.3) 
Observations: 1224 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Constant 0.033 0.038 0.033 0.038 0.064 0.040 
Pre-ECBt 0.052 0.180     
Rumourt   0.318 0.245 0.287 0.245 
NoRumourt   -0.245 0.259 -0.276 0.258 
Rumourt -1     *-0.473 0.245 
Rumourt-2     -0.051 0.245 
NoRumourt-1     -0.122 0.258 
NoRumourt-2     ***-0.672 0.258 
F Statistic 0.08 1.32 2.17 
ARCH LM: χ2 = 43.93 Yes χ2 = 40.87 Yes χ2 = 40.09 Yes 
White’s test: χ2 = 0.19 No χ2 = 0.64 No χ2 = 1.37 No 
Breusch-Godfrey: χ2 = 0.45 No χ2 = 0.45 No χ2 = 0.43 No 
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Chapter 4. The ECB Conditional Friday Effect 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the EUR/USD price formation process that takes place in the immediate 
aftermath of the ECB announcements over the period spanning from January 2011 to November 
2015. Empirical results show that the EUR/USD exchange rate response to ECB scheduled 
policy announcements is consistent with the standard economic theory formalised through the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (see Fama (1970)). The Euro currency experiences large and 
negative returns in the immediate (5-minute) period following the Central Bank Monetary 
Policy announcements, which is deemed to be mostly accommodative throughout the sample 
return period. This finding is unsurprising, given that it is simply the anticipated financial 
market response to new and relevant public information.  
The main finding of this study, however, is in stark contrast to the predictions of standard asset 
pricing theories. I document large and significantly negative returns on the EUR/USD exchange 
rate on the day following scheduled ECB policy decision announcements. However, such 
pricing anomaly only occurs on the Friday trading days that follow scheduled ECB 
announcements taking place on Thursdays. When the day of the week following an ECB 
announcement falls on a Thursday then no pricing anomaly can be observed. I define this ECB 
Friday pricing anomaly as the ‘ECB conditional Friday effect’. In section 4.6 of this chapter I 
explore several possible explanations for the ECB Friday effect, however, fail to find a 
definitive explanation in line with that found in standard economic and financial economic 
theory. I pose that the ECB conditional Friday effect is a day-of-the-week (DoW) effect 
previously undetected due, mainly, to the conditionality of the pricing anomaly to the 
aforementioned ECB announcement schedules.     
The empirical analysis is based on a 5-minute series for the EUR/USD exchange rates. I make 
use of standard linear regressions with dummy variables to isolate the ECB conditional Fridays 
from all other unconditional days of the week including non-ECB Fridays. Empirical results 
show that average returns earned on the EUR/USD on 50 Fridays following scheduled ECB 
announcements, are over 18 basis points lower than all other unconditional days of the week. 
The same analysis is then replicated when the sample is split into two sub-samples accounting 
for the tight and subsequently loose ECB’s policy stance, finding that the ECB Friday effect is 
negative and significant for both tightening and easing cycles. The ECB conditional negative 
Friday drift is larger in magnitude, at over 18 basis points, when overnight trading hours are 
excluded and the trading day is defined to start at the European opening bell. The magnitude of 
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this negative return effect in the EUR/USD market, when annualised, amounts to over 185 basis 
points. This is orders of magnitude lower than the annualised 48 basis point positive return 
observed for all other days exclusive of ECB Fridays.   
Throughout the full sample, 5 scheduled ECB announcements are observed on Wednesdays. 
When tested, findings show that an ECB conditional Thursday effect does not exist. Average 
returns on such Thursdays are approximately zero and not statistically significant different from 
all other unconditional days of the week. The day of the week is therefore a crucial factor in 
this conditional return effect.   
Overall, these findings document the presence of a price formation anomaly, which is 
conditional on a prevailing scheduled ECB policy decision announcement and on the trading 
day following the announcement falling on a Friday. Several explanations are explored for this 
conditional price formation process. 
The initial intuition is that such a uniform post-ECB negative drift must be a result of relevant 
and new public information arrival. However, findings in this chapter show that scheduled 
public information events observed on days following scheduled ECB announcements, are 
heterogeneous in macroeconomic data type and report both Euro negative and positive 
information. The intuitive reasoning based on standard asset pricing theory is concluded to be 
ineffective in explaining the ECB conditional Friday price formation process. The lack of 
relevant, new information arrival would indicate that this is a price reaction to ‘stale’ news or 
an anticipation of overnight news.   
An alternative explanation of the ECB conditional Friday effect is based on the market 
microstructure literature. Such literature finds that Friday afternoons in multiple markets 
experience higher levels order flows, volume and short selling (see among others, Breedon and 
Ralando (2013)). Large-scale profit taking and closing of positions may be expected following 
high impact ECB policy announcements. The magnitude of the average negative return on the 
EUR/USD following scheduled announcements is over 20 basis points. Therefore, this 
argument is also dismissed given that post-ECB scheduled announcement immediate market 
reaction is likely to be short positions in the EUR/USD, the covering of which would result in 
an opposite directional Friday price effect than that observed in the empirical results.  
The most plausible reason for the ECB conditional Friday effect is a risk-averse liquidation of 
long positions in the Euro prior to Friday market close. The intuition being that traders - 
cautious of a potentially ‘news rich’ weekend relating to an already dovish ECB during a 
predominantly accommodative policy cycle - would not be willing to remain long in the 
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currency over the weekend following ECB announcements. Further, ECB governing council 
(GC) members, who are mandated to a quiet period prior to scheduled announcements, tend to 
make frequent comments and clarifications to the world press during the days following ECB 
meetings. Following predominantly dovish ECB announcements, traders may justifiably attach 
a higher probability to such comments resulting in a negative impact on post-weekend market 
open. Therefore, a conclusion can be drawn that traders, long the currency on post ECB Fridays, 
are likely to make a risk-weighted decision to cut their positions whereas traders short the 
currency, are likely to make the risk-weighted decision to remain short. This conclusion comes 
with a caveat; that the strength of this argument is very much linked to the intuition 
underpinning rational risk-weighted investor/trader behaviour. Thus, the ECB conditional 
Friday effect is, in part, still a pricing puzzle worthy of further investigation.    
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows; the coming section discusses the 
unconditional and conditional DoW effect literature. Section 4.3 presents the data and Section 
4.4 the methodology in use. Section 4.5 comments on the main empirical findings. Section 4.6 
outlines the explanations for the existence of the ECB conditional Friday effect and Section 4.7 
concludes.    
4.2 Day-of-the-Week Effects 
Calendar effects are widely considered to be market pricing anomalies, and therefore violations 
of standard asset pricing theories (Philpot and Peterson (2011)). The January (see Rozeff and 
Kinney (1976)), Weekend, Monday (see Cross (1973) and French (1980)) and Turn-of-the-
month effects (Ariel (1987)) are examples of systematic return patterns around a particular 
month-of-the-year, DoW and day-of-the-month, respectively. The literature studying calendar 
affects has been predominantly concerned with equity markets; however, treasury (Gibbon and 
Hess (1981)), futures (Junkus (1986)) and foreign exchange markets (Levine (1988) and Bush 
and Stephens (2016)) have also been investigated and found to exhibit seasonal return patters.  
The literature studying the existence of calendar effects, focuses predominantly on DoW 
effects, although time-of-day-effects (see among others Breedon and Ralando (2013), Baillie 
and Bollerslev (1991) and Ranaldo (2009)) are also more prevalent with greater availability of 
intra-day data. The Monday effect is perhaps the most investigate financial market asset pricing 
‘anomaly’. Equity markets, in developed economies, are found to generate consistent negative 
returns on Mondays (Siegel (1998)). The pre-weekend Friday effect is characterised, in contrast 
with the Monday effect with the observation of positive equity market returns (Pettengill 
(2003)). The weekend effect is less consistent for currency markets. Yamori and Kurihara 
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(2003) find returns to the USD versus several major currencies to be high on Mondays and 
Wednesdays but low on Tuesdays and Fridays. This result is however, not consistent over their 
full sample period. For the EUR/USD market, the market of primary interest to this chapter, the 
only observable DoW effect has been found on Mondays. Bush and Stephens (2016) find 
negative Monday effects of around 16 and 19 basis points for two short sub-samples spanning 
January 1999 through May 2000 and November 2004 through November 2005. At the time of 
writing, an unconditional Friday effect has not been documented in the literature for the 
EUR/USD market. 
Such unconditional calendar effects have been characterised as evidence against the EMH, 
specifically in its weakest form. Unconditional calendar effects, by definition, are excess 
security returns that are observed in the absence of information events. Moreover, their 
regularity of occurrence suggests that these foreseeable patterns are not exploited by informed 
traders and the pricing anomalies are not corrected. 
More recently, the uniformity of the weekend effect has been challenged with studies showing 
that for sub-samples covering longer time horizons for equity market data the Monday and 
Friday effects disappear or even reverse direction (Galai et al. (2008)) depending on the 
macroeconomic business cycle. Similarly, Bush and Stephens (2016) have shown that the DoW 
effects for currency markets are strongly dependent on macroeconomic cycles, and therefore 
challenged the idea that such calendar effect are unconditional.  
Scholars have criticized the literature on the DoW effects for a number of different aspects 
spanning from the methodological approach (Connoly (1989)) to the issue of data mining 
(Sullivan et al. (2001)). The former critique is predominantly targeted at those assuming 
normality in asset price returns for adopted methods of estimation. This methodological 
misnomer has been accounted for in this chapter as outline in section 5. The use of maximum 
likelihood ARCH estimation, where appropriate, accounts for departures from normality in the 
specific series under analysis. The findings and methodological approach of this chapter 
certainly do not fall into this category of critique given that the ECB conditional Friday effect 
exists throughout the entire data sample used.  
Some studies seeking to explain the existence of systematic DoW patters have suggested that 
such patterns have been mischaracterised as unconditional price discovery. Such explanations 
are based on market microstructure factors, information flows and order flows. Fama (1991) 
noted that the magnitude of the Monday effect deferential versus other days of the week is less 
than the magnitude of the typical bid-ask spread. Significant reductions in the average bid-ask 
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spread in recent years are referenced as the reason for the diminishing observation of the 
Monday effect in respective data samples (Galai et al. (2008)).  Gregoriou et al. (2004) show 
that the weekend effect disappear once the bid-ask spread is used as a proxy for transaction 
costs. Bell and Levin (1998) and Draper and Paudyal (2002) find that controlling for 
institutional settlement procedures effectively eliminates the weekend effect.  
Explanations based on information flows, include Dyl and Maberly (1988) who suggest that 
the negative Monday return effect is simply due to both Micro and Macro information arrival. 
Micro information flows in the form of earnings and dividend announcements are found to have 
no conclusive impact on the weekend effect (Peterson (1990)). However, when Micro 
information flows are expanded to control for all firm specific events, DeFusco et al. (1993) 
find that the weekend effect becomes unobservable. Steely (2001) finds that the Monday effect 
disappears, for equity markets, when macroeconomic data announcements are controlled for by 
categorisating outcomes as negative and positive shocks.  
The weekday patterns observed in order flows has been linked by some studies to the systematic 
DoW return pattern. Miller (1988), Seigel (1998), Chen and Singal (2003) argue that investors 
with heterogeneous investment horizons exhibit similar patterns in order flows. They argue that 
liquidation of positions is more likely on days either side of closed weekend markets. They 
refer to heightened order flows on Mondays and Fridays as evidence of this explanation. The 
impact of order flows on the ECB conditional Friday effect is addressed in section 4.6.  
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4.3 Data description 
The Euro-US dollar (EUR/USD) foreign exchange market is the largest in the world by number 
of transactions per day. The EUR/USD exchange rate data is sourced from OLSENDATA 
(www.olsendata.com). I collect observations of 5-minute interval exchange rate data to 
accommodate the creation of non-standard trading windows to investigate price formation 
during the post-ECB window in the currency market. 5-minute interval observations are used 
since there are fewer instances of non-trading intervals than higher frequency observations. 
Exchange rate observations consists of exchange rate quotes for a period spanning from January 
03, 2011 to November 20, 2015 (238 weeks, 1194 trading days), totalling in 343,872 
observations.18  
In order to more formally analyse the post-ECB announcement trading window, I calculate 
cumulative returns on the EUR/USD for different trading periods following scheduled ECB 
announcements. More specifically, I am interested in post-ECB days which fall on Fridays since 
preliminary analysis shows that the conditional post-ECB trade only takes place when the ECB 
scheduled announcement takes place on a Thursday. For the entire sample, there are 55 
Scheduled GC policy decision announcements. Five of these announcements take place on 
Wednesdays whereas the remaining 50 occur on Thursdays.  
For completeness, I calculate cumulative returns on the EUR/USD for a number of different 
return windows. The aim is to comprehensively analyse the ‘Post-ECB Friday effect’ as a 
conditional DoW effect as well as a conditional time of day effect. For this purpose, cumulative 
five-minute log returns (in percentage points) are calculated for the 24-hour period from 2300 
CET on the day of a scheduled ECB policy decision announcement until 2300 CET on the day 
after the announcement. I also compute and investigate return windows on the EUR/USD from 
the 0800 CET (European open) and 1200 CET (European Lunch) on the day following 
scheduled announcements to the close of the same day. By construction, cumulative returns 
calculated during over these windows do not include the trading period immediately following 
the ECB GC decision outcome. 
                                                             
18 Pre-market (Sunday) trading is available through some exchanges, however trading is relatively illiquid when 
compare to standard non-weekend trading (Chaboud et al. (2014)). Due to poor levels of liquidity and the 
prevalence of non-trading intervals, these observations are omitted. This is standard practice in the literature, which 
utilise data of this type. Half trading days and major holidays during which trading is considerably less active, are 
also omitted.  
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Table 4.1 
Descriptive statistics for cumulative returns (%) on EUR/USD exchange rate for three return windows are 
calculated as follows. The 2300-2300 cumulative return window is calculated as the sum of 5-minute returns 
on the EUR/USD exchange rate from 2300 CET at the market open though 2255 CET the following day at 
market close. The 0800-2300 cumulative return window is calculated as the sum of 5-minute returns on the 
EUR/USD exchange rate from 0800 CET at the European market open though to 2255 CET on the same day at 
market close. The 1200-2300 cumulative return window is calculated as the sum of 5-minute returns on the 
EUR/USD exchange rate from 1200 CET at the European market Lunch though to 2255 CET on the same day 
at market close. Post-ECB Fridays are the post-ECB return windows that fall on a Friday following ECB 
scheduled announcements on Thursdays. All other Fridays are all respective Friday return windows, which do 
not follow ECB scheduled announcements. All other Days represent all respective return windows on all non-
Friday trading periods. 
Sample 
Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. Obs. 
post-ECB Fridays 
EUR/USD 2300-2300 -0.190 0.746 -1.738 1.671 50 
EUR/USD 0800-2300 -0.199 0.701 -1.749 1.564 50 
EUR/USD 1200-2300 -0.161 0.534 -1.428 0.900 50 
EUR/USD 2300-2300 (Tightening) -0.283 1.107 -1.738 1.400 10 
EUR/USD 0800-2300 (Tightening) -0.364 0.984 -1.749 1.361 10 
EUR/USD 1200-2300 (Tightening) -0.230 0.705 -1.428 0.900 10 
EUR/USD 2300-2300 (Easing) -0.166 0.637 -1.703 1.671 40 
EUR/USD 0800-2300 (Easing) -0.156 0.616 -1.572 1.564 40 
EUR/USD 1200-2300 (Easing) -0.143 0.490 -1.137 0.814 40 
All other Fridays  
EUR/USD 2300-2300 0.019 0.561 -1.532 1.771 191 
EUR/USD 0800-2300 0.013 0.502 -1.315 1.393 191 
EUR/USD 1200-2300 0.025 0.456 -1.619 1.163 191 
EUR/USD 2300-2300 (Tightening) 0.037 0.740 -1.532 1.202 31 
EUR/USD 0800-2300 (Tightening) 0.022 0.640 -1.159 1.041 31 
EUR/USD 1200-2300 (Tightening) 0.078 0.594 -1.215 1.024 31 
EUR/USD 2300-2300 (Easing) 0.016 0.522 -1.375 1.771 160 
EUR/USD 0800-2300 (Easing) 0.011 0.473 -1.315 1.393 160 
EUR/USD 1200-2300 (Easing) 0.015 0.426 -1.619 1.163 160 
All other Days 
EUR/USD 2300-2300 0.003 0.578 -2.153 2.299 955 
EUR/USD 0800-2300 -0.011 0.526 -2.275 2.185 955 
EUR/USD 1200-2300 0.001 0.436 -1.932 1.912 955 
EUR/USD 2300-2300 (Tightening) 0.054 0.700 -1.957 1.793 167 
EUR/USD 0800-2300 (Tightening) 0.030 0.641 -2.275 2.045 167 
EUR/USD 1200-2300 (Tightening) 0.016 0.544 -1.932 1.763 167 
EUR/USD 2300-2300 (Easing) -0.008 0.549 -2.153 2.299 788 
EUR/USD 0800-2300 (Easing) -0.020 0.498 -2.072 2.185 788 
EUR/USD 1200-2300 (Easing) -0.002 0.410 -1.836 1.912 788 
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The entire sample spans a period during which the ECB has implemented monetary policy 
measures, which could be described as ‘tightening’ and ‘easing’. The ‘tightening cycle’ 
corresponds to the period January 03, 2011 to October 20, 2011 during which the ECB increases 
interest rates to a peak of 1.75%. The ‘easing cycle’ corresponds to the period October 21, 2011 
to November 20, 2015 during which the ECB decreases interest rates from the peak of 1.75% 
to 0.050%. It is reasonable to assume that average post-announcement returns are affected by 
the policy stance of the GC during their scheduled press conference. The currency market 
response to such very divergent tones would be expected to be very different. For this reason, 
throughout the analysis in this chapter, the sample is split into ‘tightening’ and ‘easing’ sub-
samples. 
I then carry out a more formal analysis by looking at the mean, median and standard deviations 
of three previously defined windows for the post-ECB Friday announcements, as well as for 
the same returns windows on all other days and all other Fridays. Such statistics are reported in 
Table 4.1 for the full sample, as well as for the samples labelled ‘Tightening‘ and ‘Easing’. The 
former consists of the cumulative log returns for each respective return window considered to 
be during the ECB’s tightening cycle which spans 10 post-ECB Fridays and 31 non-ECB 
Fridays, whereas the latter is the cumulative log returns for the same return windows during the 
ECB’s easing cycle which spans 40 post- ECB Fridays and 160 non-ECB Fridays. The post-
ECB return window in the EUR/USD currency market appears to show an interesting price 
formation process on the day following scheduled announcements. This price formation is 
particularly prominent for post-ECB Fridays. To investigate the post-ECB window further, I 
collect the times and dates of scheduled ECB GC meetings, policy decision announcement and 
press conference times. 
The ECB GC convenes twelve times per year as part of their mandated monetary policy 
operations to review set or adjust monetary policy for the Euro area19. Following these 
meetings, the ECB announces its monetary policy stance at the pre-scheduled time of 1300 CET 
on a pre-scheduled date. Such announcements mostly take place on a Thursday (50 out of 55) 
with only a few (5 out of 55) scheduled on Wednesdays.20 Contrary to the quiet period observed 
by the GC members during the pre-announcement window, the post-announcement window is 
characterised by commentary and press briefings. GC members frequently speak to the world 
                                                             
19 Since 2015, scheduled GC policy meetings have been reduced to eight meetings per year.  
20 This is usually due to the close proximity of a public holiday, which interrupts the scheduled meeting. 
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press and market agents about the policy stance of the bank and provide reasons for any changes 
in policy.21  
The day of the week on which the scheduled announcement falls is of vital importance. Any 
significant policy decisions are also noted, which may have been taken. The dates of meeting 
and policy decisions are sourced from the ECB’s website (www.ecb.europa.eu) and further 
details of exact announcement times are gathered from Bloomberg. The above features of the 
GC meetings are set out in Appendix C1.   
 
 
  
                                                             
21 It is also common for members of the governing council to voice any divergence in their personal opinion on 
the bank’s policy decisions. 
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4.4 Methodology 
I base the empirical analysis on a standard dummy variable regression model to detect any 
potential day of the week effect for the EUR/USD market. The model is then adapted to suit 
the investigation of a potential ‘ECB conditional Friday effect’. This last specification is then 
re-estimated in Maximum Likelihood to account for any clusters of volatility, which are 
typically present in daily financial series.  
Calendar Effect Model 
I begin by investigating for the entire sample the presence of any potential unconditional DoW 
effect in the daily EUR/USD series under scrutiny. I do so by means of the following equation:  
𝑅𝑡 =  ∑ 𝛽𝑖
5
𝑖=1
𝐷𝑜𝑊𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
where 𝑅𝑡 is the cumulative daily return on the EUR/USD in percentage points, and t spans from 
1 to 1194. Such cumulative returns are calculated by summing the 5-minute returns for a 
specified trading period. For example, if the trading day is defined as the 24-hour period 
between 2300 CET on date 𝑡 − 1 to date 𝑡, the cumulative 5-minute returns during such return 
window will form a one day return observation. The explanatory variables are dummy variables 
that take unity when the return interval falls on a specific day, and zero otherwise.22 The 
coefficients 𝛽𝑖 capture the average return differential for each DoW versus all other days. The 
disturbance term, 𝜀𝑡, is assumed to be the normally distributed with mean zero and variance 𝜎
2. 
Equation (4.1) is the baseline model that I employ to investigate the ‘ECB conditional Friday 
effect’.  
This model is the standard approach taken in financial economics literature to test for calendar 
effects in multiple asset classes and across international market (see, e.g., Zhang et al. (2017) 
and Yamori and Kurihara (2004)).  
I then gauge the magnitude of the ECB conditional Friday drift in returns by splitting the 𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑡 
dummy variable into two separate dummy variables as follows:   
                                                             
22 For instance, the 𝐷𝑜𝑊1,𝑡 dummy variable takes value 1 if 𝑡 is a Monday and zero when 𝑡 
falls on any other day. 
[4.1] 
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𝑅𝑡 =  ∑ 𝛽𝑖
4
𝑖=1
𝐷𝑜𝑊𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐸𝐶𝐵(𝐹𝑟𝑖|𝐸𝐶𝐵)𝑡 + 𝛽𝑁𝑂(𝐹𝑟𝑖|𝑁𝑜𝐸𝐶𝐵)𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  
The dummy variable (𝐹𝑟𝑖|𝐸𝐶𝐵)𝑡 takes unity value for when date 𝑡 is the Friday following 
scheduled monetary policy announcements and zero otherwise, whereas the dummy 
(𝐹𝑟𝑖|𝑁𝑜𝐸𝐶𝐵)𝑡 is equal to one when date 𝑡 is any Friday that does not follow ECB 
announcement days and zero otherwise. The coefficients 𝛽𝐸𝐶𝐵  and 𝛽𝑁𝑂  capture the estimated 
average return on ECB Fridays and Non-ECB Fridays above all other days, respectively. 
Equation (4.2) therefore controls for all other unconditional days of the week returns while the 
Fridays which follow scheduled ECB announcements are isolated. 
Statistical features of the return periods generated by summing 5-minute EUR/USD log returns 
demonstrate departures from normality and could potentially suffer from serial correlation and 
conditional heteroscedasticity. Since the disturbance terms in equations (4.1) and (4.2) may 
inherit such features, least square estimators might lose consistency and deliver potentially 
spurious results (see Chien, Lee, and Wang (2002)). Based on these considerations, I 
supplement the estimation strategy by using alternative methods such as HAC sandwiches 
estimators, WLS and bootstrapping which can better cope with ill-conditioned data.  
I then re-estimate equations (4.1) and (4.2) using the following two GARCH specifications: 
𝑅𝑡 =  ∑ 𝛽𝑖
5
𝑖=1
𝐷𝑜𝑊𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛼2𝜎𝑡−1
2  
 
𝑅𝑡 =  ∑ 𝛽𝑖
4
𝑖=1
𝐷𝑜𝑊𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐸𝐶𝐵(𝐹𝑟𝑖|𝐸𝐶𝐵)𝑡 + 𝛽𝑁𝑂(𝐹𝑟𝑖|𝑁𝑜𝐸𝐶𝐵)𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  
 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛼2𝜎𝑡−1
2 + 𝛼𝐸𝐶𝐵(𝐹𝑟𝑖|𝐸𝐶𝐵)𝑡 
 
The joint estimations of mean and GARCH variance equations, which include dummy variables 
with structures similar to those defined above, can generate multi-modality in likelihood 
functions, with the peril of achieving local rather than global maxima (Doornik and Oms 
(2008)). As the number of dummy variables in the mean equation increases, the issue of multi-
[4.2] 
[4.4] 
[4.3] 
[4.6] 
[4.5] 
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modality becomes more severe. To avoid this problem, I conduct two-stage empirical 
estimations of the above GARCH models. First, I carry out OLS estimation of equation (4.3) 
and then use the residuals so obtained to estimate equation (4.4). 23 I posit that this approach is 
more suitable to deliver robust estimators with a negligible impact on the asymptotic efficiency. 
This is particularly valid given the large sample of daily returns in use. Furthermore, it has been 
shown that for similar GARCH specifications, the two-step approach is asymptotically 
equivalent to the joint estimation of the mean and variance equations (Lin, Engle, and Ito 
(1994)). 
                                                             
23 The same empirical exercise is carried out for equations (4.5) – (4.6). 
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4.5 Empirical Findings 
In this section, I set out the empirical estimates for the specifications reported in the previous 
section. I then re-assess the economic significance of the post-ECB announcements by looking 
at the risk/return delivered by trading rules designed around the same announcements.  
4.5.1 The post-ECB Trading Window 
I begin by looking at the price formation process in the EUR/USD foreign exchange market on 
Thursday scheduled ECB policy announcements and Fridays, which follow. This price 
formation process is contrasted with all other Thursday/Friday day-couplets where there are no 
scheduled ECB policy decisions. Figure 4.1 illustrates this comparison between ECB Thursdays 
and Fridays and all other Thursday/Friday 2-day return windows. The bold dashed black line 
represents the average pointwise cumulative 5-minute intraday percentage return on the 
EUR/USD for all 2-day ECB announcement windows. The announcement window is taken 
from the market open of the day of schedule ECB monetary policy announcements to the market 
close on the day following the announcement day. The average pointwise cumulative intraday 
return is calculated for 50 ECB announcement windows, where the policy announcement is 
made on a Thursday, from January 03, 2011 to September 16, 2015. The bold blue dashed line 
gives the average pointwise cumulative intraday returns, but for all 2-day Thursday/Friday 
return windows of the same definition where there are no scheduled ECB policy 
announcements. 
As predicted by standard economic theory there is an immediate price reaction to the arrival of 
new public information in the form of the ECB’s policy announcement. From approximately 
zero in the pre-announcement morning, average cumulative returns fall to a low of -20 basis 
points almost immediately following the ECB’s policy announcement. The price formation 
process taking place at the 152nd return interval on ECB Thursdays (1345 CET) is broadly in 
line with expectations given that, the central bank was in a period of policy easing for the 
majority of the sample period. Further, the announcement of all policy easing measures and 
new accommodative policy tool such as bond buying programmes were made at the regular 
scheduled announcement window.  
Following the policy decision announcement, there appears to be a period of profit taking 
during the ECB’s press conference at the 163rd return interval (1430 CET) and through to 
123 
 
European market close. Cumulative returns on the EUR/USD are mostly flat during overnight 
trade on the post-ECB Friday and into European market open on Friday mornings.  
Figure 4.1 
5-minute cumulative returns on the EUR/USD exchange rate over 2 days trading window. This figure shows 
the average cumulative returns on the EUR/USD exchange rate for 2-day trading windows. The dashed black line 
is the average cumulative returns  from 0000 CET on the day of the ECB announcement (Thursday) to 2300 CET 
on the day following the ECB announcement day (Friday). The dashed blue line shows average cumulative returns 
on all other Thursday/Friday couplets that do not include scheduled ECB announcements. The shade black and 
blue areas are pointwise 95% confidence intervals around the average cumulative returns. The sample period is 
from January 03, 2011 to November 20, 2015. The red arrow is set at 1345 CET, when ECB policy decisions are 
made public. The blue arrow is set at 1430 CET, when the ECB press conference takes place. The vertical red 
line represents the start of European Friday trading hours. 
 
Up to this stage of the trading period, the post-ECB price formation process is in line with 
fundamental economic theory. However, at the 426th return interval, corresponding to the 
European Lunch time (1200 CET) there is a noticeable drop in cumulative EUR/USD returns. 
This drop-off can be characterised as a drift since it takes place consistently over 70, five-
minute, return intervals (almost 6 hours). This post-ECB Friday afternoon drift is tantamount 
to approximately -15 basis points and appears to commence in the absence of any scheduled 
macroeconomic data points. The pointwise 95% confidence interval for average cumulative 
returns indicated by the grey shaded area, would suggest that cumulative post-ECB returns are 
negative and significantly different from zero. Moreover, when compared to the cumulative 
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returns on the EUR/USD on all other day couplets and associated 95% confidence interval, 
which are roughly zero to +5 basis points, the post-ECB drop off appears to be significant.  
Figure 4.2 
Accounting for Macroeconomic Announcements. This figure shows the average cumulative returns on the 
EUR/USD exchange rate for 2-day trading windows. The dashed red line is the average cumulative returns on the 
EUR/USD from 0000 CET ECB Thursdays to 2300 CET on ECB Fridays during which there are no observations 
of macroeconomic announcements. The dashed black line is the average cumulative returns on the EUR/USD from 
0000 CET on ECB Thursdays to 2300 CET on ECB Fridays during which macroeconomic announcements are 
observed. The dashed blue line shows average cumulative returns on the EUR/USD on all other Thursday/Friday 
couplets that do not include scheduled ECB announcements. The shade black and blue areas are pointwise 95% 
confidence intervals around the average cumulative returns for corresponding data sets. The sample period is from 
January 03, 2011 to November 20, 2015. The red arrow is set at 1345 CET, when ECB policy decisions are made 
public. The blue arrow is set at 1430 CET, when the ECB press conference takes place. The vertical red line 
represents the start of European Friday trading hours. 
 
 
It is worth noting that there are scheduled macroeconomic data announcements on some post-
ECB Fridays at 1430 CET (175th return interval), however, the outcomes of such data 
announcements are heterogeneous in expected EUR/USD market impact (see Appendix C2). 
To assess further the potential impact of macroeconomic news on the conditional ECB Friday 
drift, I split the post-ECB return window to those, which feature macroeconomic 
announcements (20) (such as the U.S Employment Report, U.S Inflation Report, Eurozone 
Inflation Report, etc.) and post-ECB trading periods during absent of major macroeconomic 
announcements (30). The result of this exercise presented in Figure 4.2, show that the drift is 
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very large and negative drift during post-ECB Fridays absent of major macroeconomic 
announcements. This negative drift appears to be in excess of 30 basis points.  
In contrast, ECB Fridays appear to exhibit no significant drift when macroeconomic news is 
detected. Based on this result I rule out the possibility that the ECB conditional Friday drift is 
due to news arrival.   
To differentiate between the policy announcement conditional price formation process and the 
Friday afternoon drift, the post-ECB Fridays is isolated and contrasted with all other Fridays. 
Figure 4.3 provides an illustrative comparison between EUR/USD average cumulative returns 
on Fridays following scheduled ECB announcements and all other Fridays.   
Figure 4.3 
Friday returns on the EUR/USD exchange rate. This figure shows the average cumulative returns on the 
EUR/USD exchange rate for Friday trading windows. The dashed black line is the average cumulative returns on 
the EUR/USD from 0000 CET on the Friday after ECB announcement days to 2300 CET at market close. The 
dashed blue line shows average cumulative returns on the EUR/USD on all other Fridays that do not follow 
scheduled ECB announcements. The shade black and blue areas are pointwise 95% confidence intervals around 
the corresponding average cumulative returns.  The sample period is from January 03, 2011 to November 20, 
2015. The vertical red line represents the start of European Friday trading hours. 
 
 
It is clear from the figure that cumulative returns on the EUR/USD on Fridays following ECB 
announcements (illustrated with dashed black line) are approximately in line with all other 
Fridays, at zero. There is however, a notable decoupling at 1230 CET (return interval 138), 
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where cumulative returns begin to drift on ECB Fridays. This drift continues throughout the 
afternoon until approximately 1640 CET (the 200th return interval), and is tantamount to -15 
basis points at European market close. Isolating Friday trading periods in this way shows that 
there is a significant conditional Friday effect observable. This effect is worthy of further 
investigation given the economic implication of an observable consistent price formation 
process, which is unexplained by standard economic theory.   
Figure 4.4 
Thursday returns on the EUR/USD exchange rate. This figure shows the average cumulative returns on the 
EUR/USD exchange rate for Thursday trading windows. The dashed black line is the average cumulative returns 
on the EUR/USD from 0000 CET on the Thursday after ECB announcement days to 2300 CET at market close. 
The dashed blue line shows average cumulative returns on the EUR/USD on all other Thursdays that do not 
follow scheduled ECB announcements. The shade black and blue areas are pointwise 95% confidence intervals 
around the average cumulative returns for corresponding data sets. The sample period is from January 03, 2011 
to November 20, 2015. The vertical red line represents the start of European Thursday trading hours. 
 
 
The apparent pricing anomaly detailed above only takes place on Friday trading days, which 
follow scheduled ECB announcements taking place on Thursdays. When the day of the week 
following an ECB announcement falls on a Thursday (rather than a Friday) no pricing anomaly 
can be observed. This can be seen from the results presented in Figure 4.4. The dashed bold 
black line represents the average cumulative returns on the EUR/USD for Thursdays, which 
follow Wednesday, scheduled ECB policy announcements. In total, there are 5 such Thursday 
trading periods in the sample. It is clear from the figure that average cumulative returns on ECB 
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conditional Thursdays do not follow the same pattern as that observed for ECB Fridays. There 
is an afternoon negative drift in cumulative returns, however, as indicated by the 95% 
confidence intervals (shaded blue and grey areas) this drift cannot be shown to be statistically 
different from zero or different from the average cumulative returns observed on all other non-
ECB Thursdays (indicated by the bold dashed blue line).  
It is fair to surmise, from the evidence presented in the Figures above, that the day-after ECB 
conditional drift is a Friday pricing anomaly and does not occur when scheduled ECB 
announcements take place on Wednesdays. 
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4.5.2 The Conditional Friday Effect 
To more formally investigate the existence, and gauge the magnitude of an ECB conditional 
Friday effect, in this section I present the results of the methodology outline in section 4.5. 
The empirical estimates of equations (4.1) to (4.6) set out in Table 4.2 confirm the existence of 
the ECB conditional Friday effect.  
I start the empirical analysis by evaluating results for the full sample, inclusive of periods of 
monetary easing and tightening. I find that there are no observable unconditional DoW effect 
in the EUR/USD foreign exchange market when the trading day is defined as the 24-hour period 
between 2300 – 2300 CET, 0800 – 2300 CET and 1200 – 2300 CET. In fact, all estimated 
coefficients of equation (4.1) are not statistically significant at standard significance levels. It 
is also worth noting at this stage, that the GARCH term is omitted from equation (4.4) and (4.6). 
Specification tests carried out show that the addition of a GARCH term over specifies the model 
and makes coefficient estimates less efficient.24 
Empirical estimation of equation (4.2) and (4.5) – (4.6) reported in Table 4.2 confirm the 
existence of a highly significant ECB conditional Friday effect, where the returns earned on the 
EUR/USD currency are orders of magnitude lower that that earned on all other days tested. 
Average returns on the EUR/USD on Fridays following scheduled ECB policy decision 
announcements are over 18 basis points lower than all other unconditional days in sample for 
24-hour trading day. The magnitude of the negative ECB Friday drift is approximately the same 
when the trading day is defined as spanning European trading hours (0800 – 2300 CET). I 
investigate this particular return window due to the apparent zero average return on the 
EUR/USD during overnight trading hours as observed in Figure 4.3. In fact, the decoupling of 
the average return pattern observed for ECB Fridays from all other Fridays appears to be more 
pronounced only after the European opening bell (0800 CET).  
Moreover, looking closer at findings presented in Figure 4.3 it appears that the negative drift is 
more pronounced and predominantly takes place in the afternoon. When the trading day is 
defined as such, the magnitude of the EUR/USD negative drift on ECB Friday afternoons is on 
average 15 basis points. Comparing the magnitude of the negative drift for all three definitions 
of the trading day, empirical results show that the majority of the ECB Friday effect takes place 
during afternoon trading hours. 
                                                             
24 This is determined by the Akaike Information Criterion 
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Table 4.2 
This table shows the results for OLS estimates of equation (4.1) and (4.2) and maximum likelihood estimates of equations (4.3) – (4.4) and (4.5) – (4.6). The dependant variable is the cumulative return 
(𝑅𝑡) on the EUR/USD from 2300 CET on date 𝑡 − 1 to 2300 CET on the date 𝑡 (first panel), from 0800 CET on date 𝑡 to 2300 CET on the same date (second panel) and from 1200 CET on date 𝑡 to 
2300 CET on the same date (third panel). The sample period is from January 01, 2011 to November 20, 2015 (1194 Observations). This sample contains 50 scheduled ECB announcements. Coefficient 
estimates for the mean equation are provided in the top panel and for the variance equation, in the bottom panel. Standard errors are given in brackets. Bootstrapped Bias-Corrected confidence intervals 
at 5% level in squared brackets (DiCiccio and Efron (1996)).Q(4) is the Ljung-Box statistic for serial correlation up to lag 4 in residuals. ARCH (4) is the ARCH-LM test for heteroscedasticity in residuals 
up to lag 4. P-values for specification tests are reported in brackets. ***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. 
 EUR/USD 2300-2300 CET EUR/USD 0800-2300 CET EUR/USD 1200-2300 CET 
 Eq. (1) Eq.(3)-(4) Eq. (2) Eq.(5)-(6) Eq. (1) Eq.(3)-(4) Eq. (2) Eq.(5)-(6) Eq. (1) Eq.(3)-(4) Eq. (2) Eq.(5)-(6) 
 OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML 
β1 0.017 
(0.038) 
 
0.028 
(0.041) 
 
0.017 
(0.038) 
[-0.056,0.090] 
0.030 
(0.040) 
 
0.005 
(0.034) 
 
0.009 
(0.040) 
0.005 
(0.034) 
[-0.062,0.072] 
0.011 
(0.039) 
0.021 
(0.029) 
 
0.026 
(0.035) 
0.021 
(0.029) 
[-0.035,0.077] 
0.027 
(0.035) 
β 2 0.024 
(0.038) 
 
0.028 
(0.041) 
0.024 
(0.038) 
[-0.050,0.098] 
0.028 
(0.041) 
0.021 
(0.034) 
 
0.012 
(0.038) 
0.021 
(0.034) 
[-0.046,0.088] 
0.013 
(0.038) 
0.026 
(0.029) 
 
0.022 
(0.034) 
0.026 
(0.029) 
[-0.030,0.083] 
0.022 
(0.033) 
β 3 -0.041 
(0.038) 
 
-0.040 
(0.033) 
-0.041 
(0.038) 
[-0.114,0.033] 
-0.040 
(0.033) 
-0.048 
(0.034) 
 
-0.046 
(0.030) 
-0.048 
(0.034) 
[-0.115,0.019] 
-0.046 
(0.030) 
-0.041 
(0.029) 
 
-0.040 
(0.026) 
-0.041 
(0.029) 
[-0.097,0.015] 
-0.041 
(0.026) 
β 4 0.011 
(0.038) 
 
0.015 
(0.032) 
0.011 
(0.038) 
[-0.063,0.085] 
0.015 
(0.032) 
-0.023 
(0.034) 
 
-0.028 
(0.029) 
-0.023 
(0.034) 
[-0.090,0.044] 
-0.027 
(0.029) 
-0.002 
(0.029) 
 
-0.003 
(0.025) 
-0.002 
(0.029) 
[-0.058,0.055] 
-0.004 
(0.025) 
β 5 -0.023 
(0.038) 
-0.012 
(0.036) 
  -0.030 
(0.034) 
-0.025 
(0.033) 
  -0.012 
(0.029) 
-0.009 
(0.027) 
  
β ECB   
 
-0.190*** 
 (0.084) 
[-0.357,-0.026] 
-0.183*** 
(0.092) 
  -0.199*** 
(0.077) 
[-0.350,-0.048] 
-0.181*** 
(0.068) 
  -0.161** 
(0.064) 
[-0.287,-0.035] 
-0.150** 
(0.062) 
β NO   
 
0.019 
(0.042) 
[-0.063,0.102] 
0.019 
(0.035) 
  0.013 
(0.038) 
[-0.062,0.088] 
0.008 
(0.038) 
  0.025 
(0.032) 
[-0.038,0.088] 
0.022 
(0.030) 
α0  0.281
*** 
(0.018) 
 0.277*** 
(0.018) 
 0.239*** 
(0.001) 
 0.239*** 
(0.001) 
 0.180*** 
(0.006) 
 0.180*** 
(0.006) 
α1  0.180
*** 
(0.060) 
 0.171*** 
(0.060) 
 0.150*** 
(0.034) 
 0.145*** 
(0.034) 
 0.087*** 
(0.028) 
 0.084*** 
(0.028) 
αECB    0.170 
(0.161) 
   0.115 
(0.078) 
   0.044 
(0.069) 
R2 0.002 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.009 0.009 
Q(4) 4.848 
(0.303) 
3.063 
(0.547) 
5.198 
(0.268) 
3.234 
(0.519) 
5.117 
(0.276) 
3.162 
(0.531) 
5.285 
(0.259) 
3.160 
(0.531) 
7.438 
(0.114) 
6.373 
(0.173) 
7.900 
(0.095) 
6.594 
(0.159) 
ARCH(4) 13.943 
(0.000) 
0.094 
(0.760) 
27.359 
(0.000) 
0.123 
(0.726) 
31.123 
(0.000) 
0.005 
(0.944) 
29.560 
(0.000) 
0.021 
(0.885) 
6.659 
(0.010) 
0.040 
(0.842) 
5.227 
(0.022) 
0.077 
(0.782) 
Note: The distribution and sample statistics of the bootstrapped betas and respective standard errors are asymptotically coverage to values achieved through OLS estimation. The results of this exercise are presented in appendix C3.   
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I believe that this particular finding differentiates the ECB Friday effect from simply the 
‘pricing in’ of information reported in the Thursday announcement. Assuming at least semi-
strong form efficiency in the EUR/USD market, the information content of the ECB 
announcement should be priced prior to the European opening hours or at least European lunch, 
given the 24-hour nature of the EUR/USD market.   
All quoted results are significant at the 1% percent level, of a higher magnitude when estimated 
using least square methodology and confirmed to be robust with bootstrapped bias-corrected 
confidence intervals.  The findings reported here therefore suggest, that the ECB conditional 
Friday effect is both statistically and economically relevant.  
Table 4.3 reports findings for when the sample is split to only include the policy tightening 
period from January 01, 2011 through October 20, 2011. When the ECB’s policy tightening 
period is isolated, the magnitude of the average return differential on ECB Fridays remains 
large and negative, yet not statistically significant.  
It is somewhat surprising to find such large negative returns in the aftermath of ECB 
announcements during a policy tightening cycle. However, given the statistical properties of 
these results it is difficult to arrive at any conclusive explanations.  
Table 4.4 reports findings for when the sample is split to only include the policy easing period 
from October 20, 2011 through November 20, 2015. For the sub-period characterized by 
loosened monetary policy stance the ECB Friday announcements produce a slightly less 
negative but significant negative drift over all other Fridays. Here the average excess return 
differential is almost 17 basis points less than all other easing sub-sample days. This result is 
notable and somewhat surprising given that the full sample ECB Friday drift is larger in 
absolute terms.  
When the trading day is re-defined as the 15-hour European trading day, between 0800 CET – 
2300 CET, the EUR-USD drifts lower on average, by almost 16 basis points versus all other 
unconditional days of the week in the easing period sample. The larger, more negative ECB 
Friday drift found for the tightening sub-sample is consistent with that found for the 24-hour 
trading days. I observe similar levels of negative drift when the trading day is confined to after 
Lunch market hours.   
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Table 4.3 
Results for the OLS estimates of equation (4.1) and (4.2) and Maximum Likelihood estimates of equations (4.3) – (4.4) and (4.5) – (4.6). The dependant variable is the cumulative return (𝑅𝑡) on the 
EUR/USD from 2300 CET on date 𝑡 − 1 to 2300 CET on the date 𝑡 (first panel), from 0800 CET on date 𝑡 to 2300 CET (second panel) and from 1200 CET on date 𝑡 to 2300 CET on the same date (third 
panel). In order to account for the effect of tightening monetary policy the sample is partitioned into the period from January 01, 2011 through October 20, 2011, so that this sample contains 10 scheduled 
ECB announcements. Coefficient estimates for the mean equation are provided in the top panel and for the variance equation, in the bottom panel. Standard errors are given in brackets. Bootstrapped Bias-
Corrected confidence intervals at 5% level in squared brackets (DiCiccio and Efron (1996)).Q(4) is the Ljung-Box statistic for serial correlation up to lag 4 in residuals. ARCH (4) is the ARCH-LM test for 
heteroscedasticity in residuals up to lag 4. P-values for specification tests are reported in brackets. ***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. 
 EUR/USD 2300-2300 CET (Tightening) EUR/USD 0800-2300 CET (Tightening) EUR/USD 1200-2300 CET (Tightening) 
 Eq. (1) Eq.(3)-(4) Eq. (2) Eq.(5)-(6) Eq. (1) Eq.(3)-(4) Eq. (2) Eq.(5)-(6) Eq. (1) Eq.(3)-(4) Eq. (2) Eq.(5)-(6) 
 OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML 
β1 -0.006 
(0.114) 
 
0.031 
(0.130) 
-0.006 
(0.114) 
[-0.227,0.214] 
0.034 
(0.129) 
0.033 
(0.104) 
0.055 
(0.114) 
0.033 
(0.103) 
[-0.168,0.231] 
0.060 
(0.112) 
0.018 
(0.088) 
0.035 
(0.112) 
0.018 
(0.088) 
[-0.151,0.188] 
0.039 
(0.112) 
β 2 
**0.232 
(0.112) 
 
0.235 
(0.153) 
**0.232 
(0.112) 
[0.015,0.450] 
0.235 
(0.153) 
 
0.191 
(0.102) 
0.155 
(0.174) 
0.191 
(0.102) 
[-0.005,0.390] 
0.159 
(0.173) 
0.154 
(0.087) 
0.123 
(0.108) 
0.154 
(0.087) 
[-0.013,0.322] 
0.125 
(0.108) 
β 3 0.025 
(0.112) 
 
0.010 
(0.094) 
0.025 
(0.112) 
[-0.193,0.242] 
0.010 
(0.094) 
-0.019 
(0.102) 
-0.041 
(0.081) 
-0.019 
(0.102) 
[-0.217,0.178] 
-0.041 
(0.081) 
-0.117 
(0.087) 
-0.126 
(0.083) 
-0.117 
(0.087) 
[-0.284,0.051] 
-0.126 
(0.082) 
β 4 -0.038 
(0.112) 
 
-0.022) 
(0.102) 
-0.038 
(0.112) 
[-0.255,0.180] 
-0.028) 
(0.102) 
-0.085 
(0.102) 
-0.089 
(0.093) 
-0.085 
(0.102) 
[-0.283,0.112] 
-0.093 
(0.092) 
0.009 
(0.087) 
0.005 
(0.070) 
0.009 
(0.087) 
[-0.160,0.176] 
-0.001 
(0.070) 
β 5 -0.021 
(0.112) 
0.021 
(0.098) 
  -0.047 
(0.102) 
-0.018 
(0.093) 
  0.025 
(0.087) 
0.061 
(0.078) 
  
β ECB   -0.283 
(0.230) 
[-0.744,0.177] 
-0.253 
(0.190) 
  -0.364* 
(0.209) 
[-0.776,0.060] 
*-0.341* 
(0.204) 
  -0.230 
(0.177) 
[-0.585,0.124] 
-0.183 
(0.194) 
β NO   0.061 
(0.129) 
[-0.189.0.311] 
0.078 
(0.116) 
  0.052 
(0.117) 
[-0.175,0.280] 
0.055 
(0.107) 
  0.105 
(0.099) 
[-0.088,0.300] 
0.121 
(0.085) 
α0  0.436
*** 
(0.057) 
 0.440*** 
(0.056) 
 0.353*** 
(0.040) 
 0.354*** 
(0.040) 
 0.273*** 
(0.026) 
 0.272*** 
(0.026) 
α1  0.159 
(0.104) 
 0.141 
(0.102) 
 0.173* 
(0.096) 
 0.156* 
(0.092) 
 0.112 
(0.079) 
 0.105 
(0.081) 
αECB    0.453 
(0.679) 
   0.170 
(0.444) 
   0.017 
(0.256) 
R2 0.019 0.017 0.027 0.026 0.021 0.020 0.036 0.035 0.024 0.022 0.037 0.035 
Q(4) 3.084 
(0.544) 
1.612 
(0.807) 
3.606 
(0.462) 
1.815 
(0.770) 
2.480 
(0.648) 
1.473 
(0.831) 
3.186 
(0.527) 
1.572 
(0.814) 
2.789 
(0.594) 
2.214 
(0.697) 
3.831 
(0.429) 
2.875 
(0.579) 
ARCH(4) 5.531 
(0.020) 
0.032 
(0.859) 
5.705 
(0.018) 
0.008 
(0.928) 
9.515 
(0.002) 
0.160 
(0.689) 
9.461 
(0.002) 
0.052 
(0.821) 
3.530 
(0.062) 
0.080 
(0.778) 
2.377 
(0.125) 
0.017 
(0.896) 
Note: The distribution and sample statistics of the bootstrapped betas and respective standard errors are asymptotically coverage to values achieved through OLS estimation. The results of this exercise are presented in appendix C3.   
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This finding suggests that potentially, the policy stance adopted by the ECB does not impact 
the directional return for the ECB Friday effect. The sign of the ECB Friday effect is 
consistently negative and not dependent on the ECB monetary policy stances. However, the 
significance and magnitude are dependent on ECB monetary policy stances.  
Emperical estimation of equations (4.4) and (4.6) show that there are no significant increases 
to volatility for any DoW or ECB conditional Fridays. This result is consistent for the full 
sample, sub-sample periods and all three definitions of the trading day.  
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Table 4.4 
Results for the OLS estimates of equation (4.1) and (4.2) and Maximum Likelihood estimates of equations (4.3) – (4.4) and (4.5) – (4.6). The dependant variable is the cumulative return (𝑅𝑡) on the 
EUR/USD from 2300 CET on date 𝑡 − 1 to 2300 CET on the date 𝑡 (first panel), from 0800 CET on date 𝑡 to 2300 CET (second panel) and from 1200 CET on date 𝑡 to 2300 CET on the same date 
(third panel). In order to account for the effect of ‘easing’ monetary policy the sample is partitioned into the period from October 21, 2011 through November 20, 2015, so that this sample contains 40 
scheduled ECB announcements. Coefficient estimates for the mean equation are provided in the top panel and for the variance equation, in the bottom panel. Standard errors are given in brackets. 
Bootstrapped Bias-Corrected confidence intervals at 5% level in squared brackets (DiCiccio and Efron (1996)).Q(4) is the Ljung-Box statistic for serial correlation up to lag 4 in residuals. ARCH (4) is 
the ARCH-LM test for heteroscedasticity in residuals up to lag 4. P-values for specification tests are reported in brackets. ***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. 
 EUR/USD 2300-2300 CET (Easing) EUR/USD 0800-2300 CET (Easing) EUR/USD 1200-2300 CET(Easing) 
 Eq. (1) Eq.(3)-(4) Eq. (2) Eq.(5)-(6) Eq. (1) Eq.(3)-(4) Eq. (2) Eq.(5)-(6) Eq. (1) Eq.(3)-(4) Eq. (2) Eq.(5)-(6) 
 OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML 
β1 0.021 
(0.039) 
 
0.025 
(0.042) 
0.021 
(0.039) 
[-0.055,0.098] 
0.026 
(0.042) 
-0.001 
(0.036) 
-0.001 
(0.042) 
-0.001 
(0.036) 
[-0.071,0.069] 
0.000 
(0.041) 
0.021 
(0.030) 
0.022 
(0.035) 
0.021 
(0.030) 
[-0.37,0.079] 
0.022 
(0.035) 
β 2 -0.021 
(0.039) 
 
-0.011 
(0.041) 
-0.021 
(0.039) 
[-0.097,0.056] 
-0.011 
(0.041) 
-0.015 
(0.036) 
-0.011 
(0.037) 
-0.015 
(0.036) 
[-0.085,0.054] 
-0.011 
(0.037) 
-0.001 
(0.030) 
0.001 
(0.036) 
-0.001 
(0.030) 
[-0.059,0.057] 
0.000 
(0.036) 
β 3 -0.055 
(0.039) 
 
-0.053 
(0.036) 
-0.055 
(0.039) 
[-0.132,0.021] 
-0.053 
(0.035) 
-0.054 
(0.036) 
-0.048 
(0.033) 
-0.054 
(0.036) 
[-0.124,0.015] 
-0.048 
(0.033) 
-0.025 
(0.030) 
-0.024 
(0.027) 
-0.025 
(0.030) 
[-0.083,0.033] 
-0.024 
(0.027) 
β 4 0.021 
(0.039) 
 
0.023 
(0.033) 
0.021 
(0.039) 
[-0.055,0.098] 
-0.023 
(0.033) 
-0.010 
(0.036) 
-0.014 
(0.030) 
-0.010 
(0.036) 
[-0.079,0.060] 
-0.013 
(0.030) 
-0.004 
(0.030) 
-0.004 
(0.026) 
-0.004 
(0.030) 
[-0.062,0.054] 
-0.004 
(0.026) 
β 5 -0.024 
(0.039) 
-0.022 
(0.039) 
  -0.026 
(0.036) 
-0.029 
(0.035) 
  -0.020 
(0.030) 
-0.022 
(0.028) 
  
β ECB   -0.166
* 
(0.089) 
[-0.340,0.011] 
-0.170** 
(0.079) 
  -0.156* 
(0.081) 
[-0.315,0.004] 
-0.158** 
(0.069) 
  -0.143** 
(0.067) 
[-0.276,-0.010] 
-0.143** 
(0.060) 
β NO   0.011 
(0.043) 
[-0.074,0.096] 
0.010 
(0.044) 
  0.005 
(0.040) 
[-0.073,0.082] 
0.001 
(0.041) 
  0.009 
(0.033) 
[-0.055,0.074] 
0.006 
(0.032) 
α0  0.264
*** 
(0.010) 
 
0.260*** 
(0.010) 
 0.220*** 
(0.009) 
 0.220*** 
(0.009) 
 0.167*** 
(0.006) 
 0.168*** 
(0.006) 
α1  0.119
*** 
(0.038) 
 
0.118*** 
(0.037) 
 0.115*** 
(0.035) 
 0.112*** 
(0.035) 
 0.029 
(0.031) 
 0.025 
(0.030) 
αECB    0.102 
(0.078) 
   0.117 
(0.072) 
   0.060 
(0.069) 
R2 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.006 
Q(4) 5.230 
(0.265) 
4.265 
(0.371) 
5.238 
(0.264) 
4.329 
(0.363) 
4.822 
(0.306) 
4.492 
(0.343) 
4.798 
(0.309) 
4.498 
(0.343) 
5.225 
(0.265) 
5.218 
(0.266) 
5.067 
(0.280) 
5.051 
(0.282) 
ARCH(4) 13.916 
(0.000) 
0.143 
(0.705) 
13.679 
(0.000) 
0.170 
(0.681) 
8.967 
(0.003) 
0.158 
(0.692) 
8.640 
(0.003) 
0.172 
(0.679) 
0.267 
(0.605) 
0.032 
(0.859) 
0.160 
(0.690) 
0.031 
(0.860) 
Note: The distribution and sample statistics of the bootstrapped betas and respective standard errors are asymptotically coverage to values achieved through OLS estimation. The results of this exercise are presented in appendix C3.   
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Empirical findings in this section demonstrate the existence of a highly significant and negative 
return effect on Friday trading days conditional on a prevailing Thursday scheduled ECB policy 
decision announcement. This conditional Friday effect is orders of magnitude more negative 
than any average return observed on all other unconditional days-of-the-week under scrutiny. 
This conditional day-of-the-week effect is consistent for multiple definitions of the trading day, 
including full 24-hour trading days, European and US combined opening hours and European 
afternoons. Further, there is no evidence of any unconditional day-of-the-week effect for 
EUR/USD currency market.   
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4.5.3 Trading the Conditional Friday Effect 
The empirical findings presented in the previous section show that the Euro consistently 
depreciates against the U.S Dollar on Fridays following the ECB’s regular monetary policy 
announcement. Such negative returns are observable and thus have been apparent to 
traders/investors for, at least the duration of the sample under scrutiny.  
Thus, it could be possible in principle to reap significant profits with a simple trading strategy 
of selling the Euro against the U.S Dollar on the Friday following the ECB’s policy 
announcement and closing out the position prior market close. This section evaluates such a 
trading strategy and compares it with equivalent short positions taken on all non-ECB Fridays 
and all other days.  
Table 4.5 presents evaluation of the profits earned (in percentage points) from this simple 
trading rule. The trading day examined is define as a full 24 hour period between 2300 CET on 
date t-1 to 2300 CET on date t, a 15-hour trading window from 0800 CET to 2300 CET on date 
t and a 11-hour trading window from 1200 CET to 2300 CET on date t.  
The figures reported are the annualised percentage profit and relative Sharpe ratio. Average 
annualised profits (Annual P) are computed by summing the daily profits for the specified days 
and dividing by the total number of years. The annualised Sharpe ratio (𝑆𝑅𝑇𝑆) is calculated as 
𝑆𝑅𝑇𝑆 =  (𝑅𝑇𝑆−𝑟𝑓/𝜎𝑇𝑆) × √𝐾, where 𝑅𝑇𝑆 is the average 24, 15, or 11-hour return on the trading 
strategy, 𝑟𝑓 is the appropriate risk-free rate for the same period and 𝜎𝑇𝑆 is the respective standard 
deviation. The Sharpe ratio is multiplied by √𝐾 to annualise the result, where K is the number 
of times that particular trading strategy would be executed per year.  
I first focus on the profitability of the trading rule for a 24-hour holding period, the results for 
which are presented in the first panel of the table. Consistent with parametric results the mean 
percentage profit on taking short position in the EUR/USD on ECB Fridays is positive and 
relatively large. Conversely, the mean percentage profits for the same trading rule is negative 
and relatively small for all other  days and non-ECB Fridays.   
The average annual profit and Sharpe ratio are highlighted in bold and show that trading on this 
basic rule for 10 days per year would generate average annualised returns of approximately 185 
basis points for the entire sample duration. Conversely shorting the EUR on all other Fridays 
would generate an average annualised loss. 
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Table 4.5 
This table provides statistical assessment of the profitability (in percentage points) of a trading rule defined as 
selling the EUR/USD and reversing the trade at the end of the defined trading day. Trading days are specified as 
from 2300 CET on date 𝑡 − 1 to 2300 CET on date 𝑡, (first panel), from 0800 CET on date 𝑡 to 2300 CET on the 
same date (second panel) and from 1200 CET on date 𝑡 to 2300 CET on the same date (third panel). The sample 
period is from January 01, 2011 to November 20, 2015. In order to account for the effect of tight and loose 
monetary policies the sample is partitioned into the periods from January 01, 2011 through October 20, 2011 and 
from October 21, 2011 through November 20, 2015 respectively, so that each partition contains 10 and 40 ECB 
announcements respectively. Average annualised profits (Annual P) are computed by summing the daily profits 
for the specified days and dividing by the total number of years. SRTS is the annualised Sharpe ratio of the trading 
strategy. The profit period for which the summary statistics are calculated are defined in the headings of the upper, 
mid and bottom panels.  
 EUR/USD 2300-2300 CET EUR/USD 0800-2300 CET EUR/USD 1200-2300 CET 
 ECB 
Fridays 
Other 
Fridays 
All 
other 
Days 
ECB 
Fridays 
Other 
Fridays 
All 
other 
Days 
ECB 
Fridays 
Other 
Fridays 
All 
other 
Days 
Mean 0.190 -0.019 -0.003 0.199 -0.013 0.011 0.161 -0.025 -0.001 
St. 
Dev. 
0.746 0.561 0.578 0.701 0.502 0.526 0.534 0.456 0.436 
Annual 
P  
1.857 -0.737 -0.477 1.944 -0.500 2.203 1.573 -0.974 -0.201 
SRTS 1.769 -0.468 -0.132 1.970 -0.355 0.667 2.091 -0.760 -0.073 
Obs. 50 191 955 50 191 955 50 191 955 
 
EUR/USD 2300-2300 CET 
(Tightening) 
EUR/USD 0800-2300 CET 
(Tightening) 
EUR/USD 1200-2300 CET 
(Tightening) 
Mean 0.283 -0.037 -0.054 0.364 -0.022 -0.030 0.230 -0.078 -0.016 
St. 
Dev. 
1.107 0.740 0.700 0.984 0.639 0.641 0.705 0.594 0.544 
Annual 
P  
3.141 -1.278 -9.973 4.045 -0.745 -5.604 2.557 -2.694 -2.948 
SRTS 0.808 -0.279 -0.992 1.170 -0.189 -0.609 1.032 -0.733 -0.377 
Obs. 10 31 167 10 31 167 10 31 167 
 
EUR/USD 2300-2300 CET 
(Easing) 
EUR/USD 0800-2300 CET 
(Easing) 
EUR/USD 1200-2300 CET 
(Easing) 
Mean 0.166 -0.016 0.008 0.156 -0.011 0.020 0.143 -0.015 0.002 
St. 
Dev. 
0.637 0.522 0.549 0.616 0.473 0.498 0.490 0.426 0.410 
Annual 
P 
1.570 -0.616 1.648 1.474 -0.444 3.951 1.352 -0.588 0.415 
SRTS 1.608 -0.375 0.430 1.560 -0.299 1.136 1.801 -0.439 0.145 
Obs. 40 160 788 40 160 788 40 160 788 
Note: The annualised Sharpe ratio (𝑆𝑅𝑇𝑆) is calculated as 𝑆𝑅𝑇𝑆 =  (𝑅𝑇𝑆−𝑟𝑓/𝜎𝑇𝑆) × √𝐾, where 𝑅𝑇𝑆 is the average 24, 15, or 
11-hour return on the trading strategy, 𝑟𝑓 is the appropriate risk-free rate for the same period and 𝜎𝑇𝑆 is the respective standard 
deviation. I multiply the Sharpe ratio by √𝐾 to annualise the result, where K is the number of times that particular trading 
strategy would be executed per year.  
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This is also true for shorting the currency on all other days throughout the sample. Further, the 
annualised Sharpe ratio of the trading rule is over 1.76, which shows that on a risk adjusted 
basis, the trading rule far outperforms shorting the EUR or holding the USD on all other days/all 
other Fridays. In fact, the risk-adjusted performance of this trading rule is far greater than 
holding the DAX index over the same period (Annualised Sharpe ratio of 0.152). 
When the sample is split to account for the ECB’s policy stance the profitability of the trading 
rule increases on an annualised basis for the tightening cycle, at over 314 basis points, but is 
slightly lower at over 157 basis points during the easing period.  This shows that the results are 
somehow independent from the monetary regimes, since standard economic theory would 
suggest instead that annual profits should be smaller under tightening regimes.  
The risk-adjusted performance of the trading rule is lower during the tightening cycle due to 
higher levels of volatility, with a Sharpe ratio of over 0.8. During the easing cycle, the Sharpe 
ratio is similar to that calculated for the full sample. The strategy outperforms shorting the EUR 
on all other days during the easing cycle on a risk adjusted basis and produces similar annualised 
profits, but with only 40 trades versus 788. During the tightening cycle the trading rule is only 
marginally outperformed on a risk adjusted basis by holding the USD on all other days (Sharpe 
ration of 0.99), however this would involve trading for 167 days versus only 10 days shorting 
the EUR. 
The second and third panel set out the same statistics for two alternative trading windows. Panel 
2, is the  ‘European Trading day which is calculated from 0800 CET – 2300 CET. The latter 
panel refers  to the trading day 1200 CET – 2300 CET and therefore to the profitability of the 
trading strategy tailored around  afternoon only (U.S market hours) trading hours. It is worth 
noting that transaction costs are ignored in the above calculations due to the possible inaccuracy 
of pinpointing an acceptable rate. However, given the relatively small number of trades required 
per year to profit from this trade it is fair to state that the impact of transaction cost would pale 
in comparison to the large profit potential.     
Results show that the trading rule would be most successful when implemented from the 
European open (0800 CET) to market close on ECB Fridays. The annualised average 
percentage profit would be in excess of 194 basis points. This is higher than the profit, which 
could be achieved for a full 24-hour window and for those found by implementing the strategy 
on afternoons only. The risk-adjusted performance of the strategy is also higher when 
implemented for a European trading day on ECB Fridays versus a 24-hour window due to lower 
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levels of volatility. However, the risk-adjusted performance of the trading rule is greater still 
when implemented during afternoon trading windows due to even lower levels of volatility. 
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4.6 Explanations for the ECB conditional Friday Effect 
The ECB conditional Friday effect appears to be an asset-pricing anomaly when standard 
financial economic theory is applied. In this section, a number of possible explanations are 
explored to find a conceivable economic reason behind this conditional return effect. The final 
discussion (3.3) outlines the one favoured by the authors as the most intuitive.  
4.6.1 Public Information Announcements  
The initial intuition is that such a uniform post-ECB negative drift must be a result of similarly 
relevant and new, public information arrival. However, scheduled public information events 
observed on days following scheduled ECB announcements are heterogeneous in terms of 
macroeconomic data type and report both Euro negative and positive information. This 
heterogeneity in public information type and outcome, along with the absence of large outliers 
in the data, initially indicates that the post-ECB drift cannot be explained with new scheduled 
public information flows. Further, it is noteworthy that the post-ECB Friday selloff in the 
EUR/USD appears to take place after, but not dependant on the announcement of major U.S 
macroeconomic data (see Figure 4.3). This may suggest that the drift is not due to the 
information content delivered by the schedule macro news, but rather by the lack of market 
direction altering data. Overall, the anomalous price formation process found, appears to be 
conditional on the prevailing ECB announcement and specific to Friday afternoons. It is not, 
however, a direct result of new scheduled public information arrival.  
 4.6.2 Friday Afternoon Order Flows 
A second possible explanation for the ECB conditional Friday effect is provided by the market 
microstructure literature. Market volume and order flows are found to be many times higher for 
numerous asset classes across multiple international markets during Friday afternoon/evening 
trading hours (see, among others, Breedon and Ralando (2013)). The practical explanation for 
this observation is the liquidation of short-term positions executed by day traders as well as the 
closing of order books for market makers. It would be reasonable to argue that such liquidations 
and closing of positions is more uniform following a large-scale market information event such 
as the prevailing ECB announcement. However, the positions held following largely dovish 
ECB announcement event are likely to be short positions, the profit taking from which is likely 
to cause a short covering spike in the EUR/USD exchange rate rather than the large negative 
drift observed in the data under scrutiny. Nonetheless, the structural requirements of large 
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brokerage houses and their resultant order flows following a large scale market event may be 
an influential factor in the post-ECB Friday price formation process.   
4.6.3 Risk Weighted Weekend Liquidation     
The most intuitively persuasive reason for the ECB conditional Friday effect is simply a risk-
weighted liquidation of long positions in the Euro prior to Friday market close. The intuition 
being that traders, cautious of weekend news relating to an already dovish ECB during a 
predominantly loose monetary policy cycle, would not be willing to stay long the currency over 
the weekend following ECB announcements. This argument appears to be the most robust given 
that ECB conditional Friday negative drift is not observed when the ECB announcement falls 
on a Wednesday. This is compounded by the fact that GC members, in contrast to the pre-
announcement silence, often give interviews and comments to market agents and the world 
press following ECB announcements (Faturn and Hutchinson (2002)). Such interviews are 
rarely in decent of the ECB’s policy stance. Should the prior updating process on aggregate, 
result in a significant enough change to the weighted average valuation that market agents place 
on the EUR/USD, then a price formation process should be observable. It would be fair to 
suggest that in a predominantly dovish policy period the overall weighted average valuation of 
the market should be negatively skewed. Therefore, a lack of market altering information 
content during the scheduled U.S data points may form part of the updating process of traders’ 
prior expectation.  
Further, the market structural influences on Fridays differ from other days of the week in the 
currency market. New information emerging from GC members during weekend press 
interactions are likely to weigh on the average valuation of the market based on the arguments 
made above, however only incorporate into price at market open Sunday evening. The result 
being a ‘gap lower’ in the market, potentially circumventing stops place by those holding long 
positions. The potential loss from such a structural event could be large for market agents; as a 
result the structural risk should be priced. 
A further institutional factor may be compounding the risk weighted post-ECB Friday 
liquidation. Large institutions such as pension funds react slower to large scale/scope public 
information events. Decisions such as currency hedging and reallocation face pre-mandated 
scrutiny, which can be a relatively slow process. These institutions may be expected to execute 
such decisions days following the ECB’s dovish policy and forward guidance announcements. 
The anticipation of large EUR negative order flows potentially leading the market, at Monday 
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open could form part of the expectation updating process for Friday afternoon traders. Thus, 
plausibly forming part of the risk adjusted liquidation.  
However, the strength of this argument is very much linked to the intuition underpinning 
rational risk-adjusted investor/trader behaviour. Thus, the ECB conditional Friday effect is in 
part a pricing puzzle worthy of further investigation.   
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4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter identifies a day-of-the-week effect conditional on a prevailing European Central 
bank policy announcement. There is a large, significant and persistently observable negative 
drift in the EUR/USD exchange rate on Fridays, which follow scheduled policy meetings, from 
January 01, 2011 through November 20, 2015. This conditional DoW effect has not been 
identified by previous studies in the literature.  
Empirical results show that following scheduled ECB policy announcements, specifically 24-
hours following the announcement the EUR/USD exchange rate drifts lower. This drift is 
statistically significant, but only on Fridays following scheduled ECB policy announcements, 
whereas the same drift becomes not statistically significant when the day following the ECB 
announcement is a Thursday. The negative Friday afternoon drift is not observable for all other 
Fridays or any other day. This price formation process is therefore named the ‘ECB conditional 
Friday effect’.  
DoW average returns on the EUR/USD during Friday trading hours following ECB 
announcements are over 17 basis points lower than all other days for a 5-year sample period. 
Moreover, when compared to all other Fridays in sample, average  returns are over 19 basis 
points lower. When the 5-year sample is split to account for the ECB’s policy stance, findings 
show that the ECB conditional Friday effect is significant only during policy easing periods. It 
is worthy of note however, that during tightening periods a negative drift is observable but not 
statistically significant.   
The economic significance of these results is apparent when the profit potential of trading rules 
tailored around the “ECB Fridays effect”. A simple trading strategy of selling the EUR/USD 
on 10 Fridays per year and buying back at market close, following ECB announcements, during 
policy easing periods, is calculated to yield annualised returns of over 135 basis points. The 
annualised Sharpe ratio, a measure of the risk-weighted profitability on such a trading strategy, 
is 1.8. This is notably greater than the 0.14 annualised Sharpe ratio for remaining short the 
currency during all other days of the easing period.  
I explore a number of explanations based on economic theory for this novel price formation 
process. The most plausible economic argument for such price formation mechanism draws on 
the idea of Bayesian prior expectation updating. Market agents, aware of the ECB’s 
accommodative policy stance, update their expectations of potential weekend information flows 
from GC members. The price formation process resulting from the prior updating process 
appears to be independent of any macroeconomic information arrival. This updating process 
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can be defined as the ‘pricing in’ of weekend information risk, taking place only on Fridays due 
the structural properties of the market. 
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Appendix C 
Appendix C1 
Dates and outcomes of the ECB’s scheduled GC meetings for the period January 13, 2011 - November 20, 
2015. The second column indicates on which day of the week the scheduled announcement took place. The 
third column shows the key interest rate set by the GC. The tightening cycle is defined as that up to October 
20, 2011 and the easing sample from October 21, 2011 through November 20, 2015.  
Scheduled Date Day of the Week Benchmark Interest Rate Monetary Policy Decision 
January 13, 2011 Thursday 1.00 No Change 
February 3, 2011 Thursday 1.00 No Change 
March 3, 2011 Thursday 1.00 No Change 
April 7, 2011 Thursday 1.25 Increased 25 basis points  
May 5, 2011 Thursday 1.25 No Change 
June 9, 2011 Thursday 1.25 No Change 
July 7, 2011 Thursday 1.50 Increased 25 basis points 
August 4, 2011 Thursday 1.50 No Change 
September 8, 2011 Thursday 1.50 No Change 
October 6, 2011 Thursday 1.50 No Change 
November 3, 2011 Thursday 1.25 Decreased 25 basis points 
December 8, 2011 Thursday 1.00 Decreased 25 basis points 
January 12, 2012 Thursday 1.00 No Change 
February 9, 2012 Thursday 1.00 No Change 
March 8, 2012 Thursday 1.00 No Change 
April 4, 2012 Wednesday 1.00 No Change 
May 3, 2012 Thursday 1.00 No Change 
June 6, 2012 Wednesday 1.00 No Change 
July 5, 2012 Thursday 0.75 Decreased 25 basis points 
August 2, 2012 Thursday 0.75 No Change 
September 6, 2012 Thursday 0.75 No Change 
October 4, 2012 Thursday 0.75 No Change 
November 8, 2012 Thursday 0.75 No Change 
December 6, 2012 Thursday 0.75 No Change 
January 10, 2013 Thursday 0.75 No Change 
February 7, 2013 Thursday 0.75 No Change 
March 7, 2013 Thursday 0.75 No Change 
April 4, 2013 Thursday 0.75 No Change 
May 2, 2013 Thursday 0.50 Decreased 25 basis points 
June 6, 2013 Thursday 0.50 No Change 
July 4, 2013 Thursday 0.50 No Change 
August 1, 2013 Thursday 0.50 No Change 
September 5, 2013 Thursday 0.50 No Change 
October 2, 2013 Wednesday 0.50 No Change 
November 7, 2013 Thursday 0.25 Decreased 25 basis points 
December 5, 2013 Thursday 0.25 No Change 
January 9, 2014 Thursday 0.25 No Change 
February 6, 2014 Thursday 0.25 No Change 
March 6, 2014 Thursday 0.25 No Change 
April 3, 2014 Thursday 0.25 No Change 
May 8, 2014 Thursday 0.25 No Change 
June 5, 2014 Thursday 0.15 Decreased 10 basis points 
July 3, 2014 Thursday 0.15 No Change 
August 7, 2014 Thursday 0.15 No Change 
September 4, 2014 Thursday 0.05 Decreased 10 basis points 
October 2, 2014 Thursday 0.05 No Change 
November 6, 2014 Thursday 0.05 No Change 
December 4, 2014 Thursday 0.05 No Change 
January 22, 2015 Thursday 0.05 No Change 
March 5, 2015 Thursday 0.05 No Change 
April 15, 2015 Wednesday 0.05 No Change 
June 3, 2015 Wednesday 0.05 No Change 
July 16, 2015 Thursday 0.05 No Change 
September 3, 2015 Thursday 0.05 No Change 
October 22, 2015 Thursday 0.05 No Change 
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Appendix C2 
The table below reports details of scheduled major macroeconomic data announcements, which occur during 
relevant post-ECB trading windows. Reported outcome and details of analyst forecasts are obtained from 
Bloomberg. 
Date  Outcome  Median 
Forecast 
Maximum  
Forecast 
Minimum  
Forecast 
Above/Below 
ECB Friday with U.S Employment Report 
03/12/2010 103 150 240 98 -47 
04/02/2011 192 196 297 100 -4 
04/03/2011 216 190 295 150 26 
06/05/2011 54 165 250 65 -111 
08/07/2011 117 85 150 0 32 
05/08/2011 0 68 160 -20 -68 
07/10/2011 80 95 150 50 -15 
04/11/2011 120 125 175 75 -5 
09/03/2012 120 205 250 175 -85 
04/05/2012 69 150 195 75 -81 
06/07/2012 163 100 165 50 63 
03/08/2012 96 130 185 70 -34 
07/09/2012 114 115 165 60 -1 
05/10/2012 171 125 154 30 46 
07/12/2012 155 152 305 80 3 
08/03/2013 88 190 366 100 -102 
05/04/2013 165 140 238 100 25 
03/05/2013 175 163 290 80 12 
07/06/2013 195 166 220 77 29 
05/07/2013 162 185 225 23 -23 
02/08/2013 169 180 220 79 -11 
06/09/2013 148 180 256 100 -32 
08/11/2013 203 185 230 115 18 
06/12/2013 74 197 250 100 -123 
10/01/2014 113 180 270 105 -67 
07/02/2014 175 149 220 100 26 
07/03/2014 192 200 275 150 -8 
04/04/2014 288 218 292 155 70 
06/06/2014 288 215 290 145 73 
05/09/2014 248 215 265 155 33 
03/10/2014 214 235 314 140 -21 
07/11/2014 321 230 306 140 91 
05/12/2014 252 240 305 160 12 
06/03/2015 126 245 300 179 -119 
04/09/2015 142 200 256 75 -58 
ECB Friday U.S Inflation Report 
14/01/2011 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.1 
17/07/2015 0.1 0.2 0.3 -0.1 -0.1 
ECB Friday U.S Retail Sales 
14/01/2011 0.3 0.5 1.1 -0.5 -0.2 
ECB Fridays Euro-Zone Inflation Report  
14/01/2011 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.2 0.1 
ECB Friday Euro-Zone GDP 
10/01/2014 0.9 0.9 1 0.8 0 
05/09/2014 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0 
05/12/2014 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0 
06/03/2015 1 1 1.4 1 0 
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Appendix C3 
Appendix C3 
The figure below reports bootstrapped regression coefficients and standard errors for the OLS estimation of equation (4.2). The dependant variable from which the initial model is estimated is 
the return (𝑅𝑡) on the EUR/USD from 2300 CET on date 𝑡 − 1 to 2300 CET on the date 𝑡. The sample period is from January 01, 2011 to November 20, 2015. For subsample results, please 
contact the authors. 
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Appendix C3 
The figure below reports bootstrapped regression coefficients and standard errors for the OLS estimation of equation (4.2). The dependant variable from which the initial model is estimated is 
the return (𝑅𝑡) on the EUR/USD from 0800 CET on date 𝑡 to 2300 CET on the same date. The sample period is from January 01, 2011 to November 20, 2015. For subsample results, please 
contact the authors. 
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Appendix C3 
The figure below reports bootstrapped regression coefficients and standard errors for the OLS estimation of equation (4.2). The dependant variable from which the initial model is estimated is 
the return (𝑅𝑡) on the EUR/USD from 1200 CET on date 𝑡 to 2300 CET on the same date. The sample period is from January 01, 2011 to November 20, 2015. For subsample results, please 
contact the authors. 
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Chapter 5. Conclusion 
The central aim of this thesis is to improve the understanding within the financial economics 
literature of some of the most puzzling financial market price formation processes. The thesis 
does this by identifying a specific information set relevant to a complete price discovery 
process discerned by market agents but previously unaccounted for by researchers. Empirical 
results provide quite clear cut evidence that this information set can explain a sizeable share of 
absolute volatility for high frequency 1-minute financial series and daily excess stock market 
returns. The implication of the findings presented in this thesis is that price formation 
processes, previously identified as puzzles, are more likely price discovery processes for which 
information flows have not previously been observable to academics due to a lack of archived 
unregulated public market relevant information.      
The thesis addresses the EMH in its strongest form as an economic principle. The EMH 
contends that for markets to be deemed efficient all new market relevant information private 
and public about the past, present or future must be priced. Crucially, this assertion indicates 
that information about the future information events must be priced. This includes best 
estimates of scheduled public information events. The thesis posits that if information exists 
which sufficiently changes these best estimates, then a price discovery process previously 
undetected by the literature occurs.  
The central hypothesis of this thesis addresses the price formation process which takes place 
due to the arrival of unconventional (at least at the time of writing) information usable by 
market participants, yet not fully considered by financial economists. Such information, by 
nature is not strictly identifiable as regulates public information, but has the ability to change 
the ‘priors’ held by market participants. This information can change the weighted average 
expectations market agents hold about the scale, timing and probability of future scheduled 
public information outcomes. Given that aggregate expectations of a future scheduled public 
information event, large enough in scope, change, then the fundamental valuation of a market 
traded asset must also change. And, a price formation process will be observed.  
The thesis identifies market relevant information; not private but also not public in the 
regulatory sense. That is, it is not published and/or archived by mandated outlets such as 
Bloomberg or Reuters. This information consists of market rumour. The rumours considered 
in this thesis are relevant to upcoming large scope macroeconomic information events. Such 
macroeconomic information flows have not in the past been considered in literature as elements 
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of an intact price discovery process. These rumours are essentially chatter, broadcast by market 
agents and commentators on the microblogging website Twitter.com. The information is 
therefore public and archived, timestamped and fully observable to both academics and market 
agents. It is worth noting that market rumours are not necessarily fundamental to the valuation 
process, however, if market participants believe that rumours can change market consensus, 
therefore price, then it is rational for the profit motive to exploit this.   
In chapter 2 a database of rumours pertaining to forthcoming scheduled ECB policy 
announcements is formed. For a 420-day trading period in the EUR/USD, 63 rumours are 
observed which gain significant traction and are widely broadcast on Twitter. The rumours are 
timestamped to within 1-minute accuracy of first broadcast. To test the price effect of these 
rumours, 1-minute intraday observations EUR/USD exchange rate are utilised. Accounting for 
intraday periodicity with a Flexible Fourier form regression and the arrival of other scheduled 
(regulated) public information flows, findings show that 25 of 63 rumour events result in a 
significant instantaneous jump in volatility. This rumour driven volatility is persistent for a 
further 60 minutes. The arrival of a rumour is found to increase excess volatility by up to 211%. 
Further, the resultant volatility persistence of the rumour event increases hourly volatility by 
as much as 2614%. While the FFF regression suffers from some potential weaknesses, the 
extensive use of the model in the intraday price discovery literature and Monte Carlo robustness 
exercise carried out in this thesis show that it is fit for purpose. 
This chapter in effect confirms the central hypothesis of this thesis; that market relevant 
information, in the form of market rumour, exists and is discerned by market agents. That such 
information relating to a future large scope macroeconomic information event can alter the 
aggregate expectation of the scale, timing and probability of its outcome. And, that this change 
in the aggregate expectation results in a price formation process. The fundamental economics 
underpinning this price formation process are based on entrenched theories of market 
informational efficiency and investor rational expectations hypothesis. The rumour conditional 
price formation process can therefore be deemed an intact price discovery process, necessary 
for a functional financial market. 
Chapter 2 sets out to identify ‘prior’ altering information flows which may have previously 
gone undetected and test whether such information flows result in a price formation process. 
Empirical results show that large scale currency market volatility occurs at the time of rumours 
broadcast and persists for some time, thereby confirming the central hypothesis of the chapter.    
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Chapter 3 investigates the central hypothesis of this thesis by focussing on a well-documented 
price formation puzzle. The pre-announcement window of scheduled central bank policy 
releases have been observed in literature to contain significant increases in price activity in the 
absence of new information. Such a price formation puzzle has been shown to contribute 
significantly to the overall level of excess returns in stock markets by Lucca and Moench 
(2015), thus posing a significant question over the informational efficiency of the relevant stock 
market.  
The chapter asserted that a Bayesian updating process of traders’ prior expectations is taking 
place in the pre-announcement window prior to large scope macroeconomic news events. Such 
updating is posited to be as a result of new information, perhaps public, which has been detected 
by market agents but not by academics. Should the content of such information change the 
weighted average expectation of market agents, about the scale, probability or timing about the 
forthcoming large scope central bank announcement, then pre-announcement price formation 
process should be observable.  
Empirical findings in this chapter show that a pre-ECB announcement price formation process 
exists. Average excess returns earned on the DAX are in excess of 49 basis points for 50, 24-
hour pre-announcements windows tested. However, when the 50 pre-announcement windows 
are categorise to account for observations of rumours, no price formation process is observable 
in the absence of rumours. Average excess returns earned during 24-hour pre-ECB windows 
where rumours are observed (30) are 80 basis points higher than all other days and statistically 
significant. Whereas, average excess returns for pre-ECB windows absent of rumours, are 
statistically insignificant. To quantify the economic significance of the rumour driven pre-ECB 
price discovery process; the excess returns on the DAX in the 24-hour pre-ECB window are 
tantamount to almost 60% of the annualised total excess returns on the DAX for the full sample 
period. The annualised Sharpe ratio of trading the ECB rumour and selling prior the 
announcement is 2.04. This is compared to 1.47 for simply buying the 24-hour pre-
announcement period and 0.15 for holding the DAX for all other days of the year. 
Solving such a large and puzzling price formation process using the central hypothesis of this 
thesis demonstrate its power as a theory of economics. Further price discovery processes such 
as the one identified in chapter 3, previously mischaracterised as price formation puzzles 
undoubtedly exist. Significantly, the application of the hypothesis developed in this thesis and 
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the rumour data source identified here, could solve a large number of financial economic 
puzzles.  
Chapter 4 shows that such unresolved price formation processes exist with the discovery of a 
conditional day-of-the-week effect previously not documented in the literature.   
Empirical results presented in this chapter show that 24 hours following scheduled ECB policy 
announcements the EUR/USD exchange rate drifts lower. This drift is statistically significant, 
but only on Fridays following scheduled ECB policy announcements. The post-ECB negative 
drift is not statistically significant when the day following the ECB announcement is a 
Thursday. The negative Friday afternoon drift is not observable for all other Fridays or any 
other day. This price formation process is therefore named the ‘ECB conditional Friday effect’.  
A simple day-of-the-week effect model, standard in the literature, is used to test the existence 
of the ECB conditional Friday effect. Findings show that average excess returns on the 
EUR/USD during Friday trading hours following ECB announcements are over 17 basis points 
lower than all other days for a 5 year sample period. When the 5 year sample is split to account 
for the ECB’s policy stance, findings show that the ECB conditional Friday effect is significant 
only during policy easing periods. It is worthy of note however, that during tightening periods 
a negative drift is observable but not statistically significant.   
A simple trading strategy of selling the EUR/USD on 10 Fridays per year and buying back at 
market close, following ECB announcements, during policy easing periods, is calculated to 
generate annualised returns of over 135 basis points. The annualised Sharpe ratio, a measure 
of the risk weighted profitability on such a trading strategy, is 1.8. This is notably greater than 
the 0.14 annualised Sharpe ratio for remaining short the currency during all other days of the 
easing period.  
The most plausible economic argument for this price formation process is determined to be one 
involving the Bayesian prior expectation updating information process defined in chapter 2 
and observed in chapter 3. Market agents, aware of the ECB’s accommodative policy stance 
update their expectations of potential weekend information flows from Governing Council 
members. The price formation resulting from this updating process appears to be taking place 
significantly after U.S macroeconomic data is accounted for. This updating process is simply 
defined as the pricing of weekend information risk, taking place only on Fridays due market 
structural properties of weekend trading.  
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The thesis sets out to investigate the price discovery process associated with information flows 
that can change market participant’s prior expectations of future market events. The wider 
question posed by this thesis is if such information flows have been identified by market agents 
but not by academics, thereby resulting in observations of unexplained price formation puzzles. 
The thesis identifies a dataset of such information flows and shows empirically that an 
associated price formation process can be observed. As a result, price formation puzzles can, 
at least in part, be solved with the central assertion of this thesis. Although, as shown in chapter 
4, further puzzles exist and further information flows are yet to be identified.  
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